Independent office of evaluation

IFAD

Investing in rural people

Building partnerships for enhanced development effectiveness – a review of country-level experiences and results

EVALUATION SYNTHESIS

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Building partnerships for enhanced development effectiveness – a review of country-level experiences and results

Evaluation synthesis

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Front cover: Free trade cocoa collecting station in Monte Bello, 25 km from the capital, Sao Tome. Cocoa beans are weighted and stored before being sent to the United Kingdom for processing into cocoa drinks.

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Foreword

The Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD (IOE) has prepared an evaluation synthesis report on the experiences and results from IFAD’s country-level partnerships. It reviews IOE evaluations since 2006, and also draws on lessons from other international financial institutions. The report is expected to contribute to the review of IFAD’s Partnership Strategy in 2018.

The focus of the synthesis is on country-level experiences and results, because this is where partnerships matter most and where they are expected to produce concrete rural poverty reduction results. The report finds that despite their importance, country-level partnerships are not explicitly addressed in IFAD's current Partnership Strategy. Global and regional partnerships have received a lot of attention at corporate level, but as highlighted by this synthesis, most of these initiatives were insufficiently linked to country programmes and have produced limited results, for example in terms of scaling up innovations.

The synthesis found that many country programmes saw a proliferation of partnerships as a result of increased country presence; however, there is limited clarity and focus on results from these partnerships. For example, cofinancing partnerships with international organizations have created important synergies and complementarities, but there is scope for IFAD to mobilize more domestic cofinancing in middle-income countries. Domestic cofinancing is essential not only for leveraging resources, but also for supporting country ownership, sustainability and scaling up. On the other hand, IFAD’s emphasis on partnerships with civil society, farmers’ organizations and indigenous groups has led to some good results with regard to knowledge sharing, learning and influencing at policy level.

The report concludes that IFAD does not have the instruments to engage with a wider range of partners for development results and that the existing instruments are often narrowly applied. Grants for instance, are frequently limited to use for knowledge and learning; but they can also support longer-term partnerships for scaling up or policy influence. Only now, for example, has IFAD adopted the SME Investment Finance Fund as an instrument to support partnerships with the private sector.

A revised corporate partnership strategy is recommended, along with a streamlined application of partnership instruments and modalities, and enhanced corporate accountability for partnership results.

I hope that this report's findings, lessons and recommendations will be used to inform the preparation of a revised partnership strategy and the implementation of partnership commitments under IFAD11 to leverage the impact of IFAD-supported interventions at the country level.

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IOE also thanks IFAD Management and staff from several departments and divisions, in particular the Partnership and Resource Mobilization Office, who provided insights on partnerships during the focus group discussions and commented on the draft report.

Contents

Annexes

Abbreviations and acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AfDB	African Development Bank
APR	Asia and the Pacific Division (IFAD)
CBO	community based organization
CLE	corporate-level evaluation
COSOP	country strategic opportunities programme
CPM	country programme manager
CSO	civil society organization
CSPE	country strategy and programme evaluation
ESA	East and Southern Africa Division (IFAD)
ESR	evaluation synthesis report
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FO	farmers' organization
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GRIPS	Grants and Investment Project System
ICARDA	International Center for Agriculture Research in the Dry Areas
ICO	IFAD country office
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group of World Bank
IFI	international financial institution
IOE	Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD
K&L	knowledge and learning
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean Division (IFAD)
LIC	low-income country
MDB	multilateral development bank
MFS	most fragile situations
MIC	middle-income country
NEN	Near East, North Africa and Europe Division (IFAD)
NGO	non-government organization
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFID	OPEC Fund for International Development
PCRV	project completion report validation
PMD	Programme Management Department (IFAD)
PPE	project performance evaluation
PPPP	public-private-producer partnerships
PRM	Partnership and Resources Mobilization Office (IFAD)
RBA	Rome-based agency
SME	small and medium enterprise
SSTC	South-South and Triangular Cooperation
ToC	theory of change
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
WCA	West and Central Africa Division (IFAD)
WFP	World Food Programme

Executive summary

I. Background

1. The IFAD Evaluation Policy calls for the Independent Office of Evaluation (IOE) to produce evaluation synthesis reports (ESRs) each year on selected topics. This synthesis on the subject of partnerships provides a learning opportunity for IFAD. It identifies and captures accumulated knowledge from existing evaluative and other credible evidence on how partnership-building can enhance IFAD's development effectiveness. The aim is to identify lessons relevant to different forms of partnership. The findings and lessons from this report may be used to contribute to a better understanding of partnerships and their role in achieving development results, and to inform the assessment of IFAD's Partnership Strategy in 2018, as well as the elaboration of applicable criteria in IOE evaluations.

2. The specific objectives of this evaluation synthesis are:

   (a) Based on evidence from IFAD evaluations, explore the types of partnerships that have enabled IFAD to deliver on its mandate to reduce rural poverty, *at country level*.

   (b) Explore the comparative strengths and weakness of different types of partners in enabling IFAD to achieve its country partnership objectives, to increase outreach and expand impact on rural poverty reduction with limited resources.

   (c) Identify the enabling or disabling factors which explain why partnerships have developed (or not) under certain conditions and how they could be improved.

   (d) Identify lessons on the role of IFAD country offices (ICOs) in building effective partnerships for greater development effectiveness.

3. While partnerships operate at the global, regional and country level, this synthesis has focused on those at the **country level**, because this is where partnerships matter most and where they are expected to produce concrete poverty reduction results. The evaluative evidence has been primarily derived from country strategy and programme evaluations (CSPEs), selected ESRs and relevant corporate-level evaluations (CLEs) focusing mainly on operations and results at country level.

4. The evaluation team systematically reviewed CSPEs completed between 2006 and 2016. The sample comprised 36 CSPEs out of a total of 40, 22 of them in middle-income countries (MICs) and 14 in low-income countries (LICs). The causal factors underlying the success or failure of partnerships were explored in further depth through a focused review of programme documentation, interviews with country programme managers (CPMs) and focus group discussions with regional economists and portfolio advisers.

5. The key question explored in this synthesis is as follows: **What forms of partnership engagement, instruments and partnership modalities, in what combinations, have been most relevant and effective for IFAD to achieve its partnership goal**, which is to improve outreach and contribution to rural poverty reduction as formulated in the 2012 IFAD Partnership Strategy.

6. With its explicit focus on partnership as a broader concept, the synthesis therefore complements earlier IOE evaluations, such as the CLEs on the private sector (2011), grants (2014) and decentralization (2016) and the ESRs on South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) (2016), indigenous peoples (2015), policy engagement (2017) and scaling up (2017).

II. Main findings

7. The High Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (2013) called for a New Global Partnership. The need for diverse and inclusive partnerships was reiterated in the Agenda 2030, which included a dedicated sustainable development goal (SDG 17) on multi-stakeholder partnerships and voluntary commitments. IFAD's Strategic Framework 2016–2025 highlights the importance of partnerships for IFAD to promote synergies among its own and other sources of finance, knowledge and expertise and create more enabling environments for poor people in rural areas to build their pathways out of poverty. Rural transformation activities will require IFAD to work with a broader range of partners and to adjust its operational model by improving resource mobilization, allocation and utilization from diverse sources. Under IFAD11, the Fund has committed to strengthening engagement with a wider range of partners, including the private sector, and to increase its focus on country-level partnerships.

8. The overarching finding from this synthesis is that the **range of IFAD's partnership instruments is limited** and has not kept up with the rapidly changing context. Furthermore, IFAD's main existing partnership instruments (loans and grants) are often not used sufficiently or strategically for producing partnership results, particularly at country level. Furthermore, IFAD had no specific instruments for private-sector partnerships at the time of the review.[1]

9. **Global partnerships are highly visible and receive a lot of attention at corporate level.** The IFAD Partnership Strategy (2012) has a strong focus on global partnership initiatives. However, as pointed out by a recent World Bank evaluation of global partnerships, promoting global partnerships throughout the portfolio may lead to a proliferation of uncoordinated partnerships that are not systematically tracked or linked to country programmes. Previous IOE evaluations have highlighted the missing links between global partnerships and country programmes in IFAD, for example for global and regional grants (see the CLE on the IFAD Policy for Grant Financing), the global partnerships with indigenous peoples (ESR on IFAD's Engagement with Indigenous Peoples) and SSTC (ESR on Non-lending Activities in the Context of South-South Cooperation).

10. The review of CSPEs for this synthesis leads to similar findings, noting for example the missing links between regional grants and national programmes in Ecuador, Nigeria and Tanzania. Cooperation with the other United Nations Rome-based agencies (RBAs) is another important global partnership, but there were only a few cases of successful links with IFAD programmes and results reported in the CSPEs (e.g. Brazil). **The Partnership Strategy is not explicit on the links between global, regional and country partnership initiatives.** Spin-offs from global partnership initiatives thus may not be clearly perceived and reported as such at country level. Hence, the review can provide only limited insights into the effectiveness of global partnership initiatives at country level.

11. The review found that **IFAD's current Partnership Strategy is not sufficient to guide country-level partnerships**. It lacks specificity as to how to develop partnerships strategically within a country context. Economic growth, rural sector diversification and donor coordination are some of the important contextual factors that influence the state of partnerships within a given country. In LICs, lower and upper MICs, and fragile and conflict-affected states, the partnership goals and partnership requirements and preferences are very different.

12. **Partnerships in LICs have generally performed better**, in particular in sub-Saharan Africa where there are well-established structures for coordination and cooperation among development partners. Significant international cofinancing had

[1] A new instrument, the SME Investment Finance Fund, was approved in December 2017.

been an important feature in many of these countries at the time of the CSPEs reviewed. Partnerships with civil society organizations (CSOs) are important in LICs because they often complement weak government capacities. The CSPE sample also revealed a larger number of private-sector partnerships in LICs, but few of them had developed into public-private-producer - partnerships (PPPPs) at the time of the evaluations.

13. **Partnerships in MICs have been underperforming and the weaknesses will have to be addressed strategically.** The review found that partnerships with central governments were often not strong enough to enable satisfactory results, in particular in larger MICs such as India and Nigeria. There is unused potential in many MICs to tap into domestic resources for cofinancing through stronger partnerships with both governments and the private sector. Partnerships with civil society were also found to be insufficient in a number of MICs. Overall, the combination of partnerships appears unsatisfactory in MICs.

14. The report distinguishes between **three categories of partnerships**. Financing partnerships (or cofinancing) combine the financial resources of partners. Knowledge and learning partnerships are alliances and networks that are often supported through regional and country grants. Coordination and cooperation partnerships are relationships of strategic importance but are often informal and therefore not systematically documented and tracked. **The three types of partnerships are equally important and have complementary roles in enhancing IFAD's development effectiveness at global, regional and country levels**. IFAD's country programmes have performed well where all three partnership categories were present.

15. **Cofinancing partnerships** are necessary but not sufficient for achieving central partnership goals. Cofinancing enables complementarities and policy engagement. Also, cofinanced projects often perform better despite trade-offs in the form of slower disbursements. Cofinancing has been less effective in leveraging additional resources. The cofinancing ratio, which is a proxy for the amount of funding leveraged by IFAD, increased for lower and upper MICs (from 1.29 and 2.51 under IFAD8 to 2.20 and 2.83 under IFAD9). However, it declined in LICs (from 1.37 under IFAD8 to 1.03 under IFAD9). This means that IFAD's goal to leverage additional funding in the agricultural sector through cofinancing will require better defined partnership strategies to mobilize cofinancing in MICs and LICs.

16. **Knowledge and learning partnerships** often provided complementarity to IFAD-government partnerships, e.g. by supporting innovative technologies or approaches. However, grants provided to international research organizations often did not lead to uptake of innovations in the country and were insufficiently linked with IFAD's loan operations, as noted by the CSPEs for India and Nigeria. Furthermore, the **outcomes of knowledge and learning partnerships are often insufficiently known, documented and linked**. Exceptions were noted in the case of Bangladesh and the Philippines, where the Knowledge and Learning Market, funded through a regional Environmental and Natural Resources Accounting Project grant, has helped foster replication of good practices across projects.

17. Strategic partnerships for **coordination and cooperation** at country level included CSOs, farmers' organizations and indigenous people's organizations, and were often effective in leveraging policy influence. IFAD's work with farmers' organizations is particularly strong in Latin America and parts of Asia. Positive examples from Africa include Madagascar, Mali and Niger where IFAD facilitated the participation of farmers' organizations in policy processes. These types of partnerships require regular interaction and communication on country and thematic priorities, commonalities and complementarities to be effective.

18. IFAD has been promoting specific **partnership modalities to strengthen cooperation and synergies with certain partners at global, regional and country levels.** These include RBA cooperation, SSTC and private-sector partnerships. The effectiveness of these partnerships is variable so far and limited results were documented in the CSPEs under review.

19. **United Nations Rome-based agencies cooperation has yet to produce tangible results**. RBA collaboration has been a corporate priority for IFAD since 2009 when the document setting directions for collaboration among RBAs was prepared. However, despite RBAs being rated by CPMs as the second most important partner, there was very limited evidence of results from RBA partnerships in the CSPEs under review. RBA cooperation at sectoral level has been more successful in countries with established coordination among development partners and in particular the United Nations. In Brazil, RBA partnerships emerging from United Nations coordination groups have played an important role in policy engagement and SSTC. At project level, however, successful RBA cooperation is the exception.

20. **South-South and Triangular Cooperation has received much attention recently.** The review found only a very few countries where successful SSTC has been reported, such as Brazil. SSTC activities have often been conducted in an ad hoc manner. They have been less effective due to missing links with country programmes, limited clarity on partner contributions and impact pathways, and missed opportunities to link SSTC with cofinanced projects in MICs. The lack of a strategic approach has been noted, for instance, in China and Turkey. The new IFAD strategy on SSTC (2016) is expected to provide a better focus and better synergies with country programmes.

21. **Cooperation with the private sector has become even more important with the value chain approaches promoted by IFAD**. Some innovative work on PPPPs has been reported for Madagascar, Moldova and Mozambique. Yet partnerships with the private sector are still struggling to overcome some fundamental issues. There is a lack of clarity around what IFAD's primary private-sector target group(s) should be. Furthermore, the diversity of partners and the particular challenges and risks involved in PPPPs require specific support mechanisms, whereas the range of instruments available for developing PPPPs is rather limited, particularly to support small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and risk-sharing mechanisms. The new SME Investment Finance Fund could provide some flexibility to engage with private-sector partners.

22. With the increased attention being paid to partnership-building it must be kept in mind that **partnerships are a means to an end** – a collaborative relationship towards mutually agreed objectives with shared responsibility for outcomes. This focus on partnership outcomes is also reflected in the IFAD partnership definition. However, reporting on partnerships in country strategic opportunities programmes (COSOPs) and CSPEs usually focuses on intentions and processes; partnership outcomes are not well described and monitored. Accordingly, this review focuses specifically on partnership results, both conceptual and practical, to the extent that they are documented in IOE evaluations.

23. Most of the reported results related to **influencing policy, knowledge and learning and leveraging resources**. These are all outcome types that have received much attention from IFAD and have been actively promoted through dialogue, participation in working groups and support for new strategy development, as well as through research grants and capacity-building for CSO/farmer organization partners. The ESR found that partnerships with multilateral development banks (MDBs), RBAs and CSOs have been quite effective in **leveraging policy influence**, provided it related to investment project experiences and knowledge and learning. There are also cases reported where

policy influence has been achieved through SSTC (e.g. Argentina and Brazil). To achieve **synergies and complementarities** international financial institutions (IFIs) were important partners for IFAD, particularly in leveraging resources, knowledge and influence.

24. Trends in partnership outcomes over time show that interest in the theme of **alignment and harmonization** has lessened in country-level partnerships since 2012, compared with the years following the 2005 Paris Declaration and 2008 Accra Agenda for Action. After 2012 the CSPEs also showed fewer results on leveraging resources and cofinancing. And **sustainability and country ownership**, supported through long-term partnerships and capacity-building with governments and other national partners such as CSOs and the private sector, also became less prominent at country level. On the other hand, **scaling up** has been gaining importance since 2012, although the documented results were still patchy in the CSPE sample. Scaling up requires a wider range of partners beyond governments. CSOs were instrumental for scaling up in several cases, but partnerships with CSOs were often scarce or ineffective.

25. Effective partnership-building and good partnership results depend on a number of factors, but according to the review **IFAD country presence and government capacity are the strongest supportive forces**. Wherever IFAD established a country presence, the frequency and quality of interactions with national government counterparts improved and enabled IFAD's participation in sectoral donor and other partner coordination groups. A well-staffed ICO was found critical in 22 out of 36 CSPEs; the importance of ICO staff with good communication skills and specific technical expertise was emphasized in 14 CSPEs. Although government capacities and government interest are important factors influencing IFAD's partnership-building efforts, the ESR also highlights their ambivalent nature, which can facilitate or hinder partnerships with a wider range of partners, including civil society. Government willingness to enter into partnerships with IFAD's preferred partners is not always a given.

26. **Partnerships provide important opportunities and benefits, but there are also costs, risks, and trade-offs that cannot be neglected**, most importantly the time it takes to organize and manage partnerships and various costs related to monitoring and implementing them. In particular, donor coordination is considered to be time consuming. The risk of partner default can be high when partners have problems mobilizing finance and other resources in a timely manner. There is also a risk for IFAD of potentially losing sight of organizational core values in partnerships, an issue that was highlighted in particular with regard to private-sector partnerships. **Some of these transaction costs and reputational risks can be reduced through longer-term relationships and trust-building,** and more could be done in this respect.

27. The partnership ladder presented in the report illustrates that the majority of IFAD's partnerships focus on implementation and information sharing. The key **partnership principles of mutuality and complementarity**, reflected in joint actions and decision-making, feature in a small number of partnerships. Too often partnerships were driven by IFAD and focused on immediate implementation concerns.

III. Conclusions

28. This ESR is not simply about partnerships. It is about specific partnership results, or outcomes, and how they can best be achieved through different forms of partnerships, with the best partners, most effectively and efficiently, and in the right way for the country and regional context.

29. **The quality of partnerships matters, but the mix of partnership types is important to achieve results, too.** A good mix of partnerships along the three

categories - cofinancing, knowledge and learning, coordination and cooperation – is important to achieve greater outreach and complementarity of results, for instance for scaling up and creating synergies.

30. **Insufficient focus on results**. Partnerships are at the core of IFAD corporate priorities: scaling up, knowledge generation and learning, and policy engagement and influence. Yet there is no coherent framework to capture the comprehensive results of partnerships. The effectiveness of COSOPs in guiding partnership-building has been overestimated. COSOPs often express programmatic intentions that are frequently more driven by political considerations than by real opportunities and available resources on the ground. Partnership-building is often ad hoc and lacks an adequate resource framework; results are not tracked. The long-term nature of partnerships and their contributions across a wider range of outcomes is not captured.

31. **IFAD's Partnership Strategy does not provide sufficient guidance on how partnership results will be achieved at country level**. The importance of country partnerships is insufficiently reflected in the corporate Partnership Strategy (2012). In addition, IFAD should refine its cofinancing strategy beyond the global level and move more strongly to the country level for cofinancing and resource mobilization, with the relevant support for country teams. The 2012 Partnership Strategy identifies increased resource mobilization as one of four categories of partnerships, but refers mainly to global resource mobilization of supplementary funds for IFAD, rather than standard project cofinancing. The importance of mobilizing domestic resources is highlighted in the IFAD11 paper (2017), but a specific strategy and guidance are needed.

32. **The limited range and versatility of partnership instruments restrict the potential to achieve better development results.** The IFAD category of non-lending activities currently combines policy engagement, knowledge and partnership-building, but does not capture key partnership outcomes such as scaling up, ownership and sustainability or leverage that may grow out of investment projects or are inherent parts of these projects. For example, grants are primarily used for knowledge and learning purposes, but partnerships may also create wider or higher-level impacts, such as scaling up or policy influence, if done in a more strategic manner. In a similar vein, cofinancing is not just about resource mobilization, but also facilitates other benefits, such as synergies and complementarities.

33. **Corporate support and sensitivity to country teams and country-level planning of partnership-building are important**. Country partnership work and outcomes need to be institutionally acknowledged and well-integrated into overall IFAD country-level programming. Currently, formal and informal corporate incentives do not encourage ICOs to undertake partnership activities such as policy engagement. Corporate support may be required to help country teams identify better ways of planning partnerships according to country opportunities and resources, and monitoring them. This includes help for country teams to mobilize the necessary partnership resources.

34. **Finally, there are many good practices on partnerships that can be shared**. Good practices include designing partnerships in such a way that they are programmatic, with clear objectives, and are results-oriented and time-bound. It is also important that partnerships are sufficiently resourced or clear resource mobilization paths are feasible and envisaged. Also, that partnership engagement rules are sufficiently long-term and flexible to gradually strengthen the ties with partners, and that the emphasis is on capitalizing on partnership synergies, making use of comparative advantages and avoiding overlap.

IV. Recommendations

35. **The partnership environment and expectations are changing fast**, together with a rapidly changing aid environment, the growing importance of MICs, increased attention to non-lending and the search for new donors in the agricultural sector. The assessment of the Partnership Strategy in 2018 provides an opportunity to critically review the relevance and effectiveness of IFAD's partnerships. The commitments made for IFAD11 are encouraging and supported by the recommendations emerging from this review.

36. The ESR recommends three areas of action that would enhance the performance of country partnerships: (a) preparation of partnership strategies tailored to the specific conditions and needs of MICs and LICs; (b) more strategic use of partnership instruments and modalities; and (c) improved accountability for partnership results.

37. **Recommendation 1. Prepare a revised corporate partnership strategy with a clear focus on country-level partnership outcomes.** Global partnerships are important for IFAD to fulfil its mandate. But, in line with IFAD's new business model, support for partnership-building has to move from global to regional and country levels. A revised partnership strategy should include a clear vision as well as specific guidance on country partnership approaches and outcomes that would motivate country programme staff and enable greater synergies between different parts of the organization. The revised strategy would recognize the importance of country-level partnerships and specify the corporate support, capacity-building and incentives for ICOs to undertake outcome-oriented partnership-building within and beyond projects. It would provide clarity on the specific types of partnership engagement, instruments and expected results in different settings. Furthermore, the revised strategy would:

    (a) Include a results-based management framework based on a broader set of instruments beyond loans and grants to facilitate partnerships with a wider range of partners, including with the private sector.

    (b) Provide guidance on how to combine these instruments to achieve key IFAD objectives of influencing policy, scaling up innovations, knowledge and learning, synergies and sustainability, and leverage.

    (c) Include specific partnership strategies for different country categories (LICs, lower and upper MICs, and most fragile situations).

    (d) Clarify the approach to preparing partnership strategies as part of the COSOP process; guide partnership development towards greater selectivity including a more rigorous cost-benefit analysis; determine the principal partnership outcomes to be achieved and the means for achieving them; and identify entry points for engagement with governments on the broader framework for partnerships.

38. **Recommendation 2. Streamline the application of partnership instruments and modalities with an eye towards partnership results.**

    (a) With regard to loans as a partnership instrument, IFAD needs to identify a wider range of specific **cofinancing** options at global and country levels.[2] The current confusion between cofinancing – mainly for enhanced partnership outcomes and aggregate leverage of funds for agriculture - and resource mobilization - for an expanded IFAD loans and grants portfolio, including supplementary funds – needs to be overcome. IFAD would be well advised to adopt specific strategies for mobilizing cofinancing in MICs and LICs, and

[2] Similar cofinancing principles could also be applied to certain forms of IFAD grants that could benefit from cofinancing.

should systematically monitor and report cofinancing partnership results beyond indicators of bigger loans and lower IFAD transaction costs, to include specific country partnership outcomes, in particular policy influence and scaling up.

(b) For **grants** as a key partnership instrument, improved IFAD internal mechanisms are required to align regional and country grants, including SSTC, and to ensure that they provide for mutually supportive lending operations and country-level partnership outcomes as envisaged in the COSOPs. The IFAD11 commitment 3.4 to strengthen synergies between lending and non-lending engagement is important and encouraging in this respect. In a similar vein, more grant funds should be mobilized for longer-term partnership-building with CSOs, farmers' organizations, indigenous groups and the private sector in the form of SMEs to strengthen their capacities, particularly in countries where governments are less supportive of the use of loans for these activities. And finally, support to CSOs should take a long-term perspective on institutional effectiveness and sustainability beyond the project level, for example through support of CSO apex or umbrella organizations.

(c) With regard to **PPPPs**, IFAD needs to recognize the challenges of PPPP partnerships and devise effective mechanisms to address them head on. This includes being upfront about the risks of PPPP and devising strategies to mitigate them. Updating IFAD's strategy for engagement with the private sector and enhancing instruments to collaborate with the private sector and foundations (IFAD11 commitment 1.2, action 6) will be an important step. In addition, IFAD should also continue the use of regional and sub-national platforms for PPPP to support networking and mutual learning.

39. **Recommendation 3. Strengthen corporate accountability for partnership results through a coherent approach to monitoring and evaluating partnerships.**

(a) The IFAD11 commitments include a number of monitorable actions that are relevant in this respect: to improve cofinancing monitoring and reporting by source and country category, and better measure IFAD's crowding in of private investment (action 5 under commitment 1.2); and to develop and implement a framework to strategically plan and monitor IFAD's partnerships at country, regional, global and institutional levels (action 27 under commitment 3.5.).

(b) Furthermore, IFAD should adopt consistent evaluation criteria and indicators for assessing the quality and effectiveness of partnership-building for IFAD self- and independent evaluations and improve the system of monitoring, reporting and evaluating of key partnership outcomes at country and IFAD corporate level, including ex-post cofinancing achievements beyond the ex-ante Grants and Investment Projects System (GRIPS). This would include at least some country-specific partnership indicators and targets (COSOPs) – based on common IFAD-wide ones - for review and adjustment as needed in annual COSOP reviews.

(c) The corporate database of grant-financed partnerships should be enhanced by including results in terms of key partnership outcomes.

(d) And finally, global partnerships of strategic importance to IFAD should be evaluated to determine how they could be enhanced. In this respect, IOE should consider evaluating the RBA partnership.

IFAD Management's response[3]

1. Management welcomes IOE's evaluation synthesis report (ESR) on building partnerships for enhanced development effectiveness – a review of country-level experiences and results. Overall Management is pleased to note that the findings of the ESR confirm Management's own assessment and analysis as elaborated in the IFAD11 – Leveraging partnerships for country-level impact and global engagement paper (IFAD11/3/R.5) presented during the third consultation of the eleventh replenishment of IFAD's resources. Furthermore, overall the recommendations are consistent with ongoing activities and pre-planned reforms to improve performance and development effectiveness as part of the IFAD11 commitments.

2. Management notes that the number of sub-recommendations in this synthesis report remains high despite the fact that follow-up on recommendations made in the evaluation products that this ESR is based on have already been internalized and reported on in various editions of the President's Report on the Implementation Status of Evaluation Recommendations and Management Actions. Management would like to reiterate that, given the nature of ESRs as learning products, the recommendations should be strategic and avoid duplication of recommendations contained in reports on which the synthesis was based.

3. Notwithstanding this, Management highly values the learning generated from the ESR and the importance of strengthening partnerships to enhance the impact of IFAD investments, particularly at the country level. Management's commitment to this is evident through IFAD's accelerated and strategic decentralization, OpEx reforms and commitments on strengthening partnership-building for IFAD11.

Recommendations

4. Management takes note of the three main recommendations of the ESR, and the number of sub-actions within each recommendation and agrees with them. Management's detailed responses to each are presented below.

(a) **Recommendation 1. Prepare a revised corporate partnership strategy with a clear focus on country-level partnership outcomes.**

Agreed.

As part of the IFAD11 commitments, Management has agreed to develop and implement a framework to strategically plan and monitor IFAD's partnerships at country, regional, global and institutional levels, including collaboration with the Rome-based agencies, international financial institutions, national and bilateral partners, and engagement in multi-stakeholder partnerships. This framework will build on the leveraging partnerships paper mentioned earlier and serve to replace the existing corporate Partnership Strategy approved in 2012.

This will be further informed by interlinked actions Management is undertaking as part of the IFAD11 commitments. These include: (i) an analysis and action plan for cofinancing; (ii) an update of the private-sector strategy to improve our engagement; (iii) a new knowledge management strategy; and (iv) setting up of an SSTC facility.

Furthermore, in line with the sub-recommendation made in the ESR, Management has already committed to update the RB-COSOP guidance to strengthen the selection of strategic country-level partnerships in LICs, LMICs and MICs amongst others for cofinancing, scaling up, policy engagement, SSTC, and private sector.

[3] The Programme Management Department sent the final Management's response to the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD on 9 February 2018.

Therefore, Management will incorporate the specific suggestions of this recommendation as a critical input to developing the framework to strategically plan and monitor IFAD partnerships at country, regional and global level in line with the IFAD11 Commitment 3.5 Action 27. Such a framework would therefore replace the need for a revised corporate strategy for country-level partnerships.

(b) **Recommendation 2. Streamline the application of partnership instruments and modalities with an eye towards partnership results.**

Agreed.

Management agrees with the recommendation and the sub-recommendations.

Cofinancing: For IFAD11, Management has committed to conducting a cofinancing analysis and develop a cofinancing strategy which would include differentiated approaches to mobilizing cofinancing at the domestic and international level. Furthermore, corporate targets will be set for domestic and international cofinancing that will be cascaded down at the regional and country level. Such targets will be analysed, discussed and agreed in the context of the development of RB-COSOPs and will be based on a country's own development strategy and priorities.

Furthermore, building on the IFAD11 business model, Management has committed to develop a transition framework to establish the most adequate package of support that IFAD could offer to accompany borrowers in their development journey, with the aim of ensuring long-lasting impact of such support. To be effective, the interventions that IFAD offers must be tailored to the specific country conditions and challenges, which will be a key consideration in the development of the transition framework. The transition framework for each country will be embedded into the RB-COSOP to provide a long-term strategic path for each country.

Grants: Management would like to highlight that the recommendations pertaining to grants in the ESR have been covered by the CLE on grant financing and followed up extensively in the 2015 President's Report on the Implementation Status of Evaluation Recommendations and Management Actions (EB 2015/115/R.5/Add.1).

In adopting a more programmatic approach at the country level, Management will strengthen synergies between the lending and non-lending portfolio and will be able to further leverage instruments such as the grants window to contribute to greater outcomes. Through quality assurance processes, it is ensured that proposals (both concept notes submitted to OSC and design documents submitted to QA) are aligned to the extent possible with the investment projects' priorities. Moreover, during implementation, and as required by the 2015 Grant Policy implementation procedures, all grants (both large and small) are required to prepare grant status reports, which report on (inter alia) linkages to the investment portfolio and other development initiatives.

However, it is important to note that not all grants will (or should) support lending operations. For example, research grants that are particularly innovative should link to IFAD operations only once it is attested that the innovative technology being tested is indeed promising for smallholder farmers. Paragraph 7 of the 2015 Grant Policy states that IFAD grants should "make a significant contribution to a global, regional or national public good related to IFAD's mandate" - which goes beyond merely supporting IFAD operations.

Management agrees to the sub-recommendation of providing more grant funds "for longer-term partnership-building with CSOs, farmer organizations, indigenous groups and private sector (SMEs) and strengthening their capacities". Management believes this is an important area of intervention and indeed, considerable IFAD grant support is provided to strengthen the capacity of such partners. As part of the development of a Citizen Engagement Strategy, one of the commitments for IFAD11, Management will strengthen its approach of engagement with these stakeholders throughout the programming and operational cycles.

PPPP: As indicated in the ESR, Management has already taken proactive action to address the demand for an increase in PPPPs. The IFAD11 commitment to submit a revised private-sector engagement strategy, will address the sub recommendation on PPPP.

(c) **Recommendation 3. Strengthen corporate accountability for partnership results through a coherent approach to monitoring and evaluating partnerships.**

Agreed.

Management agrees with the need to strengthen accountability and monitoring of results. The basis for decentralization and moving towards a hub model is expected to improve results on the ground. Management anticipates that through decentralization and the evolving role of country teams, particularly partnership-building will be strengthened at the country and regional level. This is also reflected in the IFAD11 Commitment referenced above which commits Management to develop a framework to both strategically *plan* and *monitor* IFAD's partnerships and their related outcomes.

As indicated above, revisions are being made to the guidance on project level and country programme level monitoring of results. In accordance with the anticipated revisions to the RB-COSOP guidelines, RB-COSOP results frameworks will be updated and adjusted at midterm and assessed at completion. Better and more consistent reporting on progress against partnership outcomes will be ensured through the supervision and completion reporting at the project level through the Operational Results Management System and through the results frameworks at the country level.

The aggregated results of these will be reported on in IFAD's corporate results management framework through the specific indicators included in the IFAD11 results management framework. Further refinements to guidance and criteria used for assessing partnerships, including revisions to the client survey, will be done to improve to quality of data collected on partnerships and to reflect a stronger focus on the outcomes and results achieved through these activities.

Additionally, the Quality Assurance Group performs reviews of the most recurrent grant recipients. These reviews are considered critical for IFAD to understand how to strengthen and benefit from these partnerships with recurrent recipients.

Local entrepreneur, Chann Sarom, uses a tablet to conduct a soil analysis using software developed by Intel in partnership with IFAD in Kandal Province, Cambodia. This gives farmers immediate access to information on how to improve their productivity.

Building partnerships for enhanced development effectiveness – a review of country-level experiences and results

Evaluation synthesis

I. Introduction, objectives and methodology

A. Background

Introduction

1. The IFAD Evaluation Policy states that each year the Independent Office of Evaluation (IOE) will produce evaluation synthesis reports on selected topics. This synthesis on the subject of partnerships provides a learning opportunity for IFAD. It identifies and captures accumulated knowledge from existing evaluative and other credible evidence on how partnership-building can enhance IFAD's development effectiveness. The aim is to identify lessons relevant to different forms of partnership. The findings and lessons from this report may be used to contribute to a better understanding of partnerships and their role in achieving development results, and to inform the assessment of IFAD's Partnership Strategy as well as the elaboration of applicable criteria in IOE evaluations.

IFAD's mandate and strategic focus

2. IFAD is the only international financial institution with a specific mandate to reduce rural poverty through investments in agriculture and rural development. It was established as a specialized UN agency and an international financial institution in 1977 to mobilize resources to invest in development opportunities for poor rural people. The fund works in close collaboration with borrowing country governments and local communities to design, supervise and assess country-led programmes and projects that support smallholders and poor rural producers.

3. The Agreement Establishing IFAD requires IFAD to "cooperate closely" with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the other organizations of the United Nations system, as well as with international financial institutions, civil society organizations (CSOs) and governmental and intergovernmental agencies concerned with agricultural development (article 8).

B. Synthesis objectives and scope

Objectives

4. The purpose of this synthesis is to inform the assessment of IFAD's Partnership Strategy by management in 2018. The specific objectives are:

   a. Based on evidence from IFAD evaluations, explore the types of partnerships that have enabled IFAD to deliver on its mandate, to reduce rural poverty, *at country level*.

   b. Explore the comparative strengths and weakness of different types of partners in enabling IFAD to achieve its country partnership objectives, to increase outreach and expand impact on rural poverty reduction with limited resources.

   c. Identify the enabling or disabling factors to explain why partnerships have developed (or not) under certain conditions and how they could be improved.

   d. Identify lessons on the role of IFAD country offices (ICOs) in building effective partnerships for greater development effectiveness.

Scope and approach

5. While partnerships operate at the global, regional and country level, this synthesis has focused on the operation of partnerships at the **country level,** because this is where most of IOE's evaluations of partnerships have focused. The evaluative evidence has been primarily derived from country strategy and programme evaluations (CSPEs),[1] selected evaluation synthesis reports and relevant corporate-level evaluations (CLEs), which focus mainly on the operations and the results at the country level.

6. At country level a broad range of partnerships has been studied. Both the Strategy and IOE's Evaluation Manual broadly identify the same **range of partners** at country level: member governments; CSOs, particularly those of smallholder farmers and other groups of rural people; other United Nations agencies; bilateral and multilateral development agencies; international agricultural research centres; CSOs and foundations; policy research institutes and universities; regional organizations; and private-sector players.

7. **Government** is the most important partner for IFAD. Currently, IFAD has 176 Member States and is working in partnership with governments in almost 100 countries. Government is the main partner implementing IFAD-supported programmes and projects. This synthesis has looked at government as a "facilitating partner" rather than an "implementing partner", meaning that it will review the role that government plays as a point of entry and core partner in countries in facilitating partnerships for greater development effectiveness.

8. While the focus of the analysis is on the **country level**, it is understood that partnership agreements are often the result of engagement processes at **global level** that will involve IFAD HQ. Priorities for certain partnerships, e.g. cofinancing agreements with the European Union (EU) or the Asian Development Bank (ADB), have to be seen, therefore, in the context of the existing corporate-level frameworks, policies and agreements.

9. **Timeframe**. The period covered by this synthesis starts in 2006, when the first CSPE that rated partnership performance was completed. For the period 2006-2016, the synthesis reviewed 36 of 40 CSPEs for substantive evidence on the contribution of partnerships to country outcomes in IFAD operations (annex VII.3). For analysis, this period was broken down into two phases of 2006 to 2011 (with 15 CSPEs) and 2012 to 2016 (with 21 CSPEs), with the second period starting in the year when the new Partnership Strategy was approved.

C. Conceptual framework

Evaluation questions

10. Based on the above objectives, a preliminary review of documents and in-house consultations, the following evaluation questions were formulated:

    a. How important and relevant are different partnership categories (cofinancing, knowledge and learning [K&L] and coordination and cooperation) and specific engagement modalities for IFAD?

    b. How do partnerships perform and what are their main outcomes at country level?

    c. What configurations of partnerships are most effective for different outcomes within given country contexts?

    d. What are the most important enabling and limiting factors for country-oriented partnerships?

[1] For the purpose of this ESR the more recent term CSPE is also used for the former CPEs.

e. What are the lessons and emerging good practices and how to build better partnerships at IFAD over the next five years?

11. The evaluation team developed an evaluation framework for this synthesis that includes the main evaluation questions, hypotheses and forms of partnership engagement (for details see annex I).

Theory of change

12. Underpinning IFAD's partnership approach are a number of theories for how partnerships would lead to more effective partnership outcomes and hence to greater levels of results from IFAD investments. Therefore, the synthesis is focused on examining whether evaluative evidence confirms the theories that underpin IFAD's strategies and the main interventions identified.

13. **Partnerships are a means to an end** – a collaborative relationship toward mutually agreed objectives and involving shared responsibility for outcomes.[2] This focus on partnership outcomes is also reflected in the IFAD partnership definition (from the 2012 Partnership Strategy) (see chapter II B). In order to reach its corporate goal – reducing rural poverty – IFAD relies on a broad range of partnerships. Government, as the borrower and main implementer of its loans, is the key partner for IFAD. Civil society is traditionally a core partner for reaching out to beneficiaries and for advocating changes in the policy and institutional framework. Farmers' organizations and indigenous peoples' organizations are CSOs that are close to IFAD's target groups and thus well positioned to represent their interests. The private sector has been recognized as a key player in agricultural development and is thus becoming part of IFAD's partnership strategies in many countries. And finally, multilateral and bilateral organizations are important partners for leveraging influence and outreach for poverty reduction, through cofinancing, policy engagement and knowledge generation. The different types of partnerships are all important for IFAD to achieve its objectives in any country, although their roles and constellations may vary within a given context (see annex X for a description of typical IFAD partnerships).

14. The **theory of change** (ToC) used in this synthesis defines the pathways for achieving critical partnership outcomes at country level and for exploring the causal relations and contributing factors enabling or hindering those outcomes.[3] The core elements of this ToC (figure 1) include IFAD's main *partners, partnership categories and modalities*. The key question to be explored in this synthesis is **what forms of partnership engagement, instruments and partnership modalities, and in what combinations, have been most relevant and effective for IFAD to achieve its partnership goal**, which is to improve outreach and contribution to rural poverty reduction, as formulated in the 2012 Partnership Strategy.

15. As immediate results towards the partnership goal, six main *outcomes* were identified for country partnerships: leveraging resources; influence on policies and strategies; scaling up and mainstreaming of good practices; K&L including innovations; exploitation of complementarities and synergies; and ultimately ownership and sustainability.

16. IFAD could achieve these outcomes through various *outputs* such as: making good use of partnerships in its loan projects, in particular cofinanced ones; its country-level grant results; building partner capacities; establishing knowledge platforms; vertical cooperation across geographical levels; and through engaging in policy engagement, national working groups and various events.

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[2] Picciotto, 2004.
[3] This theory of change was developed through a review of IFAD partnership documents and literature and in consultation with PRM and other key informants within IFAD during a workshop in June 2017.

17. Three main *partnership categories* were identified: cofinancing partnerships; K&L partnerships; and coordination and cooperation partnerships, that will be explained in more detail in chapter III A.

18. The ToC also considers the most important *enabling factors* as well as potential *costs and risks* associated with partnerships. These factors include IFAD institutional support and conducive governments, as well as awareness of partnership transaction costs and risks.

19. This ToC served as the reference for analysing partnership results and the most important enabling and disrupting factors for partnerships in this evaluation synthesis.

Figure 1
IFAD partnerships in countries – a theory of change



Source: Evaluation synthesis team, based on IFAD document review and consultations.

D. Evidence base

20. The synthesis has derived information on partnerships from the following IOE evaluation products.

21. **Country strategy and programme evaluations (CSPEs)** assess the extent to which partnership-building has efficiently and effectively contributed to the achievement of IFAD's goals and objectives within the country.[4] Forty CSPEs have been published since 2006 based on a consistent methodology to assess partnerships. Partnership-building, i.e. with partners beyond government counterparts, is systematically assessed under non-lending activities, for example the extent to which partnerships had been built in line with the stated intentions of the applicable country strategic opportunities programme (COSOP), in addition to indicators such as the number of partnerships enhanced through the implementation of the country programme and resources leveraged through partnerships. Information became even more detailed after the approval of IFAD's first Partnership Strategy in 2012, and with Management drawing more attention to scaling up and policy engagement since then.

[4] According to the Harmonisation Agreement (EC 2017/96/W.P.4).

22. The amount of information provided on country-relevant partnerships in the reviewed CSPEs is often extensive, with information on specific partnerships, but mainly focused on activities and certain outputs, much less on outcomes. Most commonly, partnership information focuses on cofinancing amounts and partners; regional and country-level knowledge work, particularly through IFAD grants; and work with CSOs and private sector. Often there are specific references to Rome-based Agencies although only rarely the results are reported. The CSPEs do not provide explanations of why certain partnerships worked or failed.

23. **Partnership ratings.** The ESR reviewed IOE partnership ratings to discern trends over time and regional patterns and to identify outliers for a more detailed review. CSPEs review partnership building as one of three aspects of IFAD's non-lending performance, the other two being knowledge and policy engagement. Ratings of partnership-building are usually based on both quantitative and qualitative aspects, and there are frequent references to plans in COSOPs. Often, but not always, the rationale for ratings is provided. Important criteria are: the scope of cofinancing and type of partners; the extent of partnering with CSOs and private sector; and the linkage of knowledge partnerships and IFAD's investment projects.

24. **CLEs and ESRs**. In addition to CSPEs this synthesis also relied on several CLEs and ESRs conducted by IOE since 2011. These documents usually offer extensive background analyses of their respective topics with high relevance for country partnerships and intended partnership outcomes. They provide success stories and analyse constraints from their respective angles and viewpoints. They frequently comment on typical partnership constraints. The important IFAD corporate evaluations reviewed were those on IFAD's decentralization experience (2017), grant financing (2014), and private-sector development and partnership strategy (2011). IFAD synthesis evaluations on policy engagement financing (2017), scaling up of results (2017), engagement with indigenous peoples (2015), South-South and triangular cooperation (2016) and middle-income countries (2014) were particularly informative.

25. **PPEs and PCRVs.** The ESR reviewed project performance evaluation (PPE) and project completion report validation (PCRV) ratings for a detailed analysis of the performance of cofinanced projects over the ESR period (2006 – 2016). The analysis is included in annex VII.1 and VII.2 (also see chapter III F for a summary of the analysis).

26. **The IFAD Grants and Investment Project System (GRIPS)**. GRIPS is the corporate vehicle for the collection and dissemination of information related to IFAD grant and loan financed projects. For the purpose of this synthesis, GRIPS was used to extract information on cofinancing and supplementary funding.

27. **Country strategic opportunities programmes/papers (COSOPs)**, in principle, provide for operationalization of the Partnership Strategy at country level. They indicate opportunities for potential partnerships in support of their strategic objectives, taking into account the area of focus and priority sectors of each. These partnerships could be for the purpose of project implementation, policy engagement, innovation or knowledge management and may involve cofinancing, sector-wide approaches, joint policy work and sharing of experience. Usually COSOPs include a short assessment of what has been achieved in terms of partnership-building and a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats analysis of different partners.

28. **Surveys**. The approach paper for this synthesis anticipated a survey to be conducted to collate feedback on recent partnerships from Programme Management Department (PMD) staff and in particular from CPMs. However, the survey was cancelled to avoid duplication with a Partnership and Resources Mobilization Office (PRM) survey targeting the same audience and conducted at the

same time. Instead the synthesis used some results of the PRM survey (see annex III).

29. **Focus group discussions**. The ESR process involved two focus group discussions with country programme managers (CPMs), regional economists and portfolio advisors at IFAD. The first meeting in June was to further elaborate the ToC on the basis of selected case studies. The second meeting in September was to discuss emerging findings and to further explore some key issues raised by this synthesis.

E. CSPE review methodology

30. **CSPE sample**. The evaluation team systematically reviewed the CSPEs completed between 2006 and 2016. The sample included 36 CSPEs out of a total of 40. Twenty-two middle-income countries (MICs) and 14 low-income countries (LICs) were covered (see table 1 in annex VIII.1). For three countries where there had been repeat CSPEs, the first CSPE was not reviewed separately (Ethiopia, Nigeria and Mozambique). For India, the first CSPE was reviewed but findings were merged with the second CSPE as its information was not extensive.

31. **Hypotheses**. The ToC led to the formulation of a number of hypotheses that were used in the review and analysis of CSPEs, CLEs and other documents. The hypothesis relate to the enabling factors, transaction costs and risks as identified in the ToC, among others the relevance of a clear corporate partnership vision and strategic approach, decentralized country teams for partnerships, country priorities and various resources and capacities. The initial ESR hypotheses were tested and further refined during the scoping phase, based on the review of relevant sections in the CSPEs and focus group discussions.

32. **Review matrices**. The occurrence of certain modalities of engagement, partners and outcomes and outputs was recorded for each country.[5] The extent to which different types of partners and partnership outcomes occurred in the CSPE was recorded in three different partnership matrices: the first one cross-tabulates different engagement modalities with different partners; the second one notes key outcomes/outputs for each partner.

33. **Partnership ladder**. The third matrix established a 'partnership ladder' that notes the quality of partnerships.[6] For this purpose six categories were chosen: (i) partners were mainly involved in implementation; (ii) there was substantial exchange of information during the partnership; (iii) partners decided together, with mutual understanding; (iv) partners acted together; (v) own initiatives by partners were supported; (vi) partners were entrusted with handing over or scaling up projects and initiatives.

34. **Force-field analysis**. The review documented the different factors found at country level that enable or hinder partnerships. These were aggregated and visualised in a force-field diagram, based on the number of occurrences in the documents.

35. **Data aggregation.** During the following in-depth review of the CSPEs, different types of partnership engagement and related outcomes and outputs were assessed. In this phase, qualitative data was extracted and the prevalence and intensity of partnerships recorded according to the following criteria: no reported partnership engagement (-); some engagement, but under-exploited (+); substantial engagement, visible, strategic (++); and very strong and visible

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[5] Partners included: Government, regional economic communities, international development partners, IFIs, local financial institutions, national development banks, research institutions and universities, CSOs and indigenous organizations, farmers' organizations and the private sector. Engagement modalities included: loans, grants, supplementary grants, brokering, networking, dialogue, SSTC, partnering with Rome-based Agencies, and PPPP. Outcomes/outputs included: influencing policy, scaling-up, leveraging resources, complementarities and synergies, partner capacities, alignment and harmonization, knowledge and communication and ownership.

[6] Note: The matrices only report occurrence rather than frequency.

engagement, demonstrated and well-noted results, in terms of quantities but also quality of partnership engagement (+++). These data provided the basis for many of the country examples and comparative tables and graphs included in the report (see annex V.1 for the related assessment matrix).

36. **Outlier analysis**. The review of the CSPEs generated further questions, in particular about why partnerships have developed the way they did. The synthesis separately looked at the "outliers" in terms of partnership ratings to better understand why in some countries performance on partnerships has been very good and why not in others. The outlier analysis was undertaken early in the process to inform the hypothesis tested during the main review phase.

37. **Country case studies**. The causal factors explaining success or failure in partnerships were explored in further depth through focused review of programme documentation (e.g. PPEs, portfolio reviews or COSOP documentation), interviews with CPMs and focus group discussions with regional economists and portfolio advisers. The country case studies thus contain additional evidence to explain why partnerships were effective in a certain context and under certain conditions (see annex X).

38. **Review of partnership findings at other international financial institutions (IFIs).** The ESR also selectively reviewed independent evaluations by other IFIs for findings, lessons and methodological conclusions related to partnerships, with focus on the World Bank, regional development banks and the Global Environment Facility (GEF).

F. Limitations

39. Theory-based synthesis is dependent upon the quality of evidence available in the evaluations used. The most important limitation therefore is the limited depth of the analysis included in IOE evaluations on how and why change happens. The synthesis has carefully reviewed the quality of the available evidence, in particular with regard to the depth of analysis of partnership results as well as seeking to explain why it happened. Variance in the quality and depth of the evidence inevitably limits this synthesis.

40. A second limitation is that IFAD's business processes have evolved significantly over the past decade, and some of these changes would be expected to have significant effects upon its partnership approach and how and why things occur. For instance, the IOE CLE on IFAD's Decentralization Experience (2016) found that having presence in-country has had a significant effect on partnerships created and maintained. However the synthesis confirmed that the basic principles of partnerships and why they succeed or fail remained more or less unchanged, and therefore the findings and lessons extracted from IOE evaluation of "older" IFAD projects are still relevant.

41. The main limitations to the CSPE review were their timing and way of reporting. The CSPEs were all conducted at different times. The assessment refers to information from CSPEs at the time of the evaluation, but performance may be different to date. Furthermore, CSPEs may not have captured well all ongoing activities in the respective category. For instance, this sometimes required a review of additional evidence and discussions with PMD staff for the in-depth case studies.

42. A major limitation in the CSPEs was that often partnership-relevant sections are descriptive and activity-oriented, describing the main partners and analysing factors for overall success and deficiencies. Yet reports rarely elaborate on intended or achieved specific outputs and outcomes from these partnerships, beyond general comments on performance. This is partly due to the lack of outcome specification or of ready availability of such information at country level or in IFAD's corporate information systems, as for outcomes from knowledge grants.

Most CSPEs, particularly in recent years, contain specific conclusions and recommendations on how to enhance partnerships and measure their performance.

43. A final limitation was the broad nature of IFAD partnerships and the challenges this posed for any evaluation, and in particular for a synthesis which is primarily desk-based. For this reason, focus group discussions to validate case studies and emerging findings have been built into the process of preparing this ESR.

G. Lessons on partnerships from other IFIs

44. Several other IFIs have addressed partnership performance in their evaluations in recent years. But only the ADB carried out a full-fledged partnership evaluation (2016), focusing on its corporate and global partnerships and their effectiveness in cofinancing, knowledge management, and coordination. Many of the findings and lessons learned in these evaluations refer to management and effectiveness of trust funds and global partnership programmes that are of relevance for IFAD's grants programmes. There are also important lessons with high relevance for IFAD on other institutions' experience and lessons with partnerships in cofinancing, knowledge management, PPPPs and CSOs. Specific lessons in fragile states and for small states were found in World Bank evaluations. Several evaluations included some general best practices for partnerships and limitations. (These lessons are presented in further detail in annex IX).

45. **Global partnerships** are highly visible and receive a lot of attention. However, the recent World Bank evaluation of global partnerships[7] highlights some important limitations. First, there is a risk of proliferation of uncoordinated partnership initiatives with inappropriate earmarking, and parallel budgeting and approval processes. Furthermore, many global and regional activities are neither tracked in any portfolio database nor expected to produce results. And finally, many of these global partnership programmes lack clear goals and indicators and independent evaluations.

46. The importance of **cofinancing** for better coordination, project results and policy influence is underlined in two regional bank evaluations. The ADB partnership evaluation pointed out that cofinancing facilitates coordination and ultimately better project results. But it also found that a lot of collaborative cofinancing does not mobilize additional resources. A similar conclusion came out of the African Development Bank (AfDB) comprehensive evaluation of development results which concluded that AfDB cofinancing is not sufficiently oriented towards mobilizing additional resources for the Bank and projects, although positive practices were encountered in some cases.

47. Effective **knowledge partnership** in ADB consisted of collaboration on specific initiatives that led to more systematic and joint project preparation and implementation, engagement of high-level staff in conferences and policy dialogue, and completion of a series of publications or events, sometimes with joint funding. What worked in ADB was to promote clarity and to link up knowledge partnerships with ADB technical expertise, project preparation and high-profile engagement. In contrast, the introduction of knowledge hubs proved mostly unsuccessful due to poor design and focus, under-funding, and lack of linkages with ADB technical staff.

48. In terms of **coordination and cooperation partnerships** the ADB evaluation emphasized flexible engagement rules that may enable strengthening ties with partners over time. Secondly, the ADB evaluation found that its formal partnerships are more often effective than non-formal ones. Thirdly, where

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[7] IEG (2015). *Opportunities and Challenges from Working in Partnership: Findings from IEG's Work on Partnership Programs and Trust Funds.* A learning focused note of World Banks findings on global and regional partnership programmes over the last 10 years. World Bank. Washington, DC.

partnerships allow partners to capitalize on synergies and coordination and to minimize overlaps, positive results could be expected. Gains from aligning interests and tapping into partner strengths allow for a stronger voice with the government in promoting reforms, for example.

Key lessons from other IFIs

- The proliferation of uncoordinated partnership initiatives in global partnership programmes can be reduced by linking those initiatives with country programmes and establishing effective oversight, setting goals and tracking results.
- Cofinancing does not necessarily mobilize additional resources but it facilitates coordination and ultimately better project results.
- Effective knowledge partnerships promote clarity and build strong links with the organization's technical expertise, project preparation and high-profile engagement.
- Flexible engagement over time may enable strengthening ties with partners.
- Formal partnerships are more often effective than informal ones.
- Where partnerships allow partners to capitalize on synergies and coordination and to minimize overlaps positive results could be expected.

Key points from chapter 1

- **Partnerships are a means to an end** – a collaborative relationship toward mutually agreed objectives involving shared responsibility for outcomes.
- Civil society organizations are seen as core partners for achieving IFAD's mandate and strategic objectives. Among them, farmers' organizations (FOs) are very important strategic partners for IFAD as institutions that deliver services to their members, speak on their behalf and are becoming key actors in social and policy dialogue at the local, national and international levels.
- The Indigenous Peoples Policy (2009) encourages IFAD to promote systematic dialogue with representatives of national and subnational indigenous peoples' organizations to share information, consult with them on COSOPs, and promote their participation in institutional outreach and learning events.
- The Private-Sector Strategy (2011) states that working with private companies can bring additional financial resources, technology and access to markets for IFAD target groups.
- The key question to be explored in this synthesis is **what forms of partnership engagement, instruments and partnership modalities, and in what combinations, have been most relevant and effective for IFAD to achieve its partnership goal?**
- The main evidence for this synthesis is derived from a sample of 36 CSPEs conducted between 2006 and 2016. Additional evidence came from CLEs and ESRs prepared by IOE as well as from evaluations conducted by other IFIs.

II. Partnerships for development effectiveness

A. Partnerships – the changing context and IFAD's response

49. **From Paris to Busan.** Partnership principles have been central to the **aid effectiveness agenda**, starting with the First High Level Forum in Rome (2002) which called for stronger partnerships and cooperation at country level. The Second High Level Forum in Paris (2005) concluded with a commitment to five partnership principles for improved aid effectiveness, including country ownership, donor harmonization and alignment, and greater focus on and mutual accountability for development results. These principles were followed up during the Third High Level Forum in Accra (2008) through a broad-based alliance of development partners. The Fourth High Level Forum in Busan (2011) marked a shift in focus from aid effectiveness to the broader concept of **development effectiveness**, which provided a new inclusive framework beyond traditional donors and governments. It emphasized the important role of a wider range of development stakeholders such as the private sector, CSOs, parliamentarians, and local authorities for effective results on the ground.

50. The inclusive framework on partnerships was further elaborated by the **High Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda** (2013) which called for a New Global Partnership: "A new partnership should be based on a common understanding of our shared humanity, underpinning mutual respect and mutual benefit in a shrinking world. This partnership should involve governments *but also include others: people living in poverty, those with disabilities, women, civil society and indigenous and local communities, traditionally marginalized groups, multilateral institutions, local and national government, the business community, academia and private philanthropy*".[8] The need for diverse and inclusive partnerships was reiterated in the **Agenda 2030** which includes a dedicated goal: SDG 17 on multi-stakeholder partnerships and voluntary commitments.

51. **IFAD's Strategic Framework** 2016-2025 recognises the changing context, which provides new challenges for agriculture and rural development and a new development and financing architecture. The strategic framework highlights the importance of partnerships for IFAD to promote synergies among its own and other sources of finance, knowledge and expertise and create more enabling environments for poor people in rural areas to build their pathways out of poverty (p. 20).

52. The **partnership paper prepared for the consultations on IFAD11**[9] addresses more specifically the changing external context that will require stronger partnerships for IFAD. First, the Agenda 2030 involves a **broader rural transformation agenda** which will require IFAD to work with governments and other partners to leverage financing and knowledge, and advocate globally on issues of food security and nutrition, climate change mitigation, youth employment and empowerment of smallholder farmers.[10] Second, IFAD will have to continue adjusting its operational model by **improving resource mobilization, allocation and utilization** from diverse sources.

B. IFAD Strategic Framework and Partnership Strategy

IFAD policies on partnership

53. Whilst partnerships have always been part of IFAD's business model, as part of the consultations for the Eighth Replenishment of IFAD's Resources, the organization

[8] The Report of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, UN) 2013.
[9] IFAD 11 – Leveraging partnerships for country-level impact and global engagement. October 2017.
[10] In a similar vein, the 2016 IFAD Rural Development Report refers to expanded possibilities for partnering on knowledge (p.24).

confirmed that it needed to take a more systematic and strategic approach to partnerships and defined a number of priority areas for action.

54. The **Strategic Framework 2011-2015** therefore highlighted the need for the organization "to strengthen its capacity to lead or contribute to national and international initiatives around small-scale agriculture, food security and rural poverty reduction". To this end, the Framework included "effective partnerships and resource mobilization" as one of eight principles of engagement. Under this principle, the Fund would "seek partnership opportunities and enhance its capacity to operate effectively with partners (…) in all thematic areas and at all levels." Concurrently, IFAD committed itself to reporting back to the Executive Board in September 2011 on the success of its efforts to develop a more selective approach to partnerships and the progress achieved in the priority areas for action. This it did, through an information note on progress in developing a more strategic approach to partnership and collaboration, which further committed IFAD to preparing a partnership strategy.

55. The resulting **2012 Partnership Strategy** recognized that IFAD was already working with a wide array of partners in all aspects of its work. The need was to ensure that partnerships supported the achievement of IFAD's strategic objectives (its corporate management results) and the strategy identified four broad partnership priorities: better country programmes and projects; better inputs into global policy engagement; increased mobilization of resources; and improved organizational efficiency.

Box 1
IFAD definition of partnerships

> In the 2012 Partnership Strategy, partnerships are defined as *"Collaborative relationships between institutional actors that combine their complementary strengths and resources and work together in a transparent, equitable and mutually beneficial way to achieve a common goal or undertake specific tasks. Partners share the risks, responsibilities, resources and benefits of that collaboration and learn from it through regular monitoring and review"*.[11] Embedded in the definition are the three principles of equity, transparency and mutual benefits.

56. While the Partnership Strategy identifies a number of priorities, it does not relate them to different forms of partnership engagement. The Partnership Strategy is oriented toward corporate-level outcomes, but does not propose strategies and objectives to include different partnership instruments, modalities and forms to achieve these outcomes. In particular, there is no guidance on how IFAD will strengthen country-level coordination for K&L, complementarities and synergies, ownership and sustainability and leverage.

57. The Review of the Implementation of the Partnership Strategy during IFAD9 and Priorities for IFAD10 updates the four strategic partnership priorities identified in the Partnership Strategy, to align them with the Pillars of Results Delivery of the Strategic Framework 2016–2025. It specifies the action areas through which the Partnership Strategy identifies, as: (a) better management of partnerships; (b) knowledge management and communication for partnerships; (c) increased partnership skills and capacity and integration into business processes; and (d) effective monitoring of implementation.

58. The new IFAD **Strategic Framework 2016-2025** identifies partnerships both as one of its five principles of engagement and also as one of the means of strengthening the quality of IFAD's country programmes. In addition to

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[11] A similar definition of collaborative partnerships was adopted by some other UN organisations, such as UNIDO and WFP.

strengthening successful existing partnerships - collaboration with the Rome-based agencies (RBAs) will be of strategic priority - and developing new ones, especially with partners with complementary areas of expertise, the IFAD Framework calls for IFAD to continue to engage with the international development community to build support around global issues affecting rural communities. At country level, it calls for IFAD to facilitate multi-stakeholder partnerships between governments, the private sector and small-scale rural producers; through amongst other mechanisms, South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC).

59. The Report on the Consultation on the **Eleventh Replenishment** of IFAD's resources (2017) commits IFAD to further strengthen its partnerships with FAO and World Food Programme (WFP), and a range of institutions such as multilateral development banks, the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, bilateral development agencies, the Global Donor Platform for Rural Development, foundations, non-government organizations (NGOs), farmers' associations and the private sector. Under IFAD11, the Fund has committed to increase its focus on country-level partnerships through stronger country presence.[12]

Partnership instruments

60. In IFAD's business model, partnerships with governments are the basis for the formulation and implementation of rural development programmes that respond to country- and area-specific needs. However, the success of these programmes very much relies on collaboration with other development partners, research institutions, the business sector and civil society. IFAD has a small range of instruments available to foster partnerships.

61. **Formal partnerships**. Some partnerships are formalized through memoranda of understanding or different types of agreements such as:

- **loan agreements** with member state governments at the country level; this is the most common form of partnership that provides the foundation of IFAD's work at country level.
- **supplementary funds agreements** at different levels with multilateral and bilateral organizations such as the OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, the World Bank, and the EU.
- **grants agreements** for projects and activities at the global, regional and national levels with a number of networks and knowledge platforms which pioneer innovation in research for agricultural development (often with research or CSOs)
- **institutional partnership agreements** with UN agencies, multilateral and bilateral development agencies.

62. **Informal partnerships.** Many partnerships, and particularly those at the national and local levels, are less formal and are not governed by any form of agreement. They function effectively on the basis of long-term cooperation and established trust and might end with project completion. For instance, some partnerships are established at the local level for knowledge sharing. Informal partnerships are established as well at ICO level where they contribute to dialogue and networking. Other informal partnerships often work with CSOs and development partners.

63. **Brokering**. In addition to the above instruments, IFAD brokers partnerships between different players, promoting and facilitating partnerships between national or local governments and rural producers' organizations, between governments

[12] See IFAD 11 consultation document "Enhancing IFAD11 business model to deliver impact at scale".

and private-sector players, or between rural producers' organizations and the private sector.

Global partnership initiatives

40. **Global partnerships are highly visible and receive a lot of attention at corporate level.** The IFAD Partnership Strategy (2012) has a strong focus on global partnership initiatives. It is, however, not explicit on the links between global, regional and country partnership initiatives. Spin-offs from global partnership initiatives thus may not be clearly perceived and reported as such at country level.

64. IFAD has been promoting certain **partnership modalities to strengthen cooperation and synergies with certain partners at global, regional and country levels.** These include RBA cooperation, SSTC and private-sector partnerships. These synergies were expected to serve multiple partnership objectives, including knowledge sharing, coordination and leveraging resources.

65. **PPPP**. IFAD is promoting the "4P" arrangement of public-private-producer partnerships, which ensures that smallholder producers are respected partners and that important partnership principles, such as transparency, fairness and accountability are followed, especially when it comes to recognizing local communities' tenure rights (to land, water and forests), the role of women and environmental issues. IFAD's experience in partnering with the private-sector centres on its role as a facilitator and 'honest broker'. As stated in IFAD's Strategic Framework 2011-2015, "As local and international private companies increasingly invest in agriculture, IFAD will partner with them to build mutually beneficial relations between small-scale producers and larger enterprises." Through the projects and programmes that it supports, IFAD has forged partnerships between private companies and groups of small-scale producers along specific value chains.

66. **South-South and Triangular Cooperation**. SSTC is a broad framework for promoting and supporting collaboration among countries of the South in areas such as transfer of knowledge, technology, policies and other resources.[13] Since 2008 IFAD has supported SSTC as an explicit corporate agenda item. SSTC is particularly intended to strategically reposition IFAD among a diverse group of MICs with differentiated services, which has been under discussion since IFAD8. As part of its Strategic Framework 2016-2025, as well as of the IFAD's Approach to South-South and Triangular Cooperation, IFAD plans to strengthen its work in the area of SSTC, seeing it as an integral part of its business model and of its country programming process. Through SSTC activities embedded within its country portfolios, IFAD has the capacity to mobilize, connect and act as a broker for rural poor people across countries of the Global South. SSTC is particularly important for IFAD to work with upper MICs.

67. **RBA cooperation**. Collaboration among the United Nations Rome-based agencies (RBAs), FAO, IFAD, and WFP, is a core priority for all three organizations at country, regional and global levels. In 2016, based on a request from their membership countries, the RBAs produced a document that outlines their joint efforts: *Collaboration among the United Nations Rome-based Agencies: Delivering on the 2030 Agenda*. The current and ongoing priorities for RBA collaboration are: country-level implementation of the 2030 Agenda; nutrition; resilience; data and statistics; and joint technical support to the Committee on World Food Security. In 2015, all three RBAs collaborated on 26 projects in 21 countries. According to the

[13] The "Framework of operational guidelines on United Nations support to South-South and triangular cooperation" (2012) suggested the definition of SSC as "a process whereby two or more developing countries pursue their individual and/or shared national capacity development objectives through exchanges of knowledge, skills, resources and technical know-how, and through regional and interregional collective actions, including partnerships involving Governments, regional organizations, civil society, academia and the private sector, for their individual and/or mutual benefit within and across regions."

CLE on IFAD's Decentralization Experience, ICOs generally viewed IFAD's participation in the One UN Initiative as a low priority, given that IFAD's operating model is different and more akin to that of multilateral development banks (MDBs).

68. **Civil society organizations** are seen as core partners for achieving IFAD's mandate and strategic objectives. The 2011–2015 Strategic Framework included support to rural producers' organizations as an area of thematic focus. The Partnership Strategy (2012) lists civil society among the key partners for IFAD, but it does not outline a specific strategy for partnering with CSOs, nor specific objectives. IFAD also partners directly with international CSOs. For example, Oxfam Novib is working on integrating household approaches in agricultural extension, value chains and rural finance in Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda with support from an IFAD grant.

69. **Farmers' organizations (FOs)** and rural cooperatives are key partners in IFAD's strategic framework and working with them is a high priority. At country level, IFAD's partnerships with FOs have focused on two main strategies consisting in enhancing their involvement in IFAD's Country Strategies (COSOP) and project design and enhancing FO involvement in the implementation of IFAD-funded projects through a tripartite partnership between governments, IFAD and FOs. At the regional level, IFAD has supported the institutional development of FO networks through regional programmes, including through SSTC. At the global level, in 2004, IFAD launched the Farmers' Forum as the overall framework of the partnership between IFAD and FOs.

70. **Indigenous peoples.** Since its establishment in 1978, IFAD has paid particular attention to indigenous peoples' issues, mainly in Latin America and Asia. The main instruments for IFAD's partnership support to indigenous peoples are loans, grants at country and regional levels and participation in the global debate on indigenous peoples' issues. The Indigenous Peoples Policy (2009) encourages IFAD to promote systematic dialogue with representatives of national and subnational indigenous peoples' organizations to share information, consult with them on COSOPs, and promote their participation in institutional outreach and learning events. However, at country level reference to indigenous peoples and their issues is not always explicit and they may be discussed as part of "the vulnerable" or the "marginalized" in IFAD documents and CSPEs.

Monitoring partnerships

71. COSOPs are seen as the main tool for strategic planning, managing and monitoring of partnerships at country level.[14] At the moment, performance on partnership is monitored through the annual client survey, which covers a selection of countries only.[15] In 2017, partnership-building was satisfactory in 33 per cent of the countries surveyed. The highest scores were noted for the East and Southern Africa Division (ESA). Partnership-building scores in 2016 and 2017 were below the 2014 scores.[16]

72. In response, IFAD management has since then committed to generate better partnership results under IFAD11 through enhanced emphasis on organizational decentralization and non-lending activities.[17]

C. IOE evaluations of partnership performance

73. Stagnating performance on partnership has also been noted in the **IOE Annual Report on the Results and Impact of IFAD Operations (ARRI).** The 2017

[14] See IFAD11 Replenishment Outcome Document "Leaving no one behind", December 2017.
[15] In 2017 34 countries were invited to participate in the client survey but only 30 had eligible responses.
[16] Recent activities and initiatives to better focus and selectivity and regular monitoring/reporting of partnership and providing stronger incentives to prioritize partnership-building include the revision of the RB-COSOP guidelines and new Supervision guidelines.
[17] 2017 RIDE.

ARRI indicated a steady decline in evaluation ratings for partnership-building, with moderately satisfactory or higher ratings declining from 91 per cent (2009-2011) to 75 per cent (2011-2014) to 62 per cent, (2013-2015).[18] The percentage of fully satisfactory ratings did not increase since 2006 and actually declined after 2011. At the same time the percentage of moderately unsatisfactory ratings remained stable (see figure 2 below).

Figure 2
Percentage of partnership-building ratings in 3-year moving averages (2006-2016)

Source: IFAD IOE ratings database (2017) – compiled from data in annex VII.3.

74. **Poor performance of a range of countries in recent years indicates continued problems with partnerships in these countries and in partnership-building in general.** Fully satisfactory performance was found only in countries in sub-Saharan Africa; ESA had the highest frequency of satisfactory ratings. Notably, ESA is the only region without moderately unsatisfactory ratings (see table 3 in annex VII.1). Part of the reason for the very positive results for ESA has been the strong emphasis on partnership-building in the region by the donor community and governments after the Paris 2005 Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, with many countries developing Joint (Donor) Assistance Strategies during that period (as well as in a few West-African countries, such as Mali). Least satisfactory performance has been noted in MICs (in the Near East, North Africa and Europe Division [NEN], the Latin America and the Caribbean Division [LAC], and the Asia and the Pacific Division [APR]). LAC has the highest number of moderately unsatisfactory ratings. While there are some positive examples for partnerships improvements in some countries this finding still suggests IFAD needs to be more specific on partnership goals and strategy in MICs.

75. This ESR found that, to some extent, the ratings decline is less related to the number of partnerships than to their quality and results. **Fully satisfactory performance was noted only in countries where all three categories of partnerships were present**. This indicates the need for a having a mix of partners and types of partnership engagement to achieve good results at country level (see figure 1 in annex VIII.2). Moreover, IFAD expectations of partnership-building have changed over time. There is now more attention from IFAD Management (and evaluators) on partnerships, reinforced by the 2012 Partnership Strategy, increased country presence and improved COSOPs. All these factors put the bar for performance in partnership-building higher.

76. **Outlier analysis**. The ESR has looked at the outliers that had CSPE ratings for partnership-building that were higher or lower than the average "moderately

[18] The 2017 ARRI notes that while partnerships with government have been positive, there was scope for improvement in partnerships with other IFIs and private entities. Similarly, ICOs could develop substantive partnerships, rather than just the number of partnerships.

satisfactory" (4). These outliers are the seven CSPEs where partnership has been rated "moderately unsatisfactory" (3) and the five CSPEs where partnership has been rated "satisfactory" (5) in the sample of 36 CSPEs. Countries that had a **broad-based partnering approach** and **good strategic focus** together with a **strong non-lending programme** were rated high, while those that heavily depended on government as the key partner and had missed opportunities to partner with other actors, were rated low. The examples are presented in further detail in the following chapter.

Table 1
Overview of outliers

Positive outliers ("satisfactory")	*Negative outliers ("moderately unsatisfactory")*
Broad-based partnering approach (Madagascar, Niger) Strong support to FOs (Madagascar, Mali, Niger) Collaboration with RBAs (Mali, Mozambique)	Few partnerships outside government (Bolivia, Gambia, Nigeria, Turkey)
Strong cofinancing (Mali)	Little or no cofinancing (Nigeria, India)
Successful PPPP (Uganda)	Missed opportunities to partner with private sector (Ecuador, India, Nigeria, Turkey)
Good alignment, donor coordination (Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Uganda); Strong non-lending activities (Madagascar) Focus on complementarities (Niger, Uganda).	Lack of strategic focus (Nigeria) Weak or unrealistic COSOP goals (Ecuador, Indonesia)

Source: IOE review of CSPEs in annex VII.3.

Key points from chapter II

- The rural transformation agenda under the Agenda 2030 will require IFAD to work with a **broader range of partners** and to adjust its operational model by improving resource mobilization, allocation and utilization from diverse sources.
- IFAD's business model relies on strong partnerships with government.
- The main **partnership instruments** are loans and grants. Besides this, IFAD has a limited range of instruments available for partnership-building, such as dialogue, networking and brokering.
- Many partnerships at national and local levels are less formal and not governed by any form of agreement.
- One of the most prevalent forms of partnerships is **cofinancing**, mostly with IFIs and bi-laterals (including the EU through a global partnership).
- According to IOE evaluations, poor performance of a range of countries in recent years indicates that partnerships have been too narrow or too weak to support IFAD's goals in these countries.
- Fully satisfactory performance was noted only in countries where all three categories of partnerships were present.
- Countries that had a **broad-based partnering approach** and **good strategic focus** together with a **strong non-lending programme** were rated high by IOE.
- Countries that heavily depended on government as key partner and had missed opportunities to partner with other actors, were rated low.

III. Main findings from the synthesis

A. Relevance and prevalence of partnership categories

77. This section will discuss the relevance and importance of the three main partnership categories at IFAD that were already briefly presented in the ToC, based on the CSPE sample reviewed by this ESR. It will also review the importance of certain key IFAD partners, using data from the recent PRM survey.

78. The ESR uses **three main categories of partnerships** for country engagement that are primarily defined by: (i) cofinancing and other financial arrangements; (ii) K&L; and (iii) coordination and cooperation for various purposes and partnership outcomes. They build on similar categories applied by the 2016 ADB partnership evaluation.[19]

79. Figure 3 shows the sample CSPEs, or countries, that are reporting nothing, some, substantial and very strong partnerships in each of the three categories. 'Very strong' or 'substantial' partnerships are reported for cofinancing partnerships (16 countries), followed by K&L (14 countries) and coordination and cooperation partnerships (12 countries). For a significant number of countries there was no evidence reported in the CSPEs on the respective partnership category (8 or 7, depending on category).

Figure 3
Importance of different partnership categories



Source: CSPE review, compiled from data in annex V.1

Cofinancing partnerships

80. Financing partnerships (or cofinancing)[20] combine the financial resources of partners to support development efforts and create cofinancing opportunities. This includes joint or parallel financing of standard IFAD loan projects with international partners.[21] Cofinancing is also sometimes found in grants, such as in the form of contributions from governments or the private sector. For IFAD an important goal for seeking cofinancing, in addition to increased outreach and impact, is to leverage additional resources into the agricultural sector.

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[19] AfDB 2016.
[20] According to the definition in OECD 2007, Glossary of Statistical Terms, cofinancing is "The joint or parallel financing of programmes or projects through loans or grants to developing countries provided by commercial banks, export credit agencies, other official institutions in association with other agencies or banks, or the World Bank and other multilateral financial institutions."
[21] Financing partnerships may increasingly also consist of domestic cofinancing in recipient countries, cofinancing with international or national foundations, CSOs or private sector as partners (partly financed through global trust-funds), and sizable government counterpart funding in IFAD loan- or grant-funded projects (e.g. in well-funded MICs).

81. In fact IFAD anticipates that future sources of cofinancing will have to shift and diversify with the changing opportunities and demands of IFAD's clients and partners, particularly MICs and the private sector (PRM Replenishment Paper 2017). Yet CPMs also note that each region faces different specific situations regarding domestic cofinancing.[22]

82. **International cofinancing** mainly comes from multilateral sources. Between 2003 and 2015, IFAD's top cofinancing partners were the International Development Association (US$1.0 billion), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) (US$0.8 billion), OFID (US$0.5 billion), AfDB (US$0.3 billion), Islamic Development Bank (US$0.1 billion) and the European Union (US$0.1 billion).[23]

Box 2
CPM feedback on the importance of cofinancing partners

At country level, the relative importance of cofinancing partners shows a slight difference, as indicated in the feedback from CPMs collected through the PRM survey (see annex III). For the CPMs, the most important partner for cofinancing is government, followed by various multilateral agencies, with OFID, the World Bank and the EU as the most important ones. GEF is mentioned as a cofinancing partner only once. The private sector has played a role in cofinancing in six countries, according to the survey. The feedback from CPMs also indicated difficulties in partnerships, in particular with the EU.

83. IFAD also mobilizes **supplementary project funds** outside of the regular replenishment (and its regular grant programme of work), sometimes covering important thematic niches[24] or collaborating with other global funds.[25] For instance, the IFAD-GEF partnership is a particularly important and long-running source of supplementary funds and cooperation that capitalizes on linkages between GEF strategic priorities and IFAD programmes and projects, to make them mutually reinforcing and to ensure maximum financial and environmental sustainability.[26] Among the CSPEs reviewed there were references to GEF partnerships in Brazil,[27] Jordan and Ecuador.

84. Cofinancing partnerships are more important in LICs than in MICs, as are coordination and cooperation partnerships. K&L partnerships are more often reported for MICs.

[22] According to CPMs in ESA, MICs are not particularly keen to provide high domestic cofinancing as they prefer IFAD to help them through knowledge and technological innovations.
[23] IOE. CLE on IFAD's Decentralization Experience (2016).
[24] For example environmental funds (such as the Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme, ASAP, and GEF) and some assorted other topics (such as ICT, supported by the Government of Korea; remittances and agricultural risk management supported by the EU).
[25] For example the Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme, GAFSP
[26] The IFAD-GEF unit became the environment and climate division (ECD) in 2010. It works with country programme managers (CPMs) to design components that complement IFAD loan-funded projects by reinforcing the sustainability of outcomes to enable governments to meet their national commitments on environment and climate.
[27] Also see Brazil case study on scaling up, presented in chapter III F.

Figure 4
Importance of partnerships by country category - countries reporting substantial and very strong partnerships by MIC and LIC country category



Source: CSPE review, compiled from data in annex V.1.

Knowledge and learning partnerships

85. K&L partnerships are alliances and networks that focus on generating and transferring knowledge and innovations in a particular sector or theme, and on learning and applying this knowledge in operations and harmonizing approaches. K&L partnerships at IFAD have two main purposes. Firstly, to add technical content to IFAD interventions and facilitate innovations, such as through applied and action research. And secondly, to facilitate exchange and learning on best practices and to inform policy engagement to allow for mainstreaming and scaling up of IFAD interventions. The main instruments for K&L partnerships are grants for partners at regional level, in countries and through SSTC.

86. K&L results and related grants are not as rigorously designed, monitored and reported as loan projects. Most importantly, they are not assembled in a corporate database, which often makes it difficult to know and assess their effects, even in countries and for IFAD country offices (ICOs) where they are active. The storage and retrieval of grants documentation and data has been weak, which limited learning from results.[28] In addition, K&L partnerships include a number of informal partnerships with international and national partners, which are often mentioned in the COSOP and the related documentation, but outcomes from these partnerships are not systematically documented.

87. The PRM survey (see annex III) mentions government as the most important partner for K&L at country level, followed by research institutes and multilateral agencies, in particular the RBAs. However, despite the RBAs being rated as the "second most important partner" there was very limited evidence on results from RBA partnerships in the CSPEs under review.

Coordination and cooperation partnerships

88. Coordination and cooperation partnerships are tactical and strategic relationships with development partners, beyond the first two categories, to further help IFAD implement its corporate objectives and country strategies. They seek to promote broad-based cooperation at country level in coordinating development approaches

[28] Since the 2009 policy strategic workplans for grants are required, at corporate level. But these workplans are not always transparent, poorly monitored, and apparently not too well aligned with country COSOPs. In countries grants are to be used to further COSOP objectives (grants to be integrated in and linked through COSOP). Yet many grants respond to ad-hoc requests from proposals, rather than follow a strategic plan. This may change with the new 2015 grant policy. For the purposes of this ESR the 2009 grant policy is used as reference since application of and results from the 2015 grant policy and procedures would be too early to be captured by CSPEs or other evaluations.

and acting as partners, in project and programme design, loan and grant investments, analytical work and policy engagement. They may be more oriented towards improved service delivery through partnerships (such as cooperation with RBAs, IFIs and governments) or to generating links across areas (such as health, education and agriculture) to produce synergies. The extent of cooperation in these partnerships may vary. Coordination and cooperation partnerships could be related to IFAD loan projects or to the broader non-lending programme.

89. Coordination and cooperation partnerships are often **informal** and therefore not systematically documented and tracked.

Less frequent partnerships

90. Within the portfolio reviewed by this ESR some partnerships are reported more frequently than others, as indicated in the sections above and further discussed in the following sections. It becomes evident that not all partnerships and, even more importantly, not all partnership outcomes are equally well reported. However some partnerships are simply less common or frequent and hence there is less evidence available on the outcomes.

91. The PRM survey sheds some light on this. For some partners, although they appear as a strategic priority at global level, there is actually no or limited engagement in many countries. Indigenous peoples groups were prominent partners in LAC and APR only; in the other regions they are not even present. It also appears that there is no or limited engagement with several of the multi-lateral and bilateral agencies in a number of countries (see annex III).

Key points from section A – Relevance and prevalence of partnership categories

- IFAD partnerships can be classified into three categories. These three categories of partnerships are equally important and they have **complementary roles** to play in enhancing IFAD’s development effectiveness at global, regional and country levels.
- **Financing partnerships** (or cofinancing) combine the financial resources of partners and are (almost) always formal. The most important partner for cofinancing is government, followed by various multilateral agencies, with OFID, the World Bank and the EU as the most important ones.
- **Knowledge and learning partnerships** are formal and informal alliances and networks that are often supported through regional and country grants.
- **Coordination and cooperation partnerships** are relationships of tactical or strategic importance, sometimes funded by grants. But they are often informal and therefore not systematically documented and tracked.

B. Differences in partnership modalities, instruments and partners in MICs and LICs

92. IFAD’s Partnership Strategy is not explicit on how partnerships should be developed in different types of countries. Yet there are important differences with regard to the relevance and importance of different partnership modalities, instruments and partners in MICs and LICs. These differences will be reviewed in the following section for the four country categories commonly used by IFAD: LICs, upper MICs, lower MICs and countries with fragile or most fragile situations (MFS). The information is based on the 36 reviewed CSPEs.

93. The **prevalence of partners** shows some variation between the different country categories. Partnerships with international development partners and IFIs are more frequently reported in LICs. The private sector and FOs are slightly more frequent partners of IFAD in MICs.

Figure 5
Proportion of partner types (out of all partners) reported in LICs and MICs



Source: CSPE review, see data in annex V tables 4 – 5.

94. **Partnership goals and partnership requirements and preferences are very different in LICs, lower and upper MICs and MFSs.** They also vary by region and depend on the primary beneficiaries. The most notable differences exist between Latin America, Eastern Europe and parts of NEN and those of sub-Saharan Africa and much of Asia where IFAD works. Latin America includes a number of advanced countries with strong national and regional CSOs.

Box 3
Feedback from CPMs – partnerships differ in MICs and LICs

According to the PRM survey, partnerships were less satisfactory in upper and lower MICs. In LICs the majority of partnerships were found at least moderately satisfactory. The survey indicates that partnerships with indigenous peoples groups, FOs and FAO were working well in upper and lower MICS. The Feedback from lower MICs indicates difficulties in partnerships with traditional donors (EU, World Bank, bilateral agencies) and research/academic institutions.

95. **Middle-income countries** are a very heterogeneous category, including lower and upper MICs.[29] The diversity within MICs as a group makes generalizations difficult and poses challenges to IFAD's overall approach and strategy. It is clear that what MICs need from IFAD is changing.[30] Government roles and demand for partnerships, including the partnership with IFAD, change over time as economies grow, the rural sector diversifies and the structure and patterns of rural poverty evolve. **Upper MICs** are interested in SSTC and technical know-how, in addition to being recipients of IFAD loans, and they are often also emerging donors.

96. **Low-income countries** require more interaction with government and investment in basic partner capacity building than MICs. IFAD needs more non-governmental partners for project implementation, coordination and service delivery where government capacities are weak (often LICs and MFSs) or in countries affected by natural and political calamities. For the same reasons, **fragile and conflict-**

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[29] Over 100 countries with GNI per capita of US$1,036 to US$12,615 are classified as MICs. They range in size from China, Brazil and India to Antigua and Lesotho. 72 per cent of IFAD's recipient Member States are currently (2012) classified as MICs, compared with 57 per cent in 2004. The proportion of LICs will continue to decrease. In 2012, IFAD disbursed around 70 per cent of its resources to MICS, as compared with 38 per cent in 2004 (IOE ESR on IFAD's Engagement in Middle-income Countries 2014).
[30] See ESR on IFAD's Engagement in Middle-income Countries (2014).

affected states that have many problems with government performance require special attention to alternative partnerships in order to ensure effective delivery of projects and services.

Box 2
Case study Nepal: CSO partnership

Nepal is an example of partnerships with CSOs in difficult environments and fragile and conflict affected states. In Nepal, IFAD directly built on the 2006 policy on IFAD Crisis Prevention and Recovery that suggests identifying relevant institutional development competencies in rural organizations, CSOs and community-based organizations for enhancing social cohesion and community resilience in rural areas. While most partners are financed through project loans, the CSPE points out that cooperation works better through grants, partly due to public procurement rules. Secondly, there is apparently a drawback to generating thousands of non-sustainable beneficiary groups as "partners" to deliver goods and services. At the time of the CSPE (2012), there were few self-reliant and sustainable FOs in Nepal. In general, the multitude of CSOs and beneficiary associations complicates partnering and synergies in Nepal. The CSPE concludes that for Nepal there are too many project-dependent beneficiary groups, but a shortage of profitable enterprises and sufficiently strong community organizations.

97. The review of CSPEs shows that **partnership instruments and modalities** vary between MICs and LICs. Loans and grants are almost equally used in MICs and LICs. While loan-funded projects are still a priority in many MICs, non-lending activities – knowledge management, policy engagement and partnerships – become particularly important in MICs, as is the scaling up agenda. In MICs partnerships are more often geared towards communicating IFAD approaches and experiences, alliance-building and lobbying. Interestingly IFAD is more likely to adopt a **brokering** role in MICs. The increasing requirement is for IFAD to work more indirectly with a wider range of partners and enable them to play a greater role in development in these countries.

98. **Dialogue and networking** are more common in LICs, mainly because in many LICs there is a more elaborate structure of development assistance to support dialogue and networking among development partners and IFAD has to play a direct role in it. In general, donor cooperation – and the platform it provides for dialogue and networking - is somewhat weaker in MICs than in LICs, in particular in upper MICs. **RBA cooperation** appears to be more common in LICs for the same reason.

Figure 6
Partnership instruments and modalities in LICs and MICs (prevalence in CSPE sample)



Source: CSPE review, see data in annex V tables 4 – 5.

99. **Knowledge and learning** is relatively more *in demand* in higher income countries (MICs) than in lower income and fragile countries although *importance* of K&L may

not actually vary. **SSTC** as a special mechanism of South-South knowledge transfer is of highest importance for the upper MICs, at least on the supply side; while all countries may participate in related exchanges.

100. **PPPPs** have higher prevalence in LICs despite their weaker economies. Apparently, in the absence of effective government funding, IFAD has placed greater emphasis on bringing in the private sector to provide critical services and investments in LICs. On the other hand, there seems to have been either less attention to or fewer opportunities to broker PPPPs in MICs, although the private sector is more present in these countries. An alternative reason could be that in MICs the private sector is more mature and may neither require, nor desire, public sector interventions.

Key points from section B – Differences in partnership modalities, instruments and partners in MICs and LICs

- IFAD's Partnership Strategy does not specify the strategic focus of partnership development in different types of countries. Yet **partnership goals and partnership requirements and preferences** are very different in LICs, lower and upper MICs and fragile and conflict affected states.
- **Upper MICs** are interested in technical know-how and SSTC in addition to being recipients of IFAD loans, and they are often also emerging donors.
- In **low-income countries** and **fragile and conflict-affected states** IFAD relies to a greater extent on partners outside of government. But overall, the number of partnerships is lower in LICs than in MICs.
- **Dialogue and networking** are more common in LICs, mainly because in many LICs there is a more elaborate structure to support dialogue and networking among development partners.
- MICs often have significant domestic **cofinancing**, particularly upper MICs. Cofinancing opportunities with other donors decrease with country income level, while those with government and other domestic partners increase.

C. Effectiveness of various partnership categories and types of engagement

Cofinancing partnerships

101. In line with the globally growing importance of cofinancing, the ESR found strong and substantial evidence of **international cofinancing** with other donors in many countries within the CSPE sample (annex VII.3). For the related evaluation periods five countries had international cofinancing ratios above 100 per cent: Ghana, Mali, Nepal and Uganda (annex IV.2); while 22 countries had less than 50 per cent, the lowest being Brazil, Nigeria, China and Viet Nam.[31]

102. **Cofinancing opportunities with other donors clearly decrease with country income level**, while those with government and other domestic partners increase. There is a large amount of **government cofinancing** in Brazil, China, Nigeria, Pakistan and Uganda (>100 per cent) (annex IV.2), and significant amounts of non-government domestic cofinancing can be found in India and Uganda (50–100 per cent). This indicates the potential of tapping other cofinancing sources beyond international donors, particularly in emerging lower MICs, such as Nigeria, India and Uganda and in upper MICs.

103. **Cofinancing with other donors** worked best in countries with long-term trust built up between partners (such as Ethiopia and Ghana), and where the number of IFAD cofinancing partners was not too large (sometimes there is reference to too

[31] These figures are based on the IFAD GRIPS data base, but only include countries with CSPEs in 2006-2016.

many scattered and small cofinancing partnerships, such as in Kenya and Nicaragua). It helps when donors are 'like-minded' in their development philosophy and approaches, as was the case in Moldova.

104. In some countries, cofinancing is the rule, rather than the exception (such as in Mali); in others it is not encouraged (e.g. Nigeria) or difficult in practice because aid is primarily provided through budget-support. In some countries high cofinancing shares may be driven by individual projects, such as in an IFAD-World Bank cofinanced project in Nepal. Country-specific cofinancing also varies dramatically by the period examined and the source of project cofinancing information (planned at design or actually cofinancing in the end).

105. **A number of CSPEs describe international cofinancing as 'under-exploited' and recommend stronger pursuit of cofinancing**, in particular with other MDBs (such as in Brazil, China, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda and Viet Nam). The CSPEs refer to several reasons why cofinancing may be difficult for IFAD, or even impossible. Often these are related to government and other donor preferences. In many countries governments prefer to work separately with donors, for a variety of reasons. And there is often no solid base or rationale for cofinancing as other donors are on different time lines or there is insufficient overlap of interests and priorities, or of targeted areas or beneficiaries. Even in countries with good cofinancing it is sometimes difficult to align schedules with others (e.g. Mali). In many countries cofinancing was limited due to prevailing and preferred budget support by government and other major donors.

> ***Hypothesis testing:*** *The hypothesis that (international) cofinancing may be over-rated for country partnership outcomes was rejected for seven countries (although there was some evidence of its full or partial veracity in other countries).*

106. Cofinancing may be over-rated for resource mobilization, but it has an important place for country partnership outcomes, particularly through its co-variant effects, such as for complementarities and policy engagement. This has been confirmed by the lessons from other IFIs (see chapter II D) and the cofinancing analysis (see chapter III E). But as with so many partnership efforts, cofinancing also entails certain costs and trade-offs. A recent study conducted by the Research and Impact Assessment Division of IFAD[32] concluded that projects with large amounts of cofinancing often disburse more slowly.

Knowledge and learning partnerships

107. **Much of the IFAD support for K&L work comes from grants.** Global and regional grants cover 70 per cent by numbers and 77 per cent by volume of all grants (according to the CLE on the IFAD Policy for Grant Financing).[33] IFAD grants are provided for agricultural research, knowledge management, policy engagement, and capacity building for government and CSOs, particularly for pro-poor research on innovative approaches, strengthened partners' institutional and policy capacities, enhanced advocacy and policy engagement and sharing of knowledge for development impact.[34] FAO is the single biggest recipient of IFAD grants with 7.6 per cent of total grants between 2004 and 2013[35]. Grants for FAO included knowledge work, policy engagement, and capacity building.[36] The

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[32] IFAD. Disbursement performance of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). 2017.
[33] The 2015 IFAD Policy for Grant Financing maintains grants at 6.5 per cent of the projected IFAD annual programme of loans and grants, distributed to global and regional grants (5 per cent) and country specific grants (1.5 per cent), which would correspond to 70 per cent for global and regional grants of all grants.
[34] IFAD 2015 Policy for Grant Financing, para. 8.
[35] CLE: The IFAD Policy for Grant Financing (2014).
[36] Topics covered Animal Health Packages for the Rural Poor, Wheat Rust and Early Warning, Poultry Development, Fostering Financial Innovations (CABFIN), and Capacity Development for Better Management of Public Investments in Small Scale Agriculture.

International Center for Agriculture Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA) and the International Centre for Research in Agroforestry were ranked second and third.[37]

Hypothesis testing: *Knowledge and learning were found in half of the CSPEs (18 countries) to be significantly positively correlated to research grants to international and national institutions and country-level work by these organizations. In general, grants were critical for effective partnerships in 15 countries.*

108. **Grants allow IFAD to collaborate with a wide range of institutions** that have a comparative advantage in certain areas and can therefore provide complementary input to advance IFAD's mandate.[38] Grants have been instrumental in fostering cooperation with other institutions, such as the Indigenous Peoples' Forum and regional farmer federations. Often grants enabled IFAD to broaden its partnerships beyond the loan projects and cooperate with research institutions and CSOs. In a number of cases these partnerships have helped to develop innovative approaches or knowledge products. For example, in Nepal, IFAD is very active on K&L with many CSOs, including a programme with SNV (an international Dutch NGO) on developing an innovative and inclusive business approach. In Mali, grants resulted in improved techniques and approaches in IFAD micro-finance interventions. The RuralStruc grant is an example of an innovative partnership grant, implemented in cooperation with a French NGO, to produce a major study to prepare a project for unemployed youth (the Rural Youth Vocational Training Employment and Entrepreneurship Support Project - FIER). The revised 2009 grant policy had already included the private sector as a recipient for IFAD grants.

109. **A large share of IFAD funding for knowledge and innovation goes into global and regional grants, but these have been insufficiently linked with the country programmes**. The CLE on the IFAD Policy for Grant Financing found too few links between global and regional grants and individual country programmes, such as loan-funded investment projects and country policy engagement. Results and learning from such grants inadequately benefit country programmes, although many are simply multi-country grant projects or programmes, not addressing trans-border issues or public goods. The CLE argued that some grant activities at country level, such as research, could be better carried out by national rather than international institutions. The CSPEs noted for Ecuador, Nigeria, and Tanzania that there was too little integration of regional grants with the national IFAD programme and networking between grants and loans in general. The China CSPE found little awareness among in-country primary IFAD partners of the IFAD global and regional grants that also operate in China and that global and regional grants were insufficiently linked to the main lending programme.

110. **Grants that go to international research organizations often do not lead to uptake of innovations in the country**. The CSPE for India highlighted missed opportunities for the incorporation of CGIAR centres and finds their operations in the country not clear. It notes too little linking up of the country programme with reputed national and international specialists and think tanks despite all the grants to international research institutions active in the country. Similarly, the CPE for Nigeria reports a considerable number of grants for innovation for technology (e.g. for the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture on cassava); but their effectiveness and link-up with loan activities in the country is spurious. Vertical connections between research grants to IRRI and WorldFish are somewhat better in Bangladesh, where they are strategic and at least partly connected to the country

[37] The CLE does not present outputs and outcomes of collaboration with FAO, but it looked at conditions under which grants to UN agencies are working. This included the presence of some specific and cutting-edge thematic/technical/normative expertise; and, secondly, leadership in high-level policy discussion and dialogue, strength of network and demonstrated convening capacity.
[38] CLE: The IFAD Policy for Grant Financing (2014).

programme. An exception to weak regional/country linkages is found in the Philippines, where innovation grants with international centres were well integrated to several projects, mainly helped by the strong presence of international centres in the country.

Coordination and cooperation partnerships

111. IFAD country partnerships for coordination and cooperation tend to have multiple purposes, ranging from specific project-based cooperation and better service delivery to long-term alliances, aiming at policy engagement and influence, to scaling up and to addressing specific gender interests and those of marginalized groups and indigenous peoples. Partnerships with RBAs, other donors, CSOs/FOs and the private sector are very diverse.

> ***Hypothesis testing:*** *Coordination and cooperation partnerships work best when accompanied by regular country and global interaction and communication on country and thematic priorities, commonalities and complementarities of involved agencies (19 countries).*

112. **Coordination and cooperation partnerships with international donors can be an effective vehicle for leveraging policy influence in countries with a well-functioning aid coordination structure**. The best examples for coordination and cooperation partnerships are national working groups for agriculture or specific sub-sectors in agriculture and rural development. Consultative partnerships with other donors are particularly strong in many sub-Saharan countries with strong donor Joint Assistance Strategies, such as Tanzania, Zambia, or Uganda. In Tanzania, the Agriculture Sector Development Programme, as the key government/donor aid delivery mechanism, is seen as very important for influence and leverage. Sometimes these partnerships are being organized in the context of the UN and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) (e.g. in Niger, Pakistan and Yemen).

113. **Cooperation partnerships with CSOs can be important for leveraging influence on specific issues that are at the core of IFAD's mandate.** Strategic partners in this respect are FOs and indigenous people's organizations. IFAD's work with FOs is particularly strong in Latin America, the Sahel and parts of Asia, and in countries that emphasize cooperative development (e.g. Rwanda and Viet Nam).[39] Other case studies of strong and long-term work with FOs were found in Mali, Niger, Viet Nam and Nicaragua.[40] IFAD receives supplementary funds from the EU for support to FO networks.

114. **Grants are an important instrument for partnerships with NGOs/CSOs.** Partnerships with CSOs were in the majority of cases established through grants. In the CSPE sample, CSO partnerships were established through grants in 21 countries; through loans in only 9 countries. Partnerships with FOs were through grants in 7 countries, and through loans in 3 countries.

115. **Partnerships with CSO platforms and apex organizations enable more strategic engagement.** The low capacity of CSOs to engage with development partners was often found to be a limitation.[41] IFAD's partnership with CSO

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[39] Some of the information in the following section comes from the 'Partnership in Progress 2014-2015 Report' to the sixth global meeting of the Farmers' Forum in conjunction with the thirty-ninth session of IFAD's Government Council, 15-16 February 2016.

[40] IFAD-supported farmers' organizations in Mali were chosen in 2016 to receive a direct grant from the Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme for strengthening the 'missing middle' of producer organizations in value chains. IFAD FO Focus in Niger is on decentralization and independent community structures for better market integration. In Viet Nam IFAD's strategy is to work with farmers' and women's unions. The IMPP project partnered successfully with a Women's Union vocational training centre, associated with a textile company. The DBRP project piloted enterprises with Farmers' Union to supply decorative leaves and flowers.

[41] See: IEG Evaluation of Engaging Citizens for Better Development Results (2017); also ADB evaluation of partnerships (2016).

platforms or apex organizations was instrumental to overcome these constraints and leverage influence in policy processes. In the case of AROPA[42] in Madagascar (2007-2008) the national apex FOs played an important role in the country programme strategy design. National and provincial FOs were active members of the 2006-2012 COSOP Preparation Committee and in the 2015-2019 COSOP they worked in thematic groups and sub-groups to propose key strategic areas of intervention. They also have four seats at the national country programme management team contributing to tripartite discussions with IFAD and the Ministries of Finance and Agriculture. In Senegal, the national apex FOs participated in the 2010-2015 COSOP design process through various multi-stakeholder workshops and the validation workshop contributing to the identification of key areas for IFAD investments.

Box 3
Case study India: IFAD as a partner of choice in remote areas of India

In a large lower middle-income country like India, the government views IFAD as a partner of choice in remote areas where agricultural productivity is lagging and poverty incidence is high. State governments also value IFAD's cooperation due to its attention to quality, reaching deeper in poverty layers, support to imaginative and innovative solutions and some tolerance for risk taking. For example, the North-East Region Community Resource Management Project (NERCORMP) works with 21 tribes, each with its own language, customs and systems of land tenure and local governance. Some of the project villages are situated in conflict-prone areas characterised by rivalries between tribes. In many projects local authorities are involved at all levels and provide political and technical support. In two projects (OTELP and NERCORMP), close interaction and partnership with the District Magistrate facilitated the recognition of forest and land rights for tribal poor and leveraged resources from national schemes for watershed management projects.

116. There are only very few references in the assessed CSPEs to partnerships with **indigenous peoples**, most notably the report on India, where Scheduled Tribes are actually one of the main IFAD target categories (see also the case study in scaling up section). In Viet Nam, one project (3PAD) worked specifically with ethnic minorities to promote agro-forestry, eco-tourism, agribusiness and PPPP for sustainable forestland use. Interestingly, in Ecuador the CSPE reported some resentment for the preference for indigenous peoples compared with other similarly poor smallholder farmers. The other countries where activities targeted to indigenous peoples are mentioned in the reviewed CSPEs are Argentina and Bolivia, but without providing much detail.

[42] Projet d'Appui au Renforcement des Organisations Professionnelles et aux Services Agricoles.

Key points from section C – Effectiveness of partnership categories and types of engagement

- **Cofinancing** from international and domestic partners has been important in many countries, but often the CSPEs found that opportunities for cofinancing were not sufficiently pursued. In particular there is scope for IFAD to tap into significant domestic cofinancing in upper MICs.
- Cofinancing may be over-rated for resource mobilization, but it has an important place for country partnership outcomes, particularly through its co-variant effects, such as for complementarities and policy engagement.
- **Knowledge and learning** were found to be significantly positively correlated to research grants to international and national institutions and country level work by these organizations.
- In general, grants are critical for effective partnerships. However, a large share of IFAD grant funding goes to international research organizations that often do not lead to uptake of innovations in the countries.
- **Coordination and cooperation** partnerships work best when accompanied by regular country and global interaction and communication on country and thematic priorities, commonalities and complementarities of involved agencies. These types of partnerships are often very effective in policy engagement.

D. Effectiveness of specific partnership modalities

RBA cooperation

117. **Despite RBA cooperation being a corporate priority, in general, IFAD partnership with RBAs and the UN was found to be weak.** The majority of CSPEs do not report significant involvement, sometimes referring to underexploited potential, particularly with FAO (e.g. in Kenya).[43] The PRM survey showed that CPMs were relatively satisfied in engaging with FAO, although it is not clear in what context (e.g. through FAO Investment Centre project design, an IFAD grant to FAO, or other forms of cooperation). The ESR on Non-lending Activities in the Context of South-South Cooperation also noted that opportunities with RBAs around SSTC have not been fully exploited. Nevertheless, a few positive country-level examples of partnerships with FAO and WFP were found, among others in Brazil, China, Mali, Mozambique and Turkey.

Hypothesis testing: *In 11 of the 36 CSPEs there was some indication that interagency coordination with RBAs works best where there are clear corporate agreements on scope and outcomes at country level.*

118. **There are only few cases of RBA collaboration reported on specific projects**, such as those in Mali (the Northern Mali Investment and Rural Development Programme and the Kidal Integrated Rural Development Programme); and on formulation and design with the FAO Investment Centre. With WFP there were examples of partnerships in several food security and nutrition activities and in outreach to conflict areas. Mozambique appears to have had one of the strongest long-term collaborations with RBAs among the CSPEs reviewed. First in a market support project from 2008 to 2011, then in an EC-funded Millennium Development Goal 1c project to promote nutrition, which included joint field visits. Still, the CSPE reports that there have been many coordination issues, particularly as RBA modes of operation are different and complementarities between RBAs have apparently not been optimal.

[43] The approach paper referred to the KCEP-CRAL Kenya as an example where FAO, WFP and IFAD have come together in partnership.

119. **For pragmatic reasons, ICOs are often hosted within other RBAs**, but as noted by the CLE on IFAD's Decentralization Experience (2016), this usually did not strengthen substantive and programmatic collaboration due to differing business models and priorities. An exception may be China, where IFAD used to share office premises with WFP and developed a joint IFAD-WFP programme from 1999 to 2005. There was also cooperation with the FAO Investment Centre on project design and implementation assistance.

120. **RBA cooperation seems to have been more successful within the context of wider coordination among development partners and in particular the UN**. For example, the Brazil CSPE reported a good partnership with RBAs, particularly in the UN coordination group. There was, for instance, joint policy engagement on family farming. IFAD joined forces with RBAs in SSTC and in the Africa-Brazil Food Purchasing from Africans for Africans Programme. RBA collaboration was strategically emphasized in the 2008 COSOP, but the latest CSPE (2015) still recommends more work with RBAs. Otherwise, partnerships with RBAs were rated low in LAC according to the PRM survey.[44]

South-South and Triangular Cooperation

121. Most IFAD-supported SSTC activities consist of mutual learning and horizontal SSTC regional grants. There are also a number of country grants to strengthen MIC capacity on sharing knowledge, which have been increasing in recent years, as well as solution-driven models for specific investment projects. SSTC has mainly taken the form of knowledge sharing, through field visits and conferences, workshops and policy engagement. Successful SSTC has been reported for Brazil

122. **Most SSTC have been carried out in Latin America and through Latin American countries** (with some outreach to sub-Saharan Africa), with China and Turkey as two relative newcomers, with mixed results so. Brazil facilitated most SSTC exchange with other countries, many of them in Latin America, but several also in sub-Saharan Africa (see the Mercosur case study). The CSPE for Brazil counted 24 IFAD K&L grants that operate in the country, 9 of which were on SSTC. SSTC was applied for knowledge exchange with Mozambique, Rwanda and Zambia through the 'Learning Route' and other SSTC grants.

123. **In other cases SSTC has not taken off yet, due to a lack of clarity on strategic focus and priorities**. For China the CSPE recommended to better define the IFAD-China niche in SSTC (as of 2013) and then expand it in future. CSPEs for Ecuador and Nicaragua reported a lack of strategic orientation for SSTC. SSTC in Turkey had apparently not taken off yet due to incompatibilities between IFAD and Government priorities. While IFAD was interested in promoting FOs and CSOs, whereas Government priorities were more generally value chain focused. Also, as pointed out by the PRM paper for the 2017 Replenishment meeting, it is important to work not only well with governments and come up with mutually agreeable objectives and programmes, but also to have proper institutional global arrangements (lead agencies) to implement the activities.

124. The ESR on Non-lending Activities in the Context of South-South Cooperation found that, although SSTC has been a high IFAD priority, there is still too little clarity on expected contributions and impact pathways leading to sustainable rural transformation. Many SSTC activities under loan-financed projects tend to be one-off study tours and exchange visits, rather than part of programmatic and strategic interventions that are clearly linked to the IFAD country programmes (SSTC ESR

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[44] Various initiatives on RBA collaboration are ongoing, such as the FAO investment Centre (TCI) grant on 'Capacity Development for Better Management of Public Investments in Small-Scale Agriculture in Developing Countries', the Canada funded 'Programme to Strengthen the Resilience of Livelihoods in Protracted Crisis Contexts in DRC, Niger, and Somalia', a grant to fund joint activities among WFP, FAO and IFAD in the target countries, and partnerships initiatives such as CABFIN. Yet it is not always clear which of these involve actual country-level partnerships with more enduring effects or are just based on country case studies or training and one-shot K&L activities.

2016 para. 41). A relatively programmatic approach to supporting mutual learning has been taken mainly in the context of regional grants. Furthermore, there is demand for more diverse and alternative support for SSTC to map and disseminate opportunities for MICs and their private companies to invest in agricultural development in third countries.

125. IFAD Management confirmed that most of the SSTC activities were undertaken in an ad-hoc manner and that a more organized and focused approach will be required in the future to ensure synergies across relevant institutional priorities, such as partnership-building and resource mobilization, and linkages with corporate processes such as innovation, learning and scaling up.[45] For the same reason, IFAD has prepared a new strategy for SSTC (2016) which focuses on two pillars: technical cooperation and investment promotion.[46]

PPPPs (public-private-producer partnerships)

126. IFAD's work on brokering PPPPs, particularly through supporting farmer access to markets and linkages with traders and agribusiness, has been taking off relatively recently, since around 2009/2010 with a few exceptions before (such as the Uganda Vegetable Oil Development Project - see box below). PPPPs are frequently related to support for FOs and cooperatives. Increasingly, sub-national PPPP platforms are being used as a vehicle to bring actors together and catalyse linkages.

Box 4
Case study Uganda: Brokering a public-private-producer partnership in the Vegetable Oil Development Project - implementation period: 1997-2010

> This innovative project was one of the first large public-private-producer partnerships (PPPP) for agribusiness for Uganda. IFAD played a key brokering role from the outset. It conducted a feasibility study with the World Bank and engaged in environmental impact assessments, ensured a pro-poor focus for the PPPP, and supported the Government 'behind-the-scenes' when securing a private investor and during subsequent negotiations with the company over redesigning the project.
>
> One of the key factors of success was the strong leadership of the Government, through the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries, which created a conducive environment for the private sector. Despite vested interests and adverse publicity, senior officials played a major role in pushing the project forward, thanks to their participation in the Land Acquisition Taskforce, Vegetable Oil Development Council and Impact Monitoring System. Government commitment to the project is also demonstrated by the fourfold increase in its financial support, from US$3.8 million to US$12 million. The private sector demonstrated strong commitment to the realization of the oil palm sub-project and significant patience with the Government over its negotiation of the agreement and with the slow pace of land acquisition. Its commitment is also reflected in the size of the investment and the speed of its implementation.

127. **Cooperation with the private sector for value chain development in PPPPs becomes important when market opportunities develop and marketable surplus is generated**. There are several good starts on PPPP and there is even some relatively advanced and innovative work, particularly around contract farming in Madagascar, Mozambique and Moldova. There has also been a strong orientation towards PPPPs and enterprise development in Viet Nam since 2008. At the time of the CSPE (2010), IFAD had already managed to influence Government decrees on PPPP, as well as guidelines and manuals for cooperative organizations.

128. In Madagascar, IFAD provided strong value chain support through forging partnerships of FOs with the private sector (including with processors and

[45] RIDE 2017, p. 11.
[46] IFAD's Approach to South-South and Triangular Cooperation. December 2016.

exporters). An innovative approach was taken in Mozambique in the Community Investor Partnerships Project (ProParcerias). Cofinanced with the Netherlands and FAO, models of contract farming and PPPPs were tested, analysed and synthesized by local university graduates for dissemination. An IFAD project in Moldova established good public-private partnerships with commercial banks and out-grower schemes and helped develop enterprises through business development services. For the MUVI project in Tanzania, on the other hand, the CSPE pointed to high transaction costs of this particular PPPP, offset by only modest benefits.

129. **Farmers and their organizations are a key part of PPPPs.** Farmer organizations bring together a larger number of smallholder farmers and increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the private sector in value chain development.

130. IFAD also works directly with private or semi-private companies, mostly financial institutions and banks, in the provision of rural finance (as in Mali). And in Kenya IFAD is involved in some limited private-sector engagement with Equity Bank in the context of an Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) project.

131. **But there are also a number of countries where not much progress has been made with the private sector** (e.g. in Ethiopia and Gambia) or where efforts are only beginning, such as in India with private-sector cooperation in dairy and with larger companies (Tata, Tesco). In two other countries (Nepal and Ghana), the CSPEs (both of 2010) stated that a partnership paradigm and attitude shift by the Government would be needed to achieve more support for profitable enterprises for commercialization and value chains (Nepal) and for the government to develop stronger capacities and a different mentality for working with the private sector (Ghana). For Ghana, work with the private sector in value chains was regarded as deficient, both from the IFAD and Government sides, and the CSPE called, in particular, for strengthening analytical capacities for planning interventions with the private sector.

Box 5
Lessons on successful PPPPs

In its 2015 study for IFAD[47] on "Brokering Development: Enabling Factors for Public-Private-Producer Partnerships (PPPP) in Agricultural Value Chains" (2015), the Institute of Development Studies concluded that **PPPPs require a clear rationale and objectives, that incentives of partners should be well aligned, and that partners with the right competencies should be identified, e.g. through competitive bidding, partner due diligence processes, or working with already established partners.** PPPP outcomes would depend on critical aspects of design, in particular risk-sharing and mechanisms that manage, mitigate or share these risks and that address unequal power relations that exist in vertically coordinated value chains. All partners, including farmers and their organizations, need to have ownership of the PPPP, with clear roles and responsibilities that reflect their priorities and interests. For the public sector a proactive approach should be taken to assure public accountability and transparency. Agreements are needed for partners to feel confident that the other partners will perform. Building trust is of paramount importance in PPPPs. To make PPPPs sustainable, capacity needs to be built to respond to changes in complex market systems, challenges as well as opportunities, and to adapt to the unexpected. This includes performance monitoring, with indicators that reflect joint PPPP objectives, and spaces for communication, negotiation and conflict resolution. While agricultural value chain PPPPs are time-limited interventions, they need to modify the incentives, capabilities and behaviour of different actors to ensure that they will continue their roles in the long term.

132. **Government commitment to and support for private-sector development is key to IFAD's ability to design effective investment operations in**

[47] Brokering Development: Enabling Factors for Public-Private-Producer Partnerships (PPPP) in Agricultural Value Chains (2015).

agriculture and rural development. In Zambia, the enabling environment is not universally favourable for private-sector engagement in IFAD projects. While a number of project specific partnerships with the private sector yielded some positive results, the focus on alternative project delivery mechanisms (a public/private mix) since the 1997 COSOP, is still regarded as incipient, mainly due to the unclear policy approach of Government to private-sector participation in IFAD projects.

> ***Hypothesis testing:*** *The ESR hypothesis that PPPPs are most effective when government has generated a supportive environment for private-sector engagement was validated in 13 CSPEs. Another aspect of government support was found important in 9 countries: PPPPs are most effective when IFAD works across ministries (such as Agriculture, Commerce and Trade, Industry and Small Business Development, and Environment).*

133. **The range of instruments available for PPPPs is limited, particularly for support to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and risk-sharing mechanisms.** Often support for the private sector through loans to government is problematic. Very little use has been made of the grants programme to support private-sector development, for example in terms of promoting policy engagement and knowledge management.[48] The COSOP formulation process could be used to more systematically discuss opportunities and constraints for rural private-sector development and to promote a dialogue within the country on these issues.

134. The IOE 2011 CLE on IFAD's Private-Sector Development and Partnership Strategy underlined the limitations of the existing instruments and explained why using sovereign loans is not effective for private-sector promotion. The evaluation concluded that directly lending to the private sector, including to SMEs, agro-processors, microfinance institutions, cooperatives, farmers' associations and commercial banks, could provide significant advantages to the rural poor.

135. IFAD management is aware that there is scope to strengthen private-sector partnerships and preparations for a new **private-sector instrument** are underway. The Smallholder and SME Investment Finance Fund would be a step toward providing needed flexibility for IFAD to begin to fill the gap.[49] An instrument like the SME Investment Finance Fund would probably require more of a dedicated private sector unit within IFAD. The Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) has been trying to do something similar through joint programming with the International Financial Corporation, with some success. IOE is currently in the process of evaluating such an instrument, including its potential risks, overheads and transaction costs, if lending is done with individual firms.

136. **Uncertainty about the private-sector target group.** While IFAD's commitment to make the private sector an integral partner has been growing over time (and particularly since the 2011 CLE), there is still some uncertainty in IFAD on what should be considered the prime private-sector target group. The 2011 CLE already pointed out that the private sector is not a homogenous group of actors. Entrepreneurial farmers, farmers' associations, agribusinesses and other commercial firms, as well as large national and international conglomerates, all form part of the growing private-sector target group in developing countries. The private sector definition includes a variety of operators at the smaller (rural) end of the private-sector continuum including agro-processors, and other rural micro-entrepreneurs, as well as national, regional and international operators.

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[48] CLE: IFAD's Private-Sector Development and Partnership Strategy (2011).

[49] This information comes from the PRM 2017 Replenishment Note: IFAD 11 – Leveraging partnerships for country-level impact and global engagement.

Key points from section D – Effectiveness of specific partnership modalities

- Despite **RBA cooperation** being a corporate priority, in general, IFAD partnership with RBAs and the UN was found to be weak.
- Cooperation with the **private sector** for value chain development becomes even more important when market opportunities develop and marketable surplus is generated. So far, the range of instruments available for PPPPs is limited, particularly for support of SMEs and risk-sharing mechanisms. There is also some confusion among IFAD staff and partners about IFAD's primary private-sector target group(s).
- **SSTC** has received much attention recently, but so far there are only a limited number of countries where successful SSTC has been reported in the CSPEs. The effectiveness of SSTC appears to be limited by missing links with country programmes, clarity on partner contributions and impact pathways as well as missed opportunities to link SSTC with cofinanced projects in well-resourced MICs.

E. Significant partnership outcomes

137. Most of the reported results are related to **influencing policy, K&L and leveraging resources**. These are all types of outcomes that received high attention from IFAD and have been actively promoted through dialogue, participation in working groups and support of new strategy development, research grants and capacity building (particularly of CSO/FO partners). Country ownership, synergies and sustainability are less reported as outcomes.

Figure 7
Outcomes reported for MICs and LICs



Source: CSPE review, see data in annex V.3 tables 2 – 5.

138. The comparison between earlier CSPEs and the later CSPEs (see figure above) shows that there is a notable shift among outcomes over time: **Leveraging resources and cofinancing became less important** in the CSPEs after 2012. Also, partnerships seem to be less geared towards achieving **sustainability and country ownership** through long-term partnerships and capacity building with government and other national partners (e.g. CSOs and the private sector). On the other hand, more results on **scaling up** have been reported, although they are still patchy in the overall picture.

Figure 8
Change of outcomes reported between 2006-2011 and 2012-2017 CSPEs



Source: CSPE review, see data in annex V.3 tables 4-5; annex V.3 tables 2- 3.

139. More outcomes had been reported **in LICs on leveraging resources, alignment and harmonization, and complementarities**. Given the overall structure of aid in LICs, and aid dependence of LICs vs. MICs, this is not surprising. In contrast, for MICs, the analysis finds more outcomes in knowledge and communication.

140. Almost one third of partnership outcomes are achieved with governments, most of them in the areas of influencing, alignment and knowledge. IFIs are important partners, particularly for achieving leverage, knowledge, influence and synergies. CSOs and FOs are important partners for improved partner capacities, knowledge and influence.

Enabling knowledge, learning and innovation

141. Very strong and visible engagement on **K&L**, with demonstrated results, was reported for Brazil, Mali, Nepal and the Philippines, and for Argentina in the context of policy engagement. Positive experiences with knowledge platforms were reported for Argentina, Ecuador, Ghana, Madagascar, Mozambique and Philippines. Study tours and events are reported in the CSPEs for Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Moldova, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Senegal and Viet Nam. Events with high visibility took place in the Philippines, Viet Nam, Madagascar and Moldova.

142. **Outcomes from K&L partnerships are often insufficiently known, documented and linked.** For many countries, the CSPE observed certain weaknesses in K&L, particularly the missing linkages between regional and country K&L and missing synergies between lending and non-lending projects and in-country K&L (as already reported above). This is partly due to the implementation of IFAD grants and the fact that partnerships have not been established with the longer-term perspectives envisaged by the grant policy, especially when delivered as one-off grants.[50] Furthermore, grants financing is often scarce at country level and there is usually limited involvement of CPMs in grant allocation and management decisions, which somewhat limits their strategic use for country partnership purposes and outcomes.

143. In several countries, the CSPEs found very few synergies between lending and non-lending activities. In Zambia, non-lending consisted mostly of regional and global grants that were not well-connected to the country programme, with very few

[50] CLE: The IFAD Policy for Grant Financing, para. 29. (2014).

country grants available. As a result, there was little systematic K&L visible in the country to reinforce the lending portfolio.

144. **In-country analysis and sharing of experiences and lessons learned from IFAD projects and from targeted sub-sectors is often particularly weak, due to lack of funds, attention or K&L strategies**. This was, for instance, reported for Ecuador where there were insufficient contributions from country projects to knowledge activities due to insufficient M&E and best-practice gathering. In other countries, some positive knowledge-capturing was found in IFAD projects (e.g. in Rwanda), but there was no real knowledge strategy for knowledge-partnering and exchange. In this respect, a particularly interesting case study for a country K&L initiative was found in the Philippines (box below). Through annual two-day events, IFAD brings together different partners to showcase its projects and best practices and to influence policies. One of the key enabling factors for K&L in the Philippines was that the IFAD country programme officer was trained as an expert in knowledge management.

Box 6
Case study Philippines: Innovative knowledge partnership through IFAD's Knowledge and Learning Market (KLM)

Supported by a regional Environmental and Natural Resources Accounting Project grant, the KLM initiative has been using partnerships to broaden knowledge sharing and learning since 2007. While IFAD allocates a budget for the KLM, the other stakeholders contribute in cash and kind and transportation expenses of participants are borne by their respective organizations. Different costs items (e.g. lunches, dinners, fellowship nights) are "sponsored" by a specific organization. With this "sharing" set-up comes ownership of the activity. "And when there is ownership, there is complete commitment without counting the costs or asking what's in it for me".[51]

This resulted in multiple champions and helped foster replication of good practices across projects. The KLM was crucial in creating wider visibility for IFAD operations in the Philippines. Some participants credited the KLM as an effective tool for influencing policies, noting that the presence of agencies like the National Economic and Development Authority, the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Department of Agriculture, alongside representatives of farmers groups and NGOs, were crucial in the advancement of policy engagement.

Influencing policy through partnerships

145. IFAD recognizes the importance of an enabling policy environment to support and accelerate agriculture and rural development at the corporate level. Policy engagement is a key feature in the Medium-term Plan of IFAD10 (2016-2018). IFAD selectively participates in policy engagement aimed at reducing rural poverty and empowering beneficiary organizations to gain policy influence. The IFAD 2012 Partnership Strategy sees as one of its six priorities for IFAD to act as a **broker and facilitator** to achieve better inputs into policy engagement at country level, to bring various partners together, and to support the capacity (and interest) of different players to engage in partnerships and make them better partners for the other players.

146. In 14 countries the importance of **government buy-in into IFAD objectives** was underlined. Sometimes government support was helped by units established in relevant ministries (in five cases). But while partnering with other donors can be critical, it does not automatically guarantee success for achieving more leverage, as pointed out for Ghana and the case of a cofinanced programme with the World Bank and AfDB. In the case of Ghana, IFAD innovative interventions were not yet sufficiently mature and tested when the cofinanced project was implemented. IFAD

[51] KLM story book: A decade of sharing and learning.

policy influence only started in later phases of the multi-phase programme and missed the earlier cofinancing opportunity for influence and scaling up.

147. **Knowledge generated from loans and grants provides the basis for IFAD's policy engagement.** The CSPE for Bolivia pointed to the importance of defining a policy engagement strategy based on knowledge acquired and, in addition, opportunities for scaling up. In Nicaragua, Government policies were influenced through accumulated knowledge gained from IFAD projects and communicated through special initiatives, such as round tables and policy engagement was enhanced through capacity building of partners. In Ghana, IFAD had some good policy influence mostly related to two projects (focused on rural finance and enterprise development) that contributed to conducive rural finance policies and the building of a meso-institution. In Mali, IFAD tried to boost its policy influence on the National Microfinance Strategy Action Plan plus other microfinance-related activities through concrete technical support. In Ethiopia, the CSPE concluded that policy engagement would have benefited from more systematic K&L activities. Similarly in Senegal, there was little attention to K&L in the country and hence little was achieved in terms of policy influence.

148. **IFAD's policy engagement involves bringing together a wider range of partners, including governments, rural producer organizations and other donors, in line with its brokering role**. The CSPEs present a number of good examples of IFAD's brokering role, such as its advocacy in Mali and Madagascar for FO participation in the development of new agriculture sector programmes. In Madagascar, IFAD facilitated strong FO policy engagement and influence on land tenure security and contributed to the development of a national strategy for agricultural finance. IFAD also has a strong influence in shaping policies related to agricultural services through climate-smart agriculture and on vocational training. In Niger, IFAD worked with the World Bank, the EU and AFD on policies related to natural resource management, FOs and land tenure. Sometimes brokering policy influence requires a special grant, as in the case of Nepal, where IFAD helped the Government to formulate its new 2012 Agricultural Development Strategy through a US$500,000 DSF grant, in collaboration with the ADB and other partners.

> ***Hypothesis testing:*** *Having skilled IFAD staff, preferably with specialized technical knowledge and communication capacity, helps in policy engagement and dialogue. It is also useful to strategically choose the topics of engagement of interest and buy-in to government (14 countries) and to have a long-standing relationship with relevant ministries and technical or policy units within these ministries (5 countries). In general, good communication skills, trust- and team-building are highly important for country-level partnerships, particularly for those of policy engagement and influence (14 countries).*

149. **Successful policy influence combines financial and non-financial instruments, together with long-term partners.** Successful project interventions achieve more influence when they are accompanied by K&L and related activities, funded from special grants or integrated into projects and with good integration and roles for key project partners. Influencing government partners is helped when ICO staff are well qualified in the technical and communication aspects of dialogue - which is not always the case - or when alternative arrangements are made to communicate policy messages. Often long-term partners, in particular CSOs, are indispensable for this process.

150. **Policy influence has sometimes been achieved through SSTC**. Policy influence through SSTC was most important in Argentina and in Brazil, particularly on family farming and rural poverty. In Latin America, IFAD has nurtured many partnerships for this purpose with CSOs (REAF, FIDAMERICA, PROCASUR), governments, and the regional economic community, Mercosur. The box below provides some details on the IFAD-Mercosur policy partnership for Argentina.

Box 7
Case study Argentina: Policy influence through IFAD-Mercosur partnership for family farming

Argentina is a founding member of Mercosur, a regional economic community. Since 1999 IFAD has supported policy engagement on rural development in the Southern cone with five consecutive sub-regional grants to the programme IFAD-Mercosur. IFAD has contributed to generating debate on rural poverty in Argentina and raised the family farming sector's profile in a country that has traditionally been oriented towards agroindustry for export. IFAD's policy engagement helped to link various sectors of the federal government and the provincial governments involved in poverty eradication. In particular, at the federal government level, IFAD contributed to communicating and understanding the concept of rural development and family agriculture in the Ministry of Economy and Production and to the Secretariat for Budget. The rural poverty debate, the participatory approach of the Government and the push of rural associations in search of political participation led the Government of Argentina to create the National Forum for Family Agriculture in 2006 through Resolution 132/06. This Forum brings together more than 900 small- and medium-sized rural producers from all over the country who associate some 180,000 families and provide a fundamental platform to discuss development policies in this sector.

151. **Policy engagement benefits from partnerships with other donors**, particularly through cofinancing. In Niger, policy dialogue by the World Bank, the EU and Agence Française de Développement (AFD) contributed to enhancements on policies and strategies for natural resource management, FOs and land issues. In some countries, cooperation with other donors happened in the context of supporting the government in coming up with new agricultural or rural development strategies, as in Nepal, where IFAD worked together with ADB and others in providing strategic, technical and financial assistance for strategy development.

Hypothesis testing: *Policy engagement works best when it includes MDBs or RBAs - a hypothesis proven true for 19 of the countries included in the CSPE review sample.*

152. **Partnerships with civil society can be very effective for leveraging policy influence**. One of the most prominent cases is Bangladesh, where the IFAD loan provided strong support for a CSO apex organization, the Palli Karma-Sahayak Foundation (PKSF), that implement in particular micro-finance projects through other NGOs and community based organizations (CBOs). This is a good example of where an IFAD loan has the potential, with the support of the Government and the CSO, to have significant multiplier effects and to contribute to learning and advocacy. Similarly, in Brazil a number of IFAD loan and grant activities are executed with CSOs and FOs that partly cofinance these activities. An example is the CSO PROCASUR, which was started by IFAD. In Nicaragua, IFAD generated a Fund for Strengthening Policies and Strategies (FONDEPOL) to facilitate work with CSOs, universities and consultants. In Argentina, there are many CSO grant-based partnerships to influence policy (REAF, FIDAMERICA, PROCASUR).

Box 8
Policy engagement through FOs in Nepal

In Nepal, the regional grant *Medium Term Cooperation Programme with Farmers' Organizations in Asia and the Pacific Region* (MTCP), an IFAD administered grant, financed by the EU and Switzerland, was the entry point for partnership with the Nepalese Peasants Coalition (NPC), an existing broad-based platform composed of various FOs. MTCP fostered NPC's lobbying, advocacy and campaigning agenda, leading to policy changes. It supported the engagement of FOs in policy dialogue with the Government leading to the revision of two key programmes of strategic relevance to FOs: the national Agricultural Development Strategy (ADS), and the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) cooperation.[52]

153. **Partnerships with indigenous peoples' organizations were instrumental for addressing indigenous people's issues at policy level**. The ESR on Engagement with Indigenous Peoples reported a number of good examples of IFAD's influence on policies and institutions related to access to land and natural resources for indigenous peoples, e.g. in India (land titling in traditional forest lands), the Philippines (certificates of ancestral domain titles), and Viet Nam (forest use certificates). The India CSPE recognized that the tribal projects have given IFAD an important voice in the national policy debates on tribal rights, especially on land rights of tribal peoples.

154. CSPEs also point to several factors limiting the impact of policy influence, in particular the **interest or capacity of government** to listen to and absorb policy suggestions. For Bangladesh, two factors played a role: the limited policy 'resonance' of Government, with a heavy bureaucracy that is difficult to influence; and secondly, the fact that ICO staff capacities were not sufficient for developing strong policy links with key ministries. This is an issue that resonates in several other countries, such as in Mozambique, and will be addressed below in more detail. In Rwanda, IFAD has provided substantial grants and technical assistance to the Government for agricultural strategy development since 2004, yet its influence has been very limited, because Government interest has been low even in areas with ongoing projects (such as finance and enterprise development).

Scaling up

155. As both the Strategic Framework 2011-2015 and the Ninth Replenishment document make clear, if IFAD is to achieve its ambitious goals in terms of rural poverty reduction, it needs to treat the scaling up of successful approaches and innovations as "mission-critical", by ensuring systematic attention to scaling up in country programme development and management. The 2012 Partnership Strategy puts scaling up at the top of its list of partnership priorities. Effective partnerships are a prerequisite for scaling up: the issue is relevant to partnerships for better programmes and projects, for better inputs into global policy engagement and for increased mobilization of resources.

156. IFAD also has a new strategy for scaling up (2015). Scaling up is to be done by partners, not IFAD itself, with IFAD being catalytic in identifying capable actors and developing strategic alliances and partnerships to support the scaling up of innovations. The ESR on scaling up results (2017) identified three routes for scaling up: (i) integrating IFAD-funded projects into broader public investments; (ii) adoption of IFAD concepts by partners, e.g. donors, governments, and the private sector; and (iii) informing public policies through project experiences.

157. The review of CSPEs and the ESR on scaling up suggests that, with few exceptions, **IFAD does not yet sufficiently and strategically address the scaling up of**

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[52] The Medium-Term Cooperation Programme for Farmers Organizations in Asia and the Pacific, https://www.ifad.org/topic/how_fo/regional/tags/10629915.

its innovations. This is partly because it has been confined in the past to leaving scaling up to cofinancing, mostly by other donors, or to broadening IFAD's reach through local replication. Almost all COSOPs since 2010 have made reference to scaling up, but few have articulated a strategy for it.[53] Only two – Liberia and Viet Nam – included fully developed scaling up strategies.

158. **Government support was always crucial for scaling up.** Without strong partnerships with national and local governments, even successful projects tended to work in isolation (e.g. Laos and the Dominican Republic[54]). Limited fiscal space appears to be an important factor (e.g. Brazil and India) but can in certain cases be alleviated by funds from other external donors. In Pakistan, the CSPE concluded that innovations and their scaling up may require different partners in government – and beyond - than the usual 'administrators and implementers'. Partnerships with the Apex Poverty Alleviation Fund and with government institutions at federal and provincial levels helped with scaling up. As already reported under the section on indigenous peoples' organizations above, in North-East India IFAD works closely with state governments to transfer know-how and quality project implementation methods to ultimately be scaled up, in many projects focusing on indigenous peoples (scheduled tribes).[55]

159. **Even where scaling up may be achieved at local and sub-national levels, it often does not reach the national level**, for instance through effective policy engagement, broader mainstreaming in policies and strategies and sufficient domestic cofinancing. There is often simply no adequate IFAD strategy and measuring in countries beyond the end of projects, and COSOPs in the past have paid too little attention to scaling up. In China, more technical cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture at national level could have led to wider scaling up of IFAD innovations, which the CSPE saw, at least partly, as caused by limited IFAD outreach, policy influence and lack of senior ICO staff in Beijing. In Brazil, there was some scaling up, and the CSPE therefore recommended cooperation with wider range of federal agencies and more cofinancing and knowledge sharing with other IFIs or the mobilization of domestic private cofinancing.

160. **Scaling up relies on a wider range of partners**. The CSPEs provide some good examples for scaling up through private sector and civil society partners. For example on rural micro-finance in Mali through partnerships with multiple service providers and very successfully with 'ABC', a private for-profit company with a social mandate. In Viet Nam, scaling up included market-oriented institutional capacity building, with specific and quantifiable goals: local agencies established; public-private producers' platforms; and K&L systems established. Where IFAD relied too much on government for scaling up, this has crowded out partnerships with CSOs and the private sector, as in Nigeria. Also in Gambia, scaling up was limited through official partnerships with finance institutions that were not very effective and not interested sustaining risk-sharing mechanisms beyond project completion.

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[53] As noted by the ESR on IFAD's support to Scaling up of Results (2017).
[54] These are country examples from the IOE ESR on IFAD's support to Scaling up of Results (2017).
[55] The case of India also provides examples of three different scaling-up modalities: 1. Expanded geographical coverage; 2. Shift from project to the policy level; 3. Adoption of project approaches by public programmes (fiscal space).

Box 9

Case study Brazil - Sertão: Supplementary funding and environmental knowledge partnership with GEF. Scaling up natural resource management and environmental sensitization.

The Sustainable Land Management in the Semi-Arid Sertão Project (US$15.5 million) was funded by GEF and the Government of Brazil, complementary to the IFAD-financed Dom Helder Cȃmara Project (DHCP). The significant achievements of the Sertão project were both out-scaled and up-scaled. Scaling up was supported through a series of activities including the creation of social organizations, the Social Control Organization (OCS) for Organic Production and the Participatory Organization for Organic Compliance Assessment (OPACs). They have the potential to increase the number of households adopting organic production through training workshops involving large audiences, exchanges and learning events.[56] SSTC in the form of South-South knowledge exchanges was also crucial to the scaling up of this project. This included exchanges with Cape Verde and Kenya and presentations in Senegal. The project also hosted a group of 28 leaders of farmers, peasants and indigenous organizations from seven South American countries.

161. **In loan projects partnerships with CSOs were often initiated with a view to scaling up.** Examples include Bangladesh, Brazil, Rwanda, Mozambique and Kenya. However, in a number of cases it was found that **partnerships with CSOs were either too scarce or ineffective for scaling up.** The Ghana CSPE notes a lack of sufficient numbers of partnerships with CSOs, particularly in rural finance, that would be needed for better scaling up. It found that IFAD scaling up of innovations relied too much on IFAD’s own resources, rather than co-financiers, CSOs and government. For Zambia, the CSPE found that alternative service delivery mechanisms through CSOs and the private sector do not yet work well for scaling up and that limited cofinancing hinders scaling up for a livestock project. By working with apex organizations systematically through project implementation, such as PKSF in Bangladesh, scaling up has been more successful.

Box 10

Case study Bangladesh: APEX institutions deliver funding, financial and technical services

Donors often use apex institutions to deliver funding and financial and technical services more efficiently in countries where microfinance institutions (MFIs) appear too small or numerous for direct funding relationships. Palli Karma-Sahayak Foundation (PKSF) has a clear mandate from the Government since 1990 as an apex fund for providing resources to MFIs to alleviate poverty. PKSF plays an important role in the microfinance sector in Bangladesh and has constantly been seeking to improve services to its member MFIs operating in a cost-effective way. All projects with PKSF rely on NGOs for implementation.

IFAD's collaboration with PKSF has been a very effective mechanism for sustaining and scaling up successful microfinance approaches promoted by IFAD projects within its large network. Agriculture microcredit, seasonal loans, and the combined credit and business development service introduced under earlier projects (the Micro Finance and Technical Support Project and the Microfinance for Marginal and Small Farmers Project) are now part now PKSF’s regular loan programme. The organization has recently created two technical, non-financial cells on agriculture and livestock that are providing follow up support to activities introduced in the projects with their own funds. Small value chain pilots in the Market Infrastructure Development Project in Charland Regions and the Finance for Enterprise Development and Employment Creation project have helped a number of partner organizations learn the principles of market development and later, to expand market development activities of their own with the support of PKSF. Value chain strengthening activities are being scaled up in the design of the IFAD Promoting Agricultural Commercialization and Enterprises project.

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[56] Sustainable Land Management in the Semi-Arid Sertão Project - Sertão Project Grant Agreement GEF-FSP-002-BR, Final Evaluation.

Synergies and complementarities

162. IFAD's Partnership Strategy emphasises complementarity as an important principle of partnerships. Where partnerships combine complementary strengths they are more likely to lead to outcomes that are mutually beneficial. Synergies are more difficult to put into practice and there are fewer cases reported. IFAD's unique experiences on the ground are an important contribution that can create synergies and complementarities.

163. Nurturing long-term partnerships seems to be an important factor that may lead to significant synergies between partners and initiatives. **Longer-term partnerships with CSOs and FOs** often originate in projects, but they may deliver wider synergies and complementarities, as shown in the example of Bangladesh above.

164. **Cofinancing can create synergies and complementarities**. Positive examples of policy influence and scaling up were reported for a joint IFAD-World Bank pastoral livestock programme in Ethiopia; for scaling up with ADB in Indonesia; and promising partnerships with GEF on promoting climate change adaptation in Jordan. In contrast, for Rwanda, the CSPE stated that there was little cooperation beyond a financial relationship with OFID, AfDB and bi-laterals donors.

> ***Hypothesis testing:*** *Key country strategic partnerships with IFIs such as ADB, AfDB and GEF can benefit from regular interaction and communication on country and thematic priorities, to identify commonalities and complementarities among partners, including at regional and global level (validated for 19 countries).*

165. **Partnerships established through grants can create wider synergies**. In Ecuador, the Rural Dialogue Group is key for IFAD knowledge work and policy influence. This advisory group was established through a regional grant and consists of academics, CSOs and other stakeholders.

166. In the second part of the 2000s the **UNDAF and One UN processes** played an important role in some countries for coordination, synergies and complementarities, such as in Niger or Pakistan. In some countries, new partnerships have developed from these processes, such as a joint UN country team/UNDAF programme in North East India and some emerging cooperation in Ethiopia in a country project with WFP and a regional project with FAO. In Ghana, Ethiopia, Uganda and Tanzania, ICOs engage in sector working groups.

Leveraging resources

167. In general, cofinancing at IFAD is well-understood as a critical instrument for **enhancing impact through leveraging resources and corporate visibility, scaling up of IFAD innovations and policy engagement.** It is sometimes also seen as a way to reduce administrative costs, particularly when IFAD is a junior partner in a cofinancing arrangement. At corporate level, cofinancing is linked with IFAD resource mobilization, particularly of supplementary funds.

168. A review of financial data shows that the **absolute amount of international and domestic cofinancing increased significantly** between IFAD 7 (2007-2009) and IFAD9 (2013-2015). International cofinancing doubled from US$997 million to US$1.783 billion, while domestic cofinancing, most of it from national governments, tripled from US$941 million to US$2.916 billion over this period (table 2).[57] In upper MICs the share of domestic cofinancing was above average under IFAD 7 (49 per cent) and further increased under IFAD9 (to 60.9 per cent). Domestic cofinancing saw a slight increase in lower MICs (from 32.3 per cent to 35.4 per cent) and in low-income countries (from 21.2 per cent to 27.9 per cent).

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[57] IOE calculation based on IFAD internal data.

Table 2
IFAD cofinancing trends 2007-2015 (all countries)

IFAD replenishment period	*IFAD*	*Domestic*	*International*	*IFAD*	*Domestic*	*International*	*Total*
			USD million			Per cent	USD million
IFAD 7 (2007-2009)	1,731	941	997	47.2	25.7	27.2	3,668
IFAD8 (2010-2012)	2,695	2,355	1,484	41.2	36.0	22.7	6,534
IFAD9 (2013-2015)	2,916	2,261	1,783	41.9	32.5	25.6	6,960

Source: GRIPS (see data in annex IV.1).

169. The amount of financial resources leveraged is better captured in the cofinancing ratio – i.e. the amount of US$ mobilized through cofinancing vs. the IFAD loan itself. A review of corporate-level financial data shows that, although the absolute amount of cofinancing has increased, **the cofinancing ratio was relatively stable** in recent years. After a strong increase from 1.12 in IFAD 7 to 1.42 in IFAD8 (2010-2012), it was reduced only slightly to 1.39 in IFAD9 (2013-2015). But again, the ratio declined significantly for low-income countries (from 1.26 for IFAD 7 to 1.03 for IFAD9), while it increased dramatically in both lower and upper MICs (annex IV.1 table 1.1 – 1.4).

Table 3
Cofinancing ratio per country types (2007-2015)

IFAD replenishment period	*IFAD (overall)*	*LIC*	*Lower MICs*	*Upper MICS*
IFAD 7 (2007-2009)	1.12	1.26	0.90	1.03
IFAD8 (2010-2012)	1.42	1.37	1.29	2.51
IFAD9 (2013-2015)	1.39	1.03	2.20	2.83

Source: GRIPS (see data in annex IV.1 tables 1 – 4).

170. Despite the strategic importance of cofinancing for IFAD, the target for IFAD10 (2016-2018) has been set at a moderate cofinancing ratio of 1.2. This target falls back behind the IFAD9 performance and may be too low to address the need for increased cofinancing in LICs.

171. The **Asian Development Bank** is currently one of IFAD's largest co-financiers. Between 2006 and 2016 IFAD approved ten projects in five countries (Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic and the Philippines) with US$849 million in ADB cofinancing, and has identified a pipeline of future cofinanced investments.[58] The critical element for the success of this partnership is leadership, sending a clear signal from IFAD Regional Directors to all CPMs on the importance of developing and maintaining the ADB partnership. Cofinancing with ADB was also helped by a similarly strong corporate focus in the ADB.[59] This "structured partnership" with the ADB is built on an MoU and a Framework for Cofinancing Agreement. The relationship is maintained through business planning meetings at the HQ Management level as well as the country level, and through a focal point in each of the institutions. It is based on a partnership strategy, which articulates complementary areas for financing.

[58] Source: IFAD GRIPS.
[59] See also annex IX on lessons from other IFIs.

172. IFAD has a similar partnership with **AfDB**, although it is much lower in terms of cofinancing volume than the partnership with ADB. Except for the occasional reference to cofinanced projects with the AfDB in CSPEs in Africa and certain obstacles due to government objection or prevailing unfavourable budget-support circumstances in sub-Saharan Africa, the ESR did not find much information in reviewed synthesis documents on the IFAD-AfDB partnership.

Box 11
Cofinancing analysis: Internationally cofinanced projects perform better.

IOE has evaluated 188 projects through PPEs, PCRVs and IEs during the 2006-2016 period, 111 of them cofinanced by international donors. The analysis shows that for all performance indicators (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, rural poverty impact and sustainability) there were a higher proportion of cofinanced projects that performed moderately satisfactorily or higher (i.e. ratings 4 to 6) than of projects that were not cofinanced (figure 3 and table 3). All differences between the two groups were statistically significant, except for relevance. Those statistically significant were so at the 99 per cent confidence level, except for poverty impact, which is significantly different in the two groups only at the 90 per cent confidence level. There may also be differences amongst the regions.

173. International cofinancing often does not mobilize additional resources but it facilitates coordination and ultimately better project results. This is in line with findings by the 2016 ADB evaluation that also showed better performance of cofinanced projects. As shown in the box above, cofinanced projects have performed significantly better in IFAD.

Key points from section E – Significant partnership outcomes

- IFAD's **policy engagement** involves bringing together a wide range of partners, including governments, rural producer organizations and other donors, in line with its brokering role. Policy engagement works best when it includes MDBs or RBAs. Partnerships with civil society can be very effective for leveraging policy influence.
- Government support was always crucial for **scaling up**, but successful scaling up relies on a wider range of partners. CSOs were instrumental for scaling up in several cases, but in a number of cases partnerships with CSOs were either too scarce or ineffective for scaling up.
- Outcomes from **K&L partnerships** are often insufficiently known, documented and linked. A large share of IFAD funding for knowledge and innovation goes into global and regional grants, but these are frequently insufficiently linked with the country programmes. Grants that go to international research organizations often do not lead to uptake of innovations in the country.
- Cofinancing has increased in absolute terms, in particular in MICs, but the cofinancing ratio, a proxy for the amount of **funding leveraged by IFAD**, did not increase and actually declined in LICs.
- Where partnerships combine complementary strengths they are more likely to be mutually beneficial. Cofinancing can create **synergies and complementarities**. Longer term partnerships with CSOs and FOs can create synergies.

F. Enabling and limiting factors

174. **Overview.** This chapter summarizes the evidence on overall factors that reinforce good partnerships or that may work against them. This includes findings on the specific role of government as a partner and its support for different kinds of IFAD partnerships and on the effects of IFAD decentralization and ICOs.

175. The chapter starts with drawing attention to the need to balance the positive outcomes expected from partnerships with their costs, to ensure appropriate

partnership funding and effectiveness and to come up with the most efficient partnerships and approaches for different settings.

Costs and benefits of partnerships.

176. Based on the ToC presented in chapter I, the ESR has reviewed the potential gains, costs and risks of partnerships. Costs and benefits of partnerships need to be considered together, not separately, and are critical to understand when choices are being made about what partnerships to concentrate on among a range of opportunities, with a short- and long-term perspective.

177. **Potential gains** of partnerships include outcomes such as influencing policies, scaling up and leveraging of funds, complementarities and synergies, K&L, alignment and ownership and sustainability.

178. On the other side, **transaction costs** may incur in terms of (for example) time spent arranging and managing partnerships, trust building, coordination costs, partner finance and resource problems, and delays caused through partnerships. The cost ledger also has to consider certain partnership transaction risks, such as uncertainty about partner qualifications, partner delivery capabilities, and reputational risks of association with certain partners. It also became evident from some of the case studies - such as long-term collaboration with CSOs in Bangladesh or Latin-America, close partnerships with governments, and long-term cofinancing experiences with IFIs (e.g. in Ethiopia) - that **some of these transaction costs and reputational risks can be reduced through longer-term relationships and trust-building**.[60]

Box 12
Apex organizations can decrease transaction costs

> The creation of apex organizations in countries such as Bangladesh and Mali has decreased the transaction costs for partnerships with CSOs. In Mali, prior experience and increasing trust in the relationship between IFAD and FOs led to the establishment of the National Coordination Agency for Farmers' Organizations under a Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme grant. The creation of the apex organization decreased transaction costs for IFAD and the FOs because it reduced the time spent on coordination.

179. The IFAD Partnership Strategy (2012) acknowledges that IFAD has a number of partnerships that developed in an ad-hoc manner, a few of which incur high costs while offering limited benefits.[61] The strategy therefore proposes a more selective approach and greater focus on partnership outcomes. Yet although IFAD uses substantial amounts of funds for partnering (mostly grants, but sometimes also loans; and occasionally through third parties), there is no programmatic or partnership-specific assessment (or assessment tool for that matter) that would include a cost-benefit analysis of these partnerships.

180. The reviewed CSPEs for this ESR reiterate in general terms the call for **partnership selectivity at country level and greater consideration of the benefits and expected costs of partnerships**. The balancing of benefits, costs and transaction costs of partnerships are somewhat reflected in the ubiquitous observation that there are too few qualified staff and staff focusing on partnerships, in particular at the country level. High transaction costs due to the decentralized governments have been noted by the CSPEs in Nigeria and Indonesia (see below).

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[60] Brinkerhoff 2002 and Picciotto 2004. Jobin, Dennis. 2008. *A Transaction Cost-Based Approach to Partnership Performance Evaluation*. Sage Publications, London. Vol I 4(4):437-465. http://evi.sagepub.com/content/14/4/437.
[61] Partnership Strategy, Exec. Summary, para. 4.

Box 13
Case study – transaction costs for partnerships in Indonesia

The 2014 CSPE notes that in Indonesia partnerships with subnational governments have been a particular challenge, given the wide geographical coverage of the programme and the high level of decentralization, leading to high transaction costs associated with partnership-building. According to the CSPE, IFAD had neither the resources nor the local presence required to build partnerships effectively. Furthermore, the strategic objectives of the COSOP (2009–2013) were very broad and did not provide selectivity criteria for partnerships. The client surveys showed IFAD as a partner in Indonesia on a low score of 4.9. In 2016 the score had increased significantly to 5.28. The 2015 COSOP Results Review explains that the score had improved because it focused on partnerships for maximum impact and resources, such as public-private-partnerships, both with international corporations and national companies in order to maximise impact and resources. Furthermore, IFAD strengthened partnerships with other development agencies and, as a result of this effort, leveraged a significant cofinancing with ADB.

181. The **force-field analysis** (figure 9 below) presents the most important costs and the resources required for country partnerships, as observed in the CSPEs. The analysis draws from the data reviewed that specifically looked at the enabling and disabling factors for country partnerships. Enabling factors are depicted in green, costs and risks in red. The numbers reported on the arrows indicate the number of CSPEs reporting on each factor.

Figure 9
Force-field diagram: Forces working for or against partnerships



Source: compiled by IOE team.
*Note: The disaggregated costs in this diagram are often used to illustrate different faces of the same problem and therefore may result in double counting. Transaction costs were often not explicitly mentioned in the CSPE but deduced from the underpinning problem.

182. **The enabling factors** include IFAD country presence and government capacity, which are the strongest supportive forces for effective partnership-building in countries. COSOP guidance, government preferences and an enabling partnership environment matter, too, as positive forces. They are followed by a clear corporate vision and adequate resourcing of partnership-building.

Hypothesis testing: *Although it often helps to have COSOPs with clearly defined and selective partnership priorities, relying on well-formulated and prioritized COSOPs was in practice not found sufficient for good partnership-building. In ten countries, the quality of partnership propositions in COSOPs had little correlation with actual later partnership performance.*

183. **Forces that may work against partnerships** include several costs and risks associated with partnerships. The most important cost is the time it takes to organize and manage partnerships, followed by various costs related to monitoring and enforcing them. In particular, **donor coordination** is considered to be time consuming. Often ICO staff are members of the UN country teams, but their participation is deliberately limited because such meetings were often viewed as time consuming and as not adding significant value to IFAD's operations, leading to a pragmatic decision to participate selectively in such meetings.[62]

Box 14
Nigeria – without donor coordination partnerships remained piecemeal

The 2016 CPE notes that without a strong coordinating function or office in Government, IFAD partnerships have been largely piecemeal. Institutional coordination with IFAD had been limited due to the dismantling of the project coordination unit within the Ministry of Agriculture in 2007. As such, there has been little cross-over between IFAD programmes and partner government institutions which may have otherwise deepened partnerships and prolonged institutional memory between IFAD and Government.

184. Furthermore, the **risk of partner default** can be high, such as when partners have problems mobilizing finance of their own or other resources. This suggests a need to be careful and diligent in partner identification and monitoring and to mitigate against the risk of partner default when possible. A third complex of counter-productive forces is related to the potential threat to IFAD of potentially **losing organizational core values** in partnerships. Avoiding this risk may require a process of consensus-building that sometimes could be lengthy and costly. The focus group conducted during this ESR highlighted in particular the risk of working with the private sector. **Private-sector partners** often want IFAD to absorb their risk and high transaction costs in working with smallholders. For this reason, IFAD's brokering role of organizing beneficiaries in cooperatives and FOs, to reduce risk and transaction costs and of bringing in public sector institutions and support facilities, is of primary importance.

The partnership ladder – how partnerships evolve

185. Longer-term partnerships are important as they help to reduce some of the transaction costs and risks related to partnership-building. Partnerships are a process that has to evolve, often starting with a functional working arrangement in a project. Partnerships that have proven to be beneficial can grow further and even broaden beyond their original purpose, as mutual trust and understanding increase.

186. The partnership ladder[63] visualises the increasing intensity of collaboration as partners, partly through successively increasing the level of mutuality and trust in the relationship. The ladder moves from mere implementation at the lower rungs, such as a subordinate contractor in a project, to a partnership that increasingly emphasizes mutual sharing of information, joint decision-making, and acting together with equality in decision-making, rather than in a hierarchical relationship. At the upper two levels, independent initiatives of partners would be supported and certain tasks, such as scaling up, would be completely delegated or handed over to the partner.

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[62] CLE: IFAD's Decentralization Experience (2016).
[63] Based on the model of a partnership ladder developed by BOND (Stobart 2010).

187. For the countries reviewed by this ESR, almost two-thirds of partnership collaboration clustered around implementation and sharing of information (63.8 per cent), the two lowest rungs of the ladder. The two most important partners here were government (34) and CSOs (20). (See annex V.4).

188. For research institutions, emphasis was on sharing information (and implementation) rather than acting together and handing over, for instance on capacity building or policy engagement, which could be a missed opportunity. The situation was similar for partnerships with the private sector.

189. At a higher level of the ladder, other partners' initiatives were supported in 17.2 per cent of cases, mainly those of international development partners, governments and CSOs/FOs, which is a positive sign. And similarly, the fact that there indeed was some acting together of IFAD with CSOs and FOs in at least 8 identified cases/countries, is positive.[64] Finally, there were some cases where IFAD supported initiatives had been handed over or scaled up by government.

Figure 10
Partnership ladder, indicating percentage of partnerships reported in CSPEs (2006-2016)



Source: CSPE review; see data in annex V.4.

190. The partnership ladder suggests that **most partnerships are still driven by IFAD and focused on the implementation of IFAD-supported initiatives**. There is limited attention to principles of aspects of 'jointness', e.g. mutuality and complementarity. Partnerships are less oriented towards joint decision-making and action and only in a few cases is IFAD likely to take a backseat and continue supporting its partners while handing over initiatives for scaling up.

Government as a partner and government's role in partnership-building

191. In IFAD's business model, partnerships with governments are the basis for the formulation of rural development programmes that respond to country- and area-specific needs. The central role of government and other public institutions for IFAD is a cross-cutting theme in this report. It is the most important and ubiquitous relationship that IFAD has in countries around the world and it strongly affects IFAD partnership effectiveness with third parties. Governments continue to play a critical role for all forms of partnerships and innovations, through setting partnering priorities, enabling policy environments and providing other partnership support, in projects and non-lending activities.

[64] It should be noted that there may be some under-reporting on 'acting together'.

Hypothesis testing: *The original ESR hypothesis that government capacities, governance and decentralization strongly influence the results and effective impact pathways for different forms of partnerships was found valid in 31 of 36 CSPEs.*

192. Furthermore, many of the reviewed CSPEs mentioned that IFAD collaboration with government at central and sub-national levels was as a critical factor for achieving good partnership results. Effectiveness and success of country partnerships with other development partners, research institutions, civil society and the private sector often depended on government support, policies and ownership.

Box 15

Government ownership enables multi-stakeholder policy engagement in Brazil

In Brazil, the Specialized Meeting on Family Farming (REAF) has been a success story, involving a tripartite partnership of IFAD, FOs and government officials. IFAD supported REAF technically and financially through a grant which was at the foundation of IFAD's policy dialogue programme in Brazil. The high level of ownership and commitment by Government to rural poverty reduction created a favourable context for policy dialogue. The role of grass-roots civil movements such as the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra has been as well instrumental and supported by favourable government legislation enacted through the Constitution of 1988 and subsequent government decrees.[65] Through REAF, the Government of Brazil and IFAD managed to successfully bring to the attention of all Mercosur governments the priorities of family farmers, and include their representatives in the dialogue alongside government officials to define policies and programmes that affected their lives. IFAD, in conjunction with the Inter-American Development Bank, supported the creation and structuring of a Sub-secretariat for Rural Development and Family Agriculture.

193. IFAD has good cooperation with central governments in many countries, and often provides far-reaching support to focal points, coordination units and steering committees within governments, such as in Madagascar, Moldova and Kenya (annex VI.4). In some CSPEs, it was specifically and positively noted that government collaboration went beyond the Ministry of Agriculture (Ghana), with IFAD reaching out to those of Trade and Commerce, local governments or the Ministry of Finance to better achieve its objectives.

194. Table 4 below shows that strong government capacity and support is a key factor for partnership outcomes at country level. In countries where IFAD has strong partnerships with central or sub-national government institutions, critical partnership outcomes are more often achieved, particularly in the areas of knowledge and innovation, and sustainability and ownership. Weak government partnerships are more common in fragile situations, where partnership results, such as on policy influence and complementarities and synergies, are primarily achieved through non-governmental partners, as in the case of Nepal.

[65] Brazil CSPE 2015.

Table 4
Partnership outcomes identified in countries where IFAD collaboration with and support for central and/or sub-national governments is strong or weak

IFAD collaboration with and support for government	*Outcomes*				
	Influencing	*Scaling up and mainstreaming*	*Complementarities and synergies*	*Knowledge and innovation*	*Sustainability and ownership*
Strong (central and/or sub-national)	Brazil* Ghana Madagascar Mali Nicaragua Niger Nigeria*	China Mali Nigeria* Sudan	China Mali Moldova Nicaragua Niger Uganda Nigeria	Brazil* India* Madagascar Mali Moldova Nicaragua Niger	China India* Mali Moldova Rwanda Uganda
Weak	Nepal Yemen		Nepal Yemen	Nepal	

*Weak with central government and strong with sub-national units.
Source: CSPE review - cross-tabulation of annex V.1 and annex VI.4.

195. **Decentralized government structures** (state or other sub-national level) are found in some large MICs (e.g. Brazil, India and Nigeria), and state governments are often the main counterparts for implementation and dialogue in these countries. Strong governments at central or local level can facilitate and reinforce certain forms of partnerships (such as cofinancing) and facilitate influence and scaling up through strategic adoption of enabling policies and strategies and good coordination (e.g. Brazil, Ethiopia and Tanzania).

196. **IFAD's reliance on sub-national partnerships in MICs to some extent explains low partnership ratings**. The ESR reviewed IFAD partnerships with government in further depth in 15 countries. In 7 countries, IFAD had a strong collaboration with central government; in 8 countries with sub-national government. Seven out of these countries were MICs, where the average partnership rating was 3.7. The average partnership rating for countries with strong central government collaboration (both MICs and LICs) was 4.3 (see annex VIII.3 table 1.2).

197. Strong government support and alignment for IFAD's partnering with other development partners also can contribute to better partnership results. Yet there are examples where good partnership results were achieved even with weak government support or coordination structures. In those cases, strong partnering with other government levels (such as the central level in China), with local governments (Nigeria) or with civil society (Bangladesh) have enabled results, e.g. on scaling up and knowledge and innovation (see annex VI.4).

198. The process of aid alignment and harmonization played a large role for the relationship with governments, in particular in sub-Saharan African countries after the 2005 Paris Declaration (for example in Mali, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya and Rwanda). While often helpful for strategic direction and efficiency, and division of labour and ownership, some of these processes also led to factors that limited certain forms of standard partnerships, for instance when several IFIs expanded their budget support (as in Tanzania, Kenya, Nigeria and Gambia) or when expansion of collaboration with CSOs and the private sector was not regarded as a main priority (e.g. Tanzania).

Box 16
Case study Mali – donor-coordinated grants

In Mali, donor-coordinated grants were used to engage with a wide range of partners. For instance, the RuralStruc grant on "Structural changes in rural economies linked to globalization" was financed by IFAD with the World Bank, CIRAD (a French agricultural research organization), and French cooperation. The Babyloan grant, with its innovative approach of creating a crowdfunding platform for youth, allowed partnerships with the private sector ABC Microfinance and a French NGO (the Rural Development Research Group). The Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme through its Missing Middle Initiative allocated a grant of US$2.6 million to the National Coordination Agency for Farmers' Organizations in Mali with IFAD as the implementing institution.

199. In certain cases, **strong reliance on and cooperation with government can also limit opportunities for partnering with others**, or 'crowd them out', as was reportedly the case in Nigeria, Nicaragua, China and Turkey. In several countries, government preferences concerning IFAD partnering and policy engagement were to some extent limiting in terms of IFAD partnerships. This was the case for cofinancing in China, Ethiopia and Viet Nam and with working with CSOs and the private sector in Turkey, China and Nigeria. In such cases, IFAD may need to cautiously search for pathways to broaden its partnering opportunities. The dilemma of strong governments for partnering is also discussed in the box below.

Box 17
Case study Turkey: The pros and cons of strong government ownership

The Government of Turkey demonstrates a good level of ownership and commitment to the IFAD-supported portfolio at both the central and the provincial levels. It contributes to planning exit strategies for all projects, and its continued support has been a key dimension in ensuring sustainability. In Sivas Erzincan Development Project (SEDP) and Diyarbakir Batman Siirt Development Project (DBSDP), for example, the Government is providing budgetary support for post-project activities. This responds to re-training needs, facilitates financing of local consultancies, as well as the purchasing of necessary equipment as needed. The overall policy environment has been supportive, and the Government is generally open to new ideas from IFAD. However, the 2006 COSOP highlighted that having the public sector dominating the management of regional and rural development programmes created a disincentive to the emergence of national or local initiatives outside the public domain. As a result, there were no foreign NGOs and few national NGOs with the required capacity to provide broad-based services, and collaboration with the private sector was only incipient.

Country offices and their role for partnerships

200. Over the past ten years IFAD's country presence has increased systematically and many new ICOs were opened (see the CLE on IFAD's Decentralization Experience). ICOs were supposed to play a catalytic role in non-lending activities including country partnerships, such as in donor coordination and the One UN agenda. In addition to a better understanding of the institutional and policy context, country presence in principle offers opportunities for regular and in-depth consultations with partners.

201. **IFAD country presence was found to be a defining factor explaining performance on partnerships, in particular in MICs.** The ESR identified ICO presence in the 36 reviewed CSPEs. Twenty-four countries had an ICO at the time of evaluation; these had an average partnership rating of 3.9 compared to an average of 3.6 for those without ICOs. LICs had better average ratings than MICs, whether they did or did not have ICOs. These can be explained because in many of

the LICs where IFAD did not have an ICO, it relied to a greater extent on cofinancing partnerships.[66]

202. The CLE on IFAD's Decentralization Experience also found that the contribution of country presence was notable in the case of partnership-building, but it was more limited for knowledge management and policy engagement. According to the CLE, **ICOs helped in particular to increase the frequency and quality of interactions with national government counterparts and IFAD's participation in sectoral donor coordination groups**. ICOs also contributed to mobilizing additional cofinancing, through IFIs and domestic finance, and more contacts with Rome-based and other UN agencies in-country.

203. ICOs, particularly those led by CPMs, had opportunities to enhance long-term engagement with national policy makers (building relationships and trust and understanding of local priorities), basing suggestions for policy reform on good practices documented in knowledge products and grounded in project experience, and participating in sector working groups and engaging with all relevant actors (e.g., Philippines, Kenya, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia). On the other hand, because of their small size and competing priorities, relatively little ICO staff time was allocated to policy engagement, as mentioned above.

204. The effectiveness of ICOs is often based on number and seniority of staff available in the offices and can be very negatively affected by high CPM turnover. Good coverage of partnerships, and the allocation of time to partnerships among competing priorities, are often determined by the interests, experience and initiatives of CPMs, CPOs and other support staff. Leadership provided by Regional Directors also was found to influence ICO priorities.

Box 18
Nigeria – Limited ICO capacity does not allow effective policy engagement

The CPE Nigeria (2016) concluded that IFAD's role and influence is partial, also as a result of limited ICO capacities, given the wide geographic and thematic spread of the portfolio. There is clear direction from the division to focus ICO capacity on state-level implementation support. The ICO staffing level was found to be insufficient given the size of the portfolio and its wide geographic spread, while skills appeared in line with the focus on implementation support. This focus on implementation was, however, not always understood by other development partners, who expect IFAD to be represented at a large number of meetings. The distinct role of the CPM, whose main role is to support programme implementation, differs from that of other organizations, whose representative or director has a clear mandate to focus on donor coordination and policy engagement.

205. While basic IFAD support functions to ICOs through the IFAD Field Support Unit have improved, they are mostly technical: information, communication, local administration and infrastructure, while the envisaged process of delegation of authority has progressed slowly.

206. These CLE findings are very much in line with those in the review of the CSPEs by this ESR. **ICO resources and staff capacity were mentioned in all CSPEs as the main reason for less activities than had been planned in COSOPs on partnerships and non-lending in general, and in particular for deficiencies in K&L.**

[66] Within the CSPE sample, international cofinancing exceeded 50 per cent in 11 out of 15 LICs at the time of the CSPEs.

Hypotheses testing: *A well-staffed ICO was ranked among the top factors affecting partnership-building and was positively validated in 22 out of 36 CSPEs. The importance of resources for partnerships received attention in 18 countries. The importance of good communication practices and specific expertise of ICO staff and partners for promoting certain types of partnership engagement and related outcomes was underlined in 14 CSPEs.*

207. **The advantages of ICOs for country partnership-building were clearly recognized and evident in the CSPEs.** Nevertheless, IFAD seems to be underestimating the resources (such as time, skills and funds) and the institutional/corporate support requirements for country partnerships – an important factor leading to sub-optimal partnership outcomes at country level. These variables were related to the capacity of the ICO to deliver. According to the CSPEs, many ICOs are overstretched and their staff are not always well-qualified or supported to perform all the tasks assigned to them.

Key points from section F – Enabling and limiting factors

- **IFAD country presence** and **government capacity** are the strongest supportive forces for effective partnership-building in countries.
- In the larger MICs (e.g. Brazil, India and Nigeria), state governments are often the main counterpart for implementation and dialogue.
- IFAD's **reliance on sub-national partnerships in MICs** to some extent explains low partnership ratings.
- IFAD country presence was found to be a defining factor explaining performance on partnerships, in particular in MICs.
- The importance of a **well-staffed ICO** was positively validated in 22 out of 36 CSPEs.
- Some of the transaction costs and reputational risks can be reduced through **longer-term relationships and trust-building**.
- Most partnerships are driven by IFAD and focused on the implementation of IFAD-supported investments. There is limited attention to the principles of **mutuality** and **complementarity**.

IV. Lessons from this ESR

General lessons

208. Critical **enabling factors for achieving good partnership results** include:

- partnering with the right partners in government, including state, provincial and local authorities;
- well equipped, supported and motivated ICO staff that see partnership results as a major part of their terms of reference;
- a solid analysis of relative costs and benefits of partnerships and, based on that, a selective approach;
- a differentiated approach according to country context; and
- a corporate approach that supports partnering and partnering outcomes as the core of a long-term vision of integrated loan and grant operations in country, rather than separating lending and non-lending objectives.

209. **Building up partner capacity**. IFAD as a non-implementing agency needs to systematically rely on and strengthen capacities and contributions of various partners to achieve its broader country objectives beyond projects.[67] This means **utilizing and building up the comparative strengths** of different types of partners. Different partners have different tasks to fulfil; their capacities vary significantly in different settings.

210. For good performance, **continuity is required through long-term strategic partnering with a broadened set of partners, selectively chosen for country priorities**. Partnerships call for major efforts and often long-term trust-building to be effective, efficient and sustainable. At the same time, they have to be bound by common objectives and results. Long-term graduation paths for partners need to be laid out.

211. In countries with weak government institutions and strong donor support there has often been a proliferation of CSOs and CBOs in programme implementation due to weak government implementation capacities. But without a clear strategy, sufficient support, capacity building and selectivity, **CSO partnerships** have not been effective. Establishing CSO apex organizations has been an important strategy to mitigate this risk.

212. **Partnership benefits and costs**. Partnerships have to be assessed in view of their relative benefits and costs. Partnerships are often costly and there always will be underinvestment in partnerships, unless benefits are visible, costs are realistically assessed and efforts by ICOs are institutionally rewarded. The costs and risks can be reduced through longer-term relationships and trust-building and other enabling factors.

213. **Scaling up**. Scaling up is about partnering, but it is also about the wise use of K&L and is closely related to policy engagement. Innovations and their scaling up may require different partners in government – and beyond – than the usual 'administrators and implementers'.[68] The ESR on scaling up synthesized three conclusions: (i) emphasis needs to be on scaling up "results" rather than on just approving larger loans, cofinancing and IFAD 'auto-scale-up'; (ii) scaling up often necessitates leveraging funds, but not always; and (iii) communities of practice are one of the ways to mainstream innovation experiences for scaling up by others, as well as farmer field schools and participatory planning at the district level, as happened in Tanzania.

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[67] "As a small organization, partnering to increase impact will be a vital element of how IFAD work in the future" (PRM 2017 Replenishment Paper).
[68] An observation from the Pakistan CSPE.

214. **Principles of mutuality and organizational identity** appear important in IFAD partnerships in country programmes and projects, where there is a significant hierarchy of relations through the loan and grant mechanisms, that may or may not affect the quality of mutuality and distinct entity of partners.

Lessons on partnership outcomes

215. Most **partnership types of engagement** are important in one way or the other for each of the six major partnership outcomes (table 5).

Table 5
Importance of different partnership types of engagement and country partnership outcomes

Partnership type	*Policy influence*	*Scaling up*	*K&L innovations*	*Complementarities, synergies*	*Ownership & Sustainability*	*Leveraging resources*
Cofinancing with other donors	++	++	+	+++	+	+++
Cofinancing with government and domestic partners	++	+++	+	+++	+++	+++
SSTC	++	++	+++	++	+++	++
RBA	++	+	+	++	+	+
PPPP	++	++	++	+++	+++	++
CSO/CBO *(national)*	++	++	++	++	+++	+
CSO *(international)*	+	++	+++	++	+	++
FOs	+++	++	+++	++	+++	+
Indigenous groups	+++	+	++	++	+++	+

Key: + some engagement (but under-exploited); ++ substantial engagement, visible, strategic; +++ very strong and visible engagement, demonstrated high-profile results; in terms of quantities, but also quality of partnership engagement.
Source: CSPE review (see data in annex V.1).

216. Partnerships around K&L, FOs and indigenous groups are most important to achieve real and lasting **policy influence**, due to their sustainability. While cofinancing partnerships are also likely to be highly relevant, as can be SSTC, RBA and partnerships with CSOs and private sector.

217. **Scaling up** could be achieved in the best way through working with government and domestic partners, preferably through cofinancing, and through enhancing K&L, particularly on the learning side. Cofinancing with other donors, CSOs or through SSTC could also play a major role in scaling up.

218. **Knowledge and innovations** could benefit most from partnerships with international, regional and national research organizations, in collaboration with CSOs. FOs could be a particularly important source of knowledge and innovations.

219. **Exploiting synergies and complementarities** appears to be most important in setting up PPPPs and pursuing cofinancing opportunities vis-á-vis division of labour, but is relevant in the selection of all partners.

220. Almost all types of partner engagement work strongly towards **ownership and sustainability**.

221. **Leveraging resources** is currently seen as strongly linked with cofinancing with international donors and government, but there is scope to leverage more resources through SSTC and PPPP.

Key lessons from this ESR

- Partnerships have to be programmatic, with clear objectives, results-oriented, time-bound, and sufficiently resourced.
- Partnerships for development tend to be fluid.
- Principles of mutuality and organizational identity are important for effective partnerships.
- Partnering requires more continuity through long-term strategic partnering with a broadened set of partners, selectively chosen for country priorities.

V. Conclusions and recommendations

A. Conclusions

222. This ESR is not simply about partnerships. It is about specific partnership results, or outcomes, and how they can best be achieved through different forms of partnerships, with the best partners, most effectively and efficiently, and in the right way for the country and regional context.

223. **The quality of partnerships matters, but the mix of partnership types is important to achieve results, too.** A good mix of partnerships along the three categories - cofinancing, knowledge and learning, coordination and cooperation – is important to achieve greater outreach and complementarity of results, for instance for scaling up and creating synergies.

224. **Insufficient focus on results**. Partnerships are at the core of IFAD corporate priorities: scaling up, knowledge generation and learning, and policy engagement and influence. Yet there is no coherent framework to capture the comprehensive results of partnerships. The effectiveness of COSOPs in guiding partnership-building has been overestimated. COSOPs often express programmatic intentions that are frequently more driven by political considerations than by real opportunities and available resources on the ground. Partnership-building is often ad hoc and lacks an adequate resource framework; results are not tracked. The long-term nature of partnerships and their contributions across a wider range of outcomes is not captured.

225. **IFAD's Partnership Strategy does not provide sufficient guidance on how partnership results will be achieved at country level**. The importance of country partnerships is insufficiently reflected in the corporate Partnership Strategy (2012). In addition, IFAD should refine its cofinancing strategy beyond the global level and move more strongly to the country level for cofinancing and resource mobilization, with the relevant support for country teams. The 2012 Partnership Strategy identifies increased resource mobilization as one of four categories of partnerships, but refers mainly to global resource mobilization of supplementary funds for IFAD, rather than standard project cofinancing. The importance of mobilizing domestic resources is highlighted in the IFAD11 paper (2017), but a specific strategy and guidance are needed.

226. **The limited range and versatility of partnership instruments restrict the potential to achieve better development results.** The IFAD category of non-lending activities currently combines policy engagement, knowledge and partnership-building, but does not capture key partnership outcomes such as scaling up, ownership and sustainability or leverage that may grow out of investment projects or are inherent parts of these projects. For example, grants are primarily used for knowledge and learning purposes, but partnerships may also create wider or higher-level impacts, such as scaling up or policy influence, if done in a more strategic manner. In a similar vein, cofinancing is not just about resource mobilization, but also facilitates other benefits, such as synergies and complementarities.

227. **Corporate support and sensitivity to country teams and country-level planning of partnership-building are important**. Country partnership work and outcomes need to be institutionally acknowledged and well-integrated into overall IFAD country-level programming. Currently, formal and informal corporate incentives do not encourage ICOs to undertake partnership activities such as policy engagement. Corporate support may be required to help country teams identify better ways of planning partnerships according to country opportunities and resources, and monitoring them. This includes help for country teams to mobilize the necessary partnership resources.

228. **Finally, there are many good practices on partnerships that can be shared**. Good practices include designing partnerships in such a way that they are programmatic, with clear objectives, and are results-oriented and time-bound. It is also important that partnerships are sufficiently resourced or clear resource mobilization paths are feasible and envisaged. Also, that partnership engagement rules are sufficiently long-term and flexible to gradually strengthen the ties with partners, and that the emphasis is on capitalizing on partnership synergies, making use of comparative advantages and avoiding overlap.

B. Recommendations

229. **The partnership environment and expectations are changing fast**, together with a rapidly changing aid environment, the growing importance of MICs, increased attention to non-lending and the search for new donors in the agricultural sector. The assessment of the Partnership Strategy in 2018 provides an opportunity to critically review the relevance and effectiveness of IFAD’s partnerships. The commitments made for IFAD11 are encouraging and supported by the recommendations emerging from this review.

230. The ESR recommends three areas of action that would enhance the performance of country partnerships: (a) preparation of partnership strategies tailored to the specific conditions and needs of MICs and LICs; (b) more strategic use of partnership instruments and modalities; and (c) improved accountability for partnership results.

231. **Recommendation 1. Prepare a revised corporate partnership strategy with a clear focus on country-level partnership outcomes.** Global partnerships are important for IFAD to fulfil its mandate. But, in line with IFAD's new business model, support for partnership-building has to move from global to regional and country levels. A revised partnership strategy should include a clear vision as well as specific guidance on country partnership approaches and outcomes that would motivate country programme staff and enable greater synergies between different parts of the organization. The revised strategy would recognize the importance of country-level partnerships and specify the corporate support, capacity-building and incentives for ICOs to undertake outcome-oriented partnership-building within and beyond projects. It would provide clarity on the specific types of partnership engagement, instruments and expected results in different settings. Furthermore, the revised strategy would:

(a) Include a results-based management framework based on a broader set of instruments beyond loans and grants to facilitate partnerships with a wider range of partners, including with the private sector.

(b) Provide guidance on how to combine these instruments to achieve key IFAD objectives of influencing policy, scaling up innovations, knowledge and learning, synergies and sustainability, and leverage.

(c) Include specific partnership strategies for different country categories (LICs, lower and upper MICs, and most fragile situations).

(d) Clarify the approach to preparing partnership strategies as part of the COSOP process; guide partnership development towards greater selectivity including a more rigorous cost-benefit analysis; determine the principal partnership outcomes to be achieved and the means for achieving them; and identify entry points for engagement with governments on the broader framework for partnerships.

232. **Recommendation 2. Streamline the application of partnership instruments and modalities with an eye towards partnership results.**

(a) With regard to loans as a partnership instrument, IFAD needs to identify a wider range of specific **cofinancing** options at global and country levels.[69] The current confusion between cofinancing – mainly for enhanced partnership outcomes and aggregate leverage of funds for agriculture - and resource mobilization - for an expanded IFAD loans and grants portfolio, including supplementary funds – needs to be overcome. IFAD would be well advised to adopt specific strategies for mobilizing cofinancing in MICs and LICs, and should systematically monitor and report cofinancing partnership results beyond indicators of bigger loans and lower IFAD transaction costs, to include specific country partnership outcomes, in particular policy influence and scaling up.

(b) For **grants** as a key partnership instrument, improved IFAD internal mechanisms are required to align regional and country grants, including SSTC, and to ensure that they provide for mutually supportive lending operations and country-level partnership outcomes as envisaged in the COSOPs. The IFAD11 commitment 3.4 to strengthen synergies between lending and non-lending engagement is important and encouraging in this respect. In a similar vein, more grant funds should be mobilized for longer-term partnership-building with CSOs, farmers' organizations, indigenous groups and the private sector in the form of SMEs to strengthen their capacities, particularly in countries where governments are less supportive of the use of loans for these activities. And finally, support to CSOs should take a long-term perspective on institutional effectiveness and sustainability beyond the project level, for example through support of CSO apex or umbrella organizations.

(c) With regard to **PPPPs**, IFAD needs to recognize the challenges of PPPP partnerships and devise effective mechanisms to address them head on. This includes being upfront about the risks of PPPP and devising strategies to mitigate them. Updating IFAD's strategy for engagement with the private sector and enhancing instruments to collaborate with the private sector and foundations (IFAD11 commitment 1.2, action 6) will be an important step. In addition, IFAD should also continue the use of regional and sub-national platforms for PPPP to support networking and mutual learning.

233. **Recommendation 3. Strengthen corporate accountability for partnership results through a coherent approach to monitoring and evaluating partnerships.**

(a) The IFAD11 commitments include a number of monitorable actions that are relevant in this respect: to improve cofinancing monitoring and reporting by source and country category, and better measure IFAD's crowding in of private investment (action 5 under commitment 1.2); and to develop and implement a framework to strategically plan and monitor IFAD's partnerships at country, regional, global and institutional levels (action 27 under commitment 3.5.).

(b) Furthermore, IFAD should adopt consistent evaluation criteria and indicators for assessing the quality and effectiveness of partnership-building for IFAD self- and independent evaluations and improve the system of monitoring, reporting and evaluating of key partnership outcomes at country and IFAD corporate level, including ex-post cofinancing achievements beyond the ex-ante Grants and Investment Projects System (GRIPS). This would include at least some country-specific partnership indicators and targets (COSOPs) –

[69] Similar cofinancing principles could also be applied to certain forms of IFAD grants that could benefit from cofinancing.

based on common IFAD-wide ones - for review and adjustment as needed in annual COSOP reviews.

(c) The corporate database of grant-financed partnerships should be enhanced by including results in terms of key partnership outcomes.

234. And finally, global partnerships of strategic importance to IFAD should be evaluated to determine how they could be enhanced. In this respect, IOE should consider evaluating the RBA partnership.

Evaluation framework and hypotheses

1.1 Evaluation framework

Review question	*Review method*
Overall trends and patterns	
Q.1 What are the trends and patterns with regard to different types of partners and forms of engagement for the review period and how can they be explained?	Quantitative analysis of PPA/PCRV ratings (2006 – 2016)
Q.2. How do they differ for different types of countries (MFS, MICs, LICs)?	Quantitative analysis of PPA/PCRV ratings (2006 – 2016)
Q.3. What explains the good or poor performance on partnership-building in "outlier" countries?	Qualitative evidence from selected CPEs and background information; interviews
Cofinancing partnerships	
Q.4. How can the decrease in cofinancing partnerships be explained?	Qualitative analysis of selected PPEs of cofinanced projects, supplemented by analysis from CPEs and COSOPs
Q.5. To what extent are cofinancing partnerships affecting the achievement of IFAD's goals at country level?	Analysis from CPEs and COSOPs
Government partners	
Q.6. What roles do government partners play in partnership-building and how do these affect the achievement of IFAD's partnerships outcomes and goals at country level?	Qualitative evidence from 40 CPEs
Knowledge and learning partnerships	
Q.7. How do country, regional and global K&L partnerships enhance IFAD's partnership outcomes and goals at country level?	Qualitative evidence from 40 CPEs, supplemented by case studies and feedback from selective interviews/survey responses
Q8. How do partnerships with academic institutions, think tanks and research centres contribute to an enhanced knowledge of the results of IFAD financed operations on the ground? What are the practices for engagement with academic institutions and research centres?	Qualitative evidence from 40 CPEs, supplemented by case studies and feedback from selective interviews/survey responses
Private sector	
Q.9. How do partnerships with the private sector influence the achievement of IFAD's partnership outcomes and goals at country level?	Qualitative evidence from 40 CPEs, supplemented by case studies and feedback from selective interviews/survey responses
Civil society	
Q.10. To what extent did partnerships with civil society (e.g. Novib) enable more effective interventions in partner countries?	Qualitative evidence from 40 CPEs, supplemented by case studies and feedback from selective interviews/survey responses
Interagency coordination	
Q11. How effective was IFAD's role in interagency coordination, in particular with RBAs and other IFI's working in the agricultural sector?	Qualitative evidence from 40 CPEs, supplemented by case studies and feedback from selective interviews/survey responses
Q12. What is the relevance and impact of IFAD global partnerships for IFAD partnership outcomes and goals at country level?	Qualitative evidence from 40 CPEs, supplemented by qualitative analysis of selected global partnerships and feedback from interviews/survey responses
IFAD as partner	
Q.13. What do other partners expect from IFAD and to what	Client surveys

extent has IFAD been able to match these expectations?	
Q.14. What evidence is there from independent evaluations to confirm that IFAD is a valued partner?	Evidence from 40 CSPEs and selected PPEs
Synthesis of findings	
Q.15. Which types of partners and which forms of engagement work best and under what conditions?	Synthesis of the above; PMD focus group discussion
Q.16. What are the key enabling factors for partnership-building?	Synthesis of the above; PMD focus group discussion
Q.17. What configurations of partnership arrangements are most effective within a given country context?	Partnership rubric
Q18. Can the downward trend on partnership performances, as identified in the 2016 ARRI, be confirmed (or not), and how can it be explained?	Interpretation of CPE ratings against synthesis findings

1.2 Hypotheses on enabling factors and transaction costs and risks.

1. Decentralized and sufficiently staffed country teams are among the most important factors for partnership outcomes.

2. Striking good partnerships requires a strategic and practical approach, at corporate and country levels.

2.1 A clear corporate partnership vision, strategic support and institutional acknowledgement are important for country partnerships.

2.2 Incorporating and measuring partnership results and rewarding them /introducing incentives supports partnership outcomes.

2.3 Partnerships that are clearly defined and prioritized in COSOPs produce good results.

2.4 Potential partners that are well screened for delivery capacity.

2.5 Best practices in partnership are well incorporated in partnership design and implementation (well bound, results oriented, ownership, etc.).

3. IFAD underestimates resources (time, skills and funds) and institutional/corporate support requirements for country partnerships (transaction costs) which leads to sub-optimal partnerships outcomes at country level.

4. Global partnerships often do not sufficiently acknowledge country specific priorities, conditions and constraints and therefore sub-optimally contribute to achieving country partnership outcomes.

5. IFAD overrates cofinancing partnerships vis-á-vis other partnership types of engagement to achieve influence and positive country partnership outcomes.

6. Communication skills and trust-building are highly important for partnerships.

7. Government capacities, governance and decentralization strongly influence the results and effective impact pathways for different forms of partnerships.

8. Partners and types of engagement

8.1 Partnerships with CSOs work better through provision of non-lending grant support than within projects.

8.2 PPPPs are most effective when government has generated a supportive environment for private-sector engagement.

8.3 PPPPs are most effective when IFAD works across ministries (such as Agriculture, Commerce and Trade, Industry and Small Business Development, Environment).

8.4 Key strategic partnerships with IFIs such as AfDB, ADB and GEF require regular (global) interaction and communication on country and thematic priorities, commonalities and complementarities.

8.5 Grants and supplementary funding for non-lending work are critical for effective partnership activities and outcomes.

8.6 Work at country level through research grants to international and national institutions supports knowledge partnerships in countries and related outcomes.

8.7 Hypotheses on policy engagement

8.7.1 Policy engagement works best where skilled staff on policy issues available.

8.7.2 Policy engagement works best where support units are established in relevant ministries.

8.7.3 Policy engagement works best where dialogue includes RBA and MDBs.

8.7.4 Policy engagement works best where government buy-in into IFAD objectives.

8.8 Interagency coordination with RBAs works best where there are clear corporate agreements on scope and outcomes at country level.

8.9 IFAD overrates cofinancing partnerships vis-á-vis other partnership types of engagement to achieve influence and positive country partnership outcomes.

Senior independent adviser's report

1. The evaluation synthesis on *Building Partnerships for Enhanced Development Effectiveness* being prepared by IFAD's Independent Office of Evaluation is timely as IFAD seeks to step up its development impact including through decentralization and partnerships in the field. Crucial to the success of this endeavour is both the quality, independence and rigor of the evaluative findings and their acceptance, adoption and follow through by Management. This reviewer is satisfied with evidence on these two planks thus far and is optimistic about the value addition and usefulness of this work.

2. This reviewer has given comments and inputs on the draft approach paper, earlier drafts of the paper and ongoing discussions and feedback with stakeholders including IFAD Management. The organization and accessibility of the report have improved vastly, with much greater granularity and country flavour to the findings. The links among findings, conclusions and recommendations are clear. The messages and priorities for action come through. The transparency and frankness on the data base and limitations of the evidence base are articulated.

3. Similar exercises have been carried out at other organizations including the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank, which this reviewer has supervised. Each situation is different. But one message that seems common across the differing settings is the value of keeping focused both on the costs of building partnerships (such as the time and administrative finances needed to sustain them) and the benefits (such better leveraging and synergies of rural interventions), which can vastly exceed the costs but if, and only if, reforms are carried out to make the partnerships work better. Thus the recommendations to make partnerships work better are the crux of this exercise.

4. Leading up to the recommendations, the findings on the nature of partnerships are key. If I may stress an often-forgotten aspect, it is the link between (i) partnerships that improve programme delivery (say via financing of programmes inter alia with Rome-based agencies, MDBs and governments); and (ii) partnerships in generating working links (say health, education, agriculture, etc.) that produces synergies. Some findings suggest a positive performance of knowledge partnerships and weak performance of partnership-building and policy dialogue. Is it because the abovementioned synergies work better in one and not the other, and if so why and what can be done?

5. The report has mined the available data from evaluations and discussions with the Board, operations, peer reviewers and other stakeholders very well. Going forward, more can be done on ratings and evaluation criteria that can give a stronger basis for such synthetic work. In all such synthetic work, the evaluation criteria need to be carried through rigorously: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and overall impact. Country typologies mentioned in the report are very useful. But how strong are the CSPEs and do they need strengthening?

6. The case studies are hugely important. We might be able to mine the country focus further. The analysis shows differences by country groupings and by instruments, as well as trends in partnership outcomes. Can we learn more from the vast difference in partnership effectiveness across ESA and LAC for example? Middle

income countries are noted as having better outcomes than low income ones, but is that always so?

7. The report has important conclusions on policy change, scaling up, synergies, and leverage which are especially important whenever the share of an organization in financing or a programme is relatively modest. IFAD's Board and Management should be congratulated on seeing the value of its contributions within the broader context of all that others too are doing and seeking to raise its impact inter alia through making partnerships work better. The question now would be if these intentions will be translated into operational priorities with the needed financing and staff power allocated.

8. The report has important conclusions on the role of trust, country ownership, continuity of efforts and predictability (of financing as well), strategic approaches, and monitoring and evaluation. These points merit follow up in future work. It surely seems key to have country and government ownership and capacity for good partnership outcomes. How do we square that with the observation that government being the key player can also limit impact of partnerships? Similarly, the formality of the partnership arrangements adds to administrative costs, but formal arrangements seem to work better in terms of their effectiveness.

9. The follow-up to the report, both on the part of the evaluators and Management as well as the Board, is crucial. What markers will evaluators assess over time and report on progress? How will Management and the Board ensure the needed staffing, resources and most importantly priorities for integrating partnerships more squarely into IFAD strategy?

10. This reviewer would like to express his deep appreciation for the quality and integrity of the process, the preparedness and commitment of those he was involved with and pleasure for being part of this evaluation exercise.

PRM IFAD Country Level Partnership Survey 2017

Figure 1
Most important partners for cofinancing



Source: PRM survey 2017.

Figure 2
Most important partners for knowledge and policy engagement



Source: PRM survey 2017.

Figure 3
Partners with limited or no engagement



Source: PRM survey 2017.

Cofinancing data

4.1 Cofinancing trends by IFAD replenishment periods.

Table 1
IFAD cofinancing trends 2007-2015 (all countries)

IFAD replenishment period	*Cofinancing ratio*	*IFAD*	*Domestic*	*International*	*IFAD*	*Domestic*	*International*	*Total*
	Co-fin. vs. IFAD	*USD million*			*Per cent*			*USD million*
IFAD 7 (2007-09)	1.12	1,731	941	997	47.2	25.7	27.2	3,668
IFAD8 (2010-12)	1.42	2,695	2,355	1,484	41.2	36.0	22.7	6,534
IFAD9 (2013-15)	1.39	2,916	2,261	1.783	41.9	32.5	25.6	6,960

Source: IFAD GRIPS.

Table 2
IFAD low-income countries 2007-2015

IFAD replenishment period	*Cofinancing ratio*	*IFAD*	*Domestic*	*International*	*IFAD*	*Domestic*	*International*	*Total*
	Co-fin. vs. IFAD	*USD million*			*Per cent*			*USD million*
IFAD 7 (2007-09)	1.26	1,034	495	803	44.3	21.2	34.4	2332
IFAD8 (2010-12)	1.37	1,856	1,583	965	42.1	35.9	21.9	4,404
IFAD9 (2013-15)	1.03	2,084	1,180	972	49.2	27.9	22.9	4,236

Source: IFAD GRIPS.

Table 3
IFAD lower middle-income countries 2007-2015

IFAD replenishment period	*Cofinancing ratio*	*IFAD*	*Domestic*	*International*	*IFAD*	*Domestic*	*International*	*Total*
	Co-fin. vs. IFAD	*USD million*			*Per cent*			*USD million*
IFAD 7 (2007-09)	0.90	557	341	159	52.7	32.3	15.0	3,668
IFAD8 (2010-12)	1.29	665	485	374	43.6	31.8	24/5	6,534
IFAD9 (2013-15)	2.20	709	803	759	31.2	35.4	33.4	6,960

Source: IFAD GRIPS.

Table 4
IFAD upper middle-income countries 2007-2015

IFAD replenishment period	*Cofinancing ratio*	*IFAD*	*Domestic*	*International*	*IFAD*	*Domestic*	*International*	*Total*
	Co-fin. vs. IFAD	*USD million*			*Per cent*			*USD million*
IFAD 7 (2007-09)	1.03	34	134	272	49.3	38.2	12.5	3,668
IFAD8 (2010-12)	2.51	172	287	145	28.5	47.5	24.0	6,534
IFAD9 (2013-15)	2.83	123	287	61	26.1	60.9	13.0	6,960

Source: IFAD GRIPS.

4.2 High cofinancing trends

Table 1
Countries with relatively high cofinancing

Ratio co-financier to IFAD loan in country	*Number of countries*	*Countries*
International cofinancing		
≥100%	4	Ghana, Mali, Nepal, Uganda
≥50 - <100%	11	Bangladesh, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Gambia, Jordan, Niger, Madagascar, Pakistan, Philippines, Tanzania, Yemen
Domestic cofinancing		
≥50%	3	India, Uganda
≥10 - <50%	7	Bangladesh, Brazil, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nicaragua, Nigeria
Government cofinancing		
≥100%	5	Brazil, China, Nigeria, Pakistan, Uganda,
≥50% - <100%	11	Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Ghana, India, Jordan, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Philippines, Senegal

(only countries with CSPEs in 2006-2016, based on GRIPs information [cofinancing at design])
Source: annex V table 3.

CSPE review quantitative data

Table 1
Partnership assessment matrix (source: CPMs)

	Partnership types			Outcomes					Outputs											
Country (partnerships ratings)	Cofinancing (non-government)	Knowledge and learning	Coordination and cooperation	Influencing	Scaling up and mainstreaming	Complementarities / synergies	Knowledge & Innovation	Sustainability and ownership	Working groups	Partner capacities	Cofinanced projects (intern., GRIPS)*	Grants	Policy engagement	Knowledge platforms	Events	Study tours/ Learning routes	Vertical collaboration	PPPP	Alignment and harmonization	Cofinancing share (intern, GRIPS)
Argentina 2009 (4)	-	+++	+	+++	+	++	+++	++	-	++	+	++	+++	++	+	+	++	-	+	16%
Bangladesh 2014 (4)	+++`	++	+++ NGOs	+ Tech	++	+	++	++	+	+++	++	++	+	-	-	++	+++	+	-	74%
Bolivia 2013 (3)	+	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	++	++	+	+	+ Reg.	-	++	-	-	-	47%
Brazil 2015 (4)	-	+++	+ RBA	++	+	+	+++	+	-	+	+	++	++	+	+	++	+ DHCP	+ DHCP	+	12%
Brazil 2007 (3)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+ State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	0%
China 2013 (4)	-	+	++ WFP	+	++	++	+	++	+	++	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	++	8%
Ecuador 2012 (3)	++	++	+	+	-	+	++	+	+	++	++	++	+	++	-	++	+	+	++	71%
Ethiopia 2015 (4)	+++ WB	+	++ WB - AfDB	+	++	++	+	++	+	+	++	+	++	+	-	+	+	+	+++	72%
Gambia 2015 (3)	+ AfDB	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	++	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	77%
Ghana 2010 (4)	++ WB AfDB	+	++	++	+	+	+	+	++	-	+++	+	++	++	-	-	+	+	++	104 %
India 2015 (3)	+	++	+ PPPP	+	+	+	++	++ State	+	+	+	++	-	-	+	-	+ SSC	+	++	11%
Indonesia 2012 (3)	+ ADB	-	+	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	++ Mars	++	-	32%

	Partnership types			Outcomes					Outputs											
Country (partnerships ratings)	Cofinancing (non-government)	Knowledge and learning	Coordination and cooperation	Influencing	Scaling up and mainstreaming	Complementarities / synergies	Knowledge & Innovation	Sustainability and ownership	Working groups	Partner capacities	Cofinanced projects (intern., GRIPS)*	Grants	Policy engagement	Knowledge platforms	Events	Study tours/ Learning routes	Vertical collaboration	PPPP	Alignment and harmonization	Cofinancing share (intern, GRIPS)
Jordan 2011 (4)	+++ GEF etc.	++	-	-	+ MF	-	++	+	-	+	++	++	-	+	-	-	+ Reg.	-	+	76%
Kenya 2010 (4)	+	+ CoP	+	-	-	+	-	+	++	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	+++	31%
Madagascar 2012 (5)	++	++	++	++	-	+	++	+	++	++	++	+	++	++	+	-	+++	+++	++	58%
Mali 2012 (5)	+++	+++	++	++	+++ MF	++	+++	++	++	++	+++	++	+++	+	+	-	+++	+	+++	115 %
Mali 2006 (3)	+	++	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	++	++	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	51%
Moldova 2013 (4)	++	+	+ USAID	+	+	++	++	++	++	-	+	-	-	+	++	++	++	++	++	15%
Morocco 2006 (4)	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	++	+	+	-	-	-	-	+	32%
Mozambique 2016 (5)	++	++	+++	++	+	+++	++	++	+	++	+	++	+	++	++	+	+++	+++	++	47%
Nepal 2012 (4)	++ WB, ADB	+++	+	++	-	++	+++	+	+	++	+++	+++	++	-	-	+	++	++	++	133 %
Nicaragua 2016 (4)	++	+	+	++	+	++	++	+	++	++	+	++	++	+	+	++	++	++	++	33%
Niger 2009 (5)	++	+	++	++	-	+++	++	+	+	++	++	++	++	+	+	-	-	-	+++	73%
Nigeria 2015 (3) 2008 (4)	- Govt.	++	+ CSO, Res	++	++	++	+	-	++	+	- 2015 + 2008	++	++	+	-	+	+	+	+	5% 11%
Pakistan 2007 (4)	++	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	++	++	-	+	-	+	-	-	+	57%
Philippines 2016 (4)	+ADB	+++	++ Res	++ Tech	++ Tech	++ Res	++	+	-	+	++	++	+	++	+++	-	++	+	-	84%
Rwanda 2010 (4)	+	-	-	+	-	+	+	++	+	++	+	++	-	+	+	++	+	+	+++	43%

Country (partnerships ratings)	Partnership types			Outcomes					Outputs											Cofinancing share (intern, GRIPS)
	Cofinancing (non-government)	Knowledge and learning	Coordination and cooperation	Influencing	Scaling up and mainstreaming	Complementarities / synergies	Knowledge & Innovation	Sustainability and ownership	Working groups	Partner capacities	Cofinanced projects (intern., GRIPS)*	Grants	Policy engagement	Knowledge platforms	Events	Study tours/ Learning routes	Vertical collaboration	PPPP	Alignment and harmonization	
Senegal 2013 (4)	+	-	++ POs	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	++	+	+	+	43%
Sudan 2008 (3)	+	-	-	+	++	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	37%
Tanzania 2014 (4)	++	+	+++ ASDP	+	++	+++	+	++	++	++	++	+	+	+	+	-	++ Local	++	+++	92%
Turkey 2015 (3)	-	++	+	+ Pol	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	++	-	+	13%
Uganda 2011 (5)	++	+	+++	+	-	+++	+	+++ UJAS	++	+	+++	+ SNV	+	+	+	-	+++	+++	+++ UJAS	120%
Viet Nam 2010 (4)	-	+	+ PS	+ Proj.	+	+	+ WG	++	++ Gov.	+	-	+ PPPP	+ Proj.	+	+++	++	++ Local	++	++	9%
Yemen 2010 (4)	++	-	+	++	+	++	+	+	+	+	++	+	++	+	-	+	+	+	++	60%
Zambia 2013 (4)	-	+	+	++	-	+	+	++	++	+	+	+	++	+	-	+	+ Reg	+	++	20%
Counts																				
Totals	**47**	46	44	40	**28**	**47**	**49**	39	34	41	**52**	**49**	39	33	**23**	28	46	37	**49**	
+	11	13	16	13	11	15	17	17	12	14	15	14	13	21	13	10	13	16	12	
++	12	9	8	12	7	10	10	11	11	12	13	16	10	6	2	9	9	6	12	
+++	4	5	4	1	1	4	4	0	0	1	4	1	2	0	2	0	5	3	**7**	
-	8	8	7	9	16	6	4	7	12	8	4	4	10	8	18	16	8	10	4	

* International cofinancing only (GRIPS information). Legend: - = <10%; + 10 - < 50%; ++ 50 - < 100%; +++ > 100%; country portfolio at time of CSPE evaluation
Source: compiled by IOE based on CSPE reviews. Cofinancing data is derived from annex VII.3 table 1.

Legend: **-** no reported partnership engagement; **+** some engagement (but under-exploited); **++** substantial engagement, visible, strategic; **+++** very strong and visible engagement, demonstrated high-profile results; in terms of quantities, but also quality of partnership engagement. **Note:** An assessment of '-'does not necessarily mean that there is no engagement, but that it may be minor or there is no reference in the CSPE in terms of partnerships. For instance, projects may be well aligned with governments, but there may have been no particular partnership effort on alignment, harmonization and use of country systems. Secondly, this table refers to information from CSPEs at the time of the evaluation. Performance may be different as of 2017.

5.1 Partnership types of engagement

The following tables (1 to 4) provide the incidences of types of engagement and were compiled by IOE based on the CSPE reviews found in annex V.1.

Table 1
Types of engagement 2006 – 2017 (n=36)

	Types of engagement										
Partners	Loans	Grants	Supplementary	Brokering	Networking	Dialogue	SSTC	RBA	PPPPs	Total (rows)	% (rows)
Government	**36**	14	1	15	4	22	6	1	14	112	21.3
Regional Economic Communities	0	1	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	4	0.8
International Development Partners	**24**	18	3	5	13	18	7	7	2	94	17.9
IFIs	**21**	5	0	3	6	9	0	0	1	45	8.6
Local financial institutions	7	3	0	6	0	2	0	0	1	19	3.6
Development Banks	6	2	0	4	0	2	0	0	3	17	3.2
Research Institutions/Universities	4	**23**	0	4	7	4	2	0	0	44	8.4
CSOs/IP organizations	9	**21**	0	14	15	12	5	0	9	85	16.2
Farmers' organizations	3	7	0	14	8	7	4	0	9	52	9.9
Private sector	11	3	0	14	6	3	1	0	15	53	10.1
TOTAL	121	97	4	79	59	81	26	8	54	525	100.0
Percent (column of engagement type sub-group)	55.5	44.5		36.1	26.9	37.0	29.5	9.1	61.4		

Note: use 1 to match partners with types of engagement. Each CSPE may include several types of engagement. Each Type of engagement could be associated to one or more partners.

Table 2
Types of engagement 2006 – 2011 (n=15)

	Types of engagement										
Partners	Loans	Grants	Supplementary Funding	Brokering	Networking	Dialogue	SSTC	RBA	PPPPs	Total (rows)	% (rows)
Government	14	3	0	6	1	9	1	0	5	39	22.0
Regional Economic Communities	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	3	1.7
International Development Partners	8	4	0	2	4	6	4	1	0	29	16.4
IFIs	8	1	0	2	3	3	0	0	0	17	9.6
Local financial institutions	3	1	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	8	4.5
Development Banks	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	5	2.8
Research Institutions/Universities	1	8	0	1	3	2	1	0	0	16	9.0
CSOs/IP organizations	3	8	0	5	7	2	2	0	3	30	16.9
Farmers' organizations	0	2	0	5	3	2	1	0	4	17	9.6
Private sector	3	1	0	3	1	1	0	0	4	13	7.3
TOTAL	43	29	0	27	22	28	10	1	17	177	100.0
Percent (column of engagement type sub-group)	59.7	40.3		35.1	28.6	36.4	35.7	3.6	60.7		

Table 3
Types of engagement 2012 - 2017 (n=21)

	Types of engagement										
Partners	Loans	Grants	Supplementary Funding	Brokering	Networking	Dialogue	SSTC	RBA	PPPPs	Total (rows)	% (rows)
Government	22	11	1	9	3	13	5	1	9	73	21.0
Regional Economic Communities	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.3
International Development Partners	16	14	3	3	9	12	3	6	2	65	18.7
IFIs	13	4	0	1	3	6	0	0	1	28	8.0
Local financial institutions	4	2	0	4	0	0	0	0	1	11	3.2
Development Banks	3	2	0	3	0	2	0	0	2	12	3.4
Research Institutions/Universities	3	15	0	3	4	2	1	0	0	28	8.0
CSOs/IP organizations	6	13	0	9	8	10	3	0	6	55	15.8
Farmers' organizations	3	5	0	9	5	5	3	0	5	35	10.1
Private sector	8	2	0	11	5	2	1	0	11	40	11.5
TOTAL	78	68	4	52	37	53	16	7	37	348	100.0
Percent (column of engagement type sub-group)	53.4	46.6		36.6	26.1	37.3	26.7	11.7	61.7		

Annex V

Table 4
Types of engagement low-income countries (n=14)

	Types of engagement										
Partners	Loans	Grants	Supplementary Funding	Brokering	Networking	Dialogue	SSTC	RBA	PPPPs	Total (rows)	% (rows)
Government	14	4	1	2	1	8	1	1	4	35	18.6
Regional Economic Communities	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.5
International Development Partners	10	8	1	1	6	8	2	3	1	39	20.7
IFIs	11	2	0	0	3	5	0	0	1	22	11.7
Local financial institutions	2	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	5	2.7
Development Banks	2	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	6	3.2
Research Institutions/Universities	2	8	0	0	3	1	0	0	0	14	7.4
CSOs/IP organizations	4	12	0	6	4	2	0	0	4	32	17.0
Farmers' organizations	1	3	0	5	4	1	0	0	3	17	9.0
Private sector	7	1	0	3	1	0	0	0	5	17	9.0
TOTAL	53	41	2	19	22	27	3	4	19	188	100.0
Percent (column of engagement type sub-group)	56.4	43.6		27.9	32.4	39.7	11.5	15.4	73.1		

Table 5
Types of engagement middle-income countries (n=22)

	Types of engagement										
Partners	Loans	Grants	Supplementary Funding	Brokering	Networking	Dialogue	SSTC	RBA	PPPPs	Total (rows)	% (rows)
Government	22	10	0	13	3	14	5	0	10	77	22.8
Regional Economic Communities	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	3	0.9
International Development Partners	14	10	2	4	7	10	5	4	1	55	16.3
IFIs	10	3	0	3	3	4	0	0	0	23	6.8
Local financial institutions	5	1	0	5	0	2	0	0	1	14	4.2
Development Banks	4	1	0	3	0	1	0	0	2	11	3.3
Research Institutions/Universities	2	15	0	4	4	3	2	0	0	30	8.9
CSOs/IP organizations	5	9	0	8	11	10	5	0	5	53	15.7
Farmers' organizations	2	4	0	9	4	6	4	0	6	35	10.4
Private sector	4	2	0	11	5	3	1	0	10	36	10.7
TOTAL	68	56	2	60	37	54	23	4	35	337	100.0
Percent (column of engagement type sub-group)	54.8	45.2		39.7	24.5	35.8	37.1	6.5	56.5		

5.2 Partnership outcomes

The following tables (1 to 5) provide the incidences of partnership outcomes and were compiled by IOE based on the CSPE reviews found in annex V.1.

Table 1
Partnership outcomes 2006 - 2017 (n=36)

Partners	Influencing	Scaling-up	Leveraging resources	Complementarities/Synergies	Partner capacities	Alignment, harmonisation, use of country systems	Sustainable, effective M&E	Knowledge and communication	Ownership	Total (rows)	% (rows)
	Outcomes										
Government	**22**	5	7	3	10	16	4	13	9	89	29.7
Regional Economic Communities	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.3
International Development Partners	7	4	14	6	1	5	1	9	0	47	15.7
IFIs	5	2	13	3	1	2	0	3	0	29	9.7
Local financial institutions	0	1	2	0	4	0	0	0	0	7	2.3
Development Banks	2	0	2	0	3	1	0	1	1	10	3.3
Research Institutions/Universities	6	1	0	0	0	1	0	8	0	16	5.3
CSOs/IP organizations	10	4	2	1	13	0	1	13	3	47	15.7
Farmers' organizations	7	3	1	0	12	0	0	10	2	35	11.7
Private sector	4	1	0	1	7	0	1	5	0	19	6.3
TOTAL	64	21	41	14	51	25	7	62	15	300	
Column percentage	21.3	7.0	13.7	4.7	17.0	8.3	2.3	20.7	5.0		

Table 2
Partnership outcomes 2006 - 2011 (n=15)

Partners	Influencing	Scaling-up	Leveraging resources	Complementarities/Synergies	Partner capacities	Alignment, harmonisation, use of country systems	Sustainable, effective M&E	Knowledge and communication	Ownership	Total (rows)	% (rows)
	Outcomes										
Government	10	0	4	1	4	5	1	6	3	34	33.0
Regional Economic Communities	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1.0
International Development Partners	1	2	5	1	0	0	0	2	0	11	10.7
IFIs	2	0	7	1	1	0	0	1	0	12	11.7
Local financial institutions	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	4	3.9
Development Banks	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	3	2.9
Research Institutions/Universities	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	4	3.9
CSOs/IP organizations	3	1	2	1	3	0	1	4	2	17	16.5
Farmers' organizations	2	1	1	0	3	0	0	4	2	13	12.6
Private sector	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	4	3.9
TOTAL	22	4	21	5	15	5	2	21	8	103	
Column percentage	21.4	3.9	20.4	4.9	14.6	4.9	1.9	20.4	7.8		

Annex V

Table 3
Partnership outcomes 2012 – 2017 (n=21)

Partners	Influencing	Scaling-up	Leveraging resources	Complementarities/Synergies	Partner capacities	Alignment, harmonisation, use of country systems	Sustainable, effective M&E	Knowledge and communication	Ownership	Total (rows)	% (rows)
	Outcomes										
Government	12	5	3	2	6	11	3	7	6	55	27.9
Regional Economic Communities	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0
International Development Partners	6	2	9	5	1	5	1	7	0	36	18.3
IFIs	3	2	6	2	0	2	0	2	0	17	8.6
Local financial institutions	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	3	1.5
Development Banks	2	0	2	0	1	1	0	1	0	7	3.6
Research Institutions/Universities	5	1	0	0	0	1	0	5	0	12	6.1
CSOs/IP organizations	7	3	0	0	10	0	0	9	1	30	15.2
Farmers' organizations	5	2	0	0	9	0	0	6	0	22	11.2
Private sector	2	1	0	0	7	0	1	4	0	15	7.6
TOTAL	42	17	20	9	36	20	5	41	7	197	
Column percentage	21.3	8.6	10.2	4.6	18.3	10.2	2.5	20.8	3.6		

Table 4
Partnership outcomes 2006 – 2017 low-income countries (n=14)

Partners	Influencing	Scaling-up	Leveraging resources	Complementarities/Synergies	Partner capacities	Alignment, harmonisation, use of country systems	Sustainable, effective M&E	Knowledge and communication	Ownership	Total (rows)	% (rows)
	Outcomes										
Government	6	0	1	1	3	7	2	3	3	26	26.3
Regional Economic Communities	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0
International Development Partners	3	2	6	2	0	3	0	4	0	20	20.2
IFIs	3	1	5	2	0	1	0	1	0	13	13.1
Local financial institutions	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	2.0
Development Banks	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2.0
Research Institutions/Universities	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	4	4.0
CSOs/IP organizations	3	1	2	1	4	0	0	2	1	14	14.1
Farmers' organizations	2	1	1	0	5	0	0	3	0	12	12.1
Private sector	1	0	0	1	3	0	1	0	0	6	6.1
TOTAL	20	6	17	7	16	11	3	15	4	99	
Column percentage	20.2	6.1	17.2	7.1	16.2	11.1	3.0	15.2	4.0		

Table 5
Partnership outcomes 2006 – 2017 middle-income countries (n=22)

Partners	Outcomes: Influencing	Scaling-up	Leveraging resources	Complementarities/Synergies	Partner capacities	Alignment, harmonisation, use of country systems	Sustainable, effective M&E	Knowledge and communication	Ownership	Total (rows)	% (rows)
Government	16	5	6	2	7	9	2	10	6	63	31.3
Regional Economic Communities	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.5
International Development Partners	4	2	8	4	1	2	1	5	0	27	13.4
IFIs	2	1	8	1	1	1	0	2	0	16	8.0
Local financial institutions	0	1	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	5	2.5
Development Banks	1	0	1	0	3	1	0	1	1	8	4.0
Research Institutions/Universities	5	0	0	0	0	1	0	6	0	12	6.0
CSOs/IP organizations	7	3	0	0	9	0	1	11	2	33	16.4
Farmers' organizations	5	2	0	0	7	0	0	7	2	23	11.4
Private sector	3	1	0	0	4	0	0	5	0	13	6.5
TOTAL	44	15	24	7	35	14	4	47	11	201	
Column percentage	21.9	7.5	11.9	3.5	17.4	7.0	2.0	23.4	5.5		

5.3 Partnership ladder

The following table provides the strength of engagement and was compiled by IOE based on the CSPE reviews found in annex V.1.

Table 1
Partnership ladder 2006 - 2017 (n=36)

Partner	Partnership ladder: 1. Partner Implementation	2. Sharing Information	3. Deciding Together	4. Acting together	5.Supporting initiatives	6. Handing over/Scaling-up	Total (rows)	% (rows)
Government	**34**	17	5	8	10	8	82	25.6
Regional Economic Communities	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.3
International Development Partners	10	19	3	7	13	1	53	16.6
IFIs	9	12	2	6	5	1	35	10.9
Local financial institutions	7	3	0	0	2	1	13	4.1
Development Banks	2	1	0	1	3	0	7	2.2
Research Institutions/Universities	12	13	0	3	5	2	35	10.9
CSOs/IP organizations	**20**	16	0	4	8	2	50	15.6
Farmers' organizations	7	5	0	4	5	1	22	6.9
Private sector	10	7	0	2	3	0	22	6.9
TOTAL	111	93	10	35	55	16	320	100.0
Column percentage	34.7	29.1	3.1	10.9	17.2	5.0		

5.4 Hypothesis testing

1. **Hypotheses**. The ToC led to the formulation of a number of hypotheses that were used in the review and analysis of CSPEs, CLEs and other documents in this ESR (see annex I). There are two types of hypotheses.

2. The first set relates to the enabling factors and transaction costs and risks as identified in the ToC. Among others they refer to the relevance of a clear corporate partnership vision and strategic approach, decentralized country teams for partnerships, country priorities and various resources and capacities.

3. The second set is related to hypotheses on specific partnership categories and modalities that were derived from a review of literature and interviews.

Table 1
Hypothesis testing 2006 - 2017

Hypotheses	Correct	Not correct	Partially correct
General			
1.Decentralized and sufficiently staffed country teams are among the most important factors for partnership outcomes	**22**	0	7
2. Striking good partnerships requires a strategic and practical approach, at corporate and country levels	**20**	0	3
2.1 A clear corporate partnership vision, strategic support and institutional acknowledgement are important for country partnerships	**24**	0	0
2.2 Incorporating and measuring partnership results and rewarding them /introducing incentives supports partnership outcomes	3	0	0
2.3 Partnerships that are clearly defined and prioritized in COSOPs produce good results	10	**10**	7
2.4 Potential partners that are well screened for delivery capacity	**20**	2	2
2.5 Best practices in partnership are well incorporated in partnership design and implementation (well bound, results oriented, ownership etc.)	19	0	1
3. IFAD underestimates resources (time, skills and funds) and institutional/corporate support requirements for country partnerships (transaction costs) which leads to sub-optimal partnerships outcomes at country level	18	3	2
4. Global partnerships often do not sufficiently acknowledge country specific priorities, conditions and constraints and therefore sub-optimally contribute to achieving country partnership outcomes	8	2	2
5. IFAD overrates cofinancing partnerships vis-á-vis other partnership types of engagement to achieve influence and positive country partnership outcomes	2	**7**	4
6. Communication skills and trust-building are highly important for partnerships	14	0	0
7. Government capacities, governance and decentralization strongly influence the results and effective impact pathways for different forms of partnerships.	**31**	0	0

Hypotheses (continued)	Correct	Not correct	Partially correct
Partners and types of engagement	**0**	**0**	**0**
8.1 Partnerships with CSOs work better through provision of non-lending grant support than within projects	0	3	1
8.2 PPPPs are most effective when government has generated a supportive environment for private-sector engagement	13	0	0
8.3 PPPPs are most effective when IFAD works across Ministries (Agriculture, Commerce and Trade, Industry and Small Business Development, Environment etc.)	9	1	1
8.4 Key strategic partnerships with IFIs such as AfDB, ADB and GEF require regular (global) interaction and communication on country and thematic priorities, commonalities and complementarities	19	0	1
8.5 Grants and supplementary funding for non-lending work are critical for effective partnership activities and outcomes	15	0	2
8.6 Work at country level through research grants to international and national institutions supports knowledge partnerships in countries and related outcomes	18	0	0
8.7.1 Policy engagement works best where Skilled staff on policy issues available	9	0	0
8.7.2 Policy engagement works best where Support units are established in relevant ministries	5	0	2
8.7.3 Policy engagement works best where Dialogue includes RBA and MDBs	19	0	0
8.7.4 Policy engagement works best where government buy-in into IFAD objectives	14	0	1
8.8 Interagency coordination with RBAs works best where there are clear corporate agreements on scope and outcomes at country level.	11	2	1

4. **The most frequently confirmed hypotheses** were those that proposed, firstly, a high influence of government capacities and governance on partnership results (31), secondly, a clear IFAD corporate partnership vision, strategic support and institutional acknowledgment for country partnerships (24) and thirdly, a well-staffed ICO. Also very important were good screening of partners (20), a strategic, selective and practical approach to partnerships (20), incorporation of best practices in partnership design (19), and a proper estimation of the resources required for partnerships (18).[1]

5. Interestingly, although it often helps to have **COSOPs with clearly defined and prioritized partnerships** (or in reverse, partnership-building can go wrong when they are not), relying on well formulated and prioritized COSOPs was not found sufficient for good partnership-building in practice. In ten countries the quality of partnership propositions in COSOPs had little correlation with actual later

[1]While it is appropriate to primarily point out and focus on hypotheses that were validated in a large number of countries, these numbers are only indicative, particularly in the case of hypotheses that were neither confirmed nor rejected in many countries (i.e. those with a low count). In those cases related issues may simply not have been prominently on display during the time of the country evaluations.

partnership-building, or partnership-building may have been positive although it was not well addressed in the COSOP.

6. **A number of hypotheses dealt with specific partners types of forms of engagement.** A hypothesis that assumed that **(international) cofinancing may be over-rated for country partnership outcomes** was soundly rejected for seven countries (although there was some evidence to its full or partial veracity in some other countries, but the overall numbers are low). Cofinancing has an important place for country partnership outcomes, particularly through its co-variant effects, such as for complementarities and policy engagement (a qualitative finding from CSPEs). **Knowledge and learning** were found in half of the CSPEs (18) to be significantly positively correlated to research grants to international and national institutions and country level work by these organizations. In general, grants are critical for effective partnerships (15). **Coordination and cooperation partnerships** work best when accompanied by regular country *and* global interaction and communication on country and thematic priorities, commonalities and complementarities of involved agencies (19). Clear corporate agreements on scope and outcomes at country level were found useful in 11 countries for cooperation between RBAs, but did not guarantee good partnership outcomes in all countries.

7. **IFAD policy engagement** is often more effective when it includes either other IFIs or RBAs. This was the case in 19 countries. Skilled IFAD staff, preferably with specialized technical knowledge and communication capacity, help in policy engagement and dialogue. It also is useful to strategically choose the topics of engagements of interest and buy-in to government (14) and to have a long-standing relationship with relevant Ministries and technical or policy units within these Ministries (5). In general, good communication skills, and trust- and team-building are highly important for country-level partnerships, particularly for those of policy engagement and influence (14).

8. In terms of IFAD **work with CSOs,** no preference was found in the CSPEs for support of CSOs through grants compared with project loan funds; if anything, it is apparently just the opposite. But the issue was discussed in very few CSPEs (four only). Work with the **private sector and PPPPs** is most effective when government generated a supportive environment for private-sector engagement (13) and when IFAD worked across ministries (9) to include those beyond Agriculture, such as Ministries of Commerce and Trade, Industry and Small Business Development, and Environment).

CSPE review qualitative data

6.1 Country examples for strong and weak cofinancing partnerships

Strong partnerships *(positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)*	**Weak partnerships** *(little activity, weaknesses emphasized)*
Cofinancing	
ECUADOR – Cofinancing improved in recent years (Spanish Trust Fund, GEF, World Bank). Government important co-financier. But cofinancing is still underexploited. ETHIOPIA – Long-term World Bank cofinancing is regarded as a model for influence and long-term impact (in the context of a programme for pastoralists) – But Government did not support the proposed IFAD/AfDB project cofinancing partnership INDONESIA (ADB) – Cofinancing with ADB (P4K) is noteworthy MALI – Strong cofinancing; many IFAD partners TANZANIA – Cofinancing is relatively good, mainly through Agriculture Sector Development Programme - ASDP (but mechanisms of cofinancing are not quite clear. Is it cofinancing, parallel funding or basket funding?) NIGER – Quite a few cofinancing partners, World Bank, AFD, WADB, BSF, UNDP, WFP and others (including UN system) YEMEN – Significant cofinancing in Yemen (expanded to EU and the Islamic Development Bank before CSPE).	BRAZIL – CSPE recommends more cofinancing and knowledge sharing with IFIs (currently no international or domestic private cofinancing (→ little leverage). CHINA – Only 8 per cent cofinancing; IFAD has few contacts with other IFIs and other donors (except WFP). Few partnerships with multi- and bilateral partners (partly due to China Govt. preference for division of labour). GAMBIA – Few other donors and opportunities; Donor Joint Assistance Strategy is built on budget support (World Bank/AfDB) in which IFAD cannot be part; some cofinancing with AfDB INDIA – Relatively high domestic cofinancing; some limited cofinancing with the World Bank and DfID (14 per cent CSPE) but still too little for large-scale scaling up beyond state project areas MOLDOVA – Some good cofinancing with USAID, DANIDA (“like-minded donors”); but below potential (cofinancing was not explicitly encouraged by 2007 COSOP) MOZAMBIQUE – There is some cofinancing with the EC; but overall cofinancing is under-exploited, particularly with the World Bank and AfDB NEPAL – Despite financial support by IFAD for the Agriculture Development Strategy (ADS), there is limited cofinancing. Agricultural partners prefer to work individually in Nepal, partly related to area specific focus and division of labour and to weak Government. There is one larger cofinanced project with the World Bank (PAF) (which may explain the high cofinancing rate in GRIPS of 133 per cent) NIGERIA – Almost no donor cofinancing (e.g. the World Bank, DfID, USAID); missed opportunities SENEGAL – Some cofinancing with the World Bank, WADB and EU food facility; but too little for having sufficient financial

Strong partnerships *(positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)*	**Weak partnerships** *(little activity, weaknesses emphasized)*
Cofinancing	
	leverage ZAMBIA – Very limited cofinancing, low Government counterpart funding. All of this is considered important for broader delivery and scaling up . JORDAN – Not much interaction with other donors, low cofinancing KENYA – Too many scattered and small cofinancing partnerships with a variety of donors (AGRA, BSF, GEF, OFID, UNDP), not sufficiently sub-sector focused – Few strategic opportunities for major cofinancing, since several partners focus on budget-support (KJAS) – CSPE recommendation: Scope for partnerships with the World Bank, AfDB, USAID should be pursued more actively RWANDA – Some limited cofinancing with OFID, AfDB and bilaterals. Not much cooperation beyond financial relationship. No systematic extension in line with COSOP suggestions. VIET NAM – Little cofinancing from IFIs or others (not encouraged by Government). Scaling up mainly through Government mainstreaming of integrated rural approaches. PAKISTAN – Changing roles of cofinancing by the World Bank and ADB: IFAD moving from junior to senior partner and back again; party driven through need for supervision partners until 2007 – Other potential cofinancing partners (Islamic Development Bank and UN system) were not explored; COSOP is vague on who to partner with

6.2 Country examples for strong and weak knowledge and learning partnerships

Strong partnerships (positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)	**Weak partnerships** (little activity, weaknesses emphasized)
Knowledge and learning grants (mostly regional research)	
BANGLADESH – Purposive research grants: IRRI / WorldFish / vertical connections regional grants/country grants; strategic and somewhat connected to country programme BOLIVIA – Some IFAD grants produced good results (mostly regional), such as PROCASUR (Rural Development Training). Global grant to Bioversity (strong on PPPP, quinoa, germ banks). But little synergy between IFAD grants and country loans. BRAZIL – Many grants (24), 9 of which on SSC. For instance, EMBRAPA was supposed to 'socialize' innovations. But in general, there is limited information to assess ultimate grant results. ECUADOR – There is focus on knowledge management through various grants. K&L is at the core of partnerships in Ecuador, mostly through Government projects and regional grants. MALI – Long-term research with CG Bioversity informed PAPAM project design NEPAL – Successful ICRISAT grant on grain legumes – Partnership with ILO did not work out due to their inexperience in the field – Programme with SNV (intern. NGO) on developing innovative and inclusive business approach *(note: not clear whether* this *is international or national grant)* NIGERIA – Considerable number of 'grants for innovation' for technology (e.g. International Institute of Tropical Agriculture on cassava); but not clear on effectiveness. PHILIPPINES – Grants for innovation with international centres were well related to projects in 2 out of 3 cases; → influence through innovations; complementarities and synergies; helped by strong presence of international centres in country ZAMBIA – Regional grants do involve some activities for Zambians (e.g. exchange visits, training). SSTC. Various regional	CHINA – Little awareness among Chinese primary IFAD partners of IFAD global and regional grants that also operate in China. Global and regional grants insufficiently linked to main lending programme. INDIA – Knowledge sharing mainly visible at project level – Incorporation of CG centres in country operations not clear – CSPE: too little linking up with reputed national and international specialists and think tanks; despite all the grants to International Research Institutions TANZANIA – Regional grants funded Tanzanian Apex organizations (CSOs, Finance, Coops); but insufficient amount and country responsibility for grants. Better links of lending with non-lending would be desirable. TURKEY – K&L could be important in context of SSC. ICARDA has regional IFAD grant. FAO cooperation could be tapped. But not well integrated. MOROCCO – No K&L strategy, K&L mainly project related – Regional and global grants exist, but there is insufficient synergy between grants and projects (only few inputs, such as from ICARDA); insufficient policy engagement

Strong partnerships (positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)	**Weak partnerships** (little activity, weaknesses emphasized)
knowledge platforms are being utilized. NIGER – Mostly through regional and country grants for international institutions; and also through grants to NGOs to accompany IFAD projects (action research) PAKISTAN – ICARDA worked in Pakistan area development project. ICARDA innovative grant work to be scaled up.	
K&L in-country	
ECUADOR – Rural Dialogue Group (regional grant triggered; consisting of academics, CSOs etc.) is key for IFAD knowledge work and policy influence. But broadening of partners is needed. INDIA – There are some knowledge partnerships with NARS MADAGASCAR – IFAD established various Union Associations and Regional Federations for K&L MALI – Grant-financed activities very prominent. Grants resulted in improved techniques and approaches in micro-finance. RuralStruc grant may be good example for P. through grants (this includes a French NGO). This grant produced a major study that was used for project development (FIER) for unemployed youth and crowd funding in France. MOLDOVA – Some exchange with neighbouring countries Belarus and Armenia. – Exchange starting with Agrarian University of Moldova (conservation agric.; GEF) MOZAMBIQUE – Some good K&L cooperation, particularly on models of PPPP and nutrition – Some limitations due to limited ICO capacities NIGERIA – Value of 'networking between grants and loans' could be enhanced. – Grants should increasingly move focus from technology to markets research.	ECUADOR – Not sufficient contribution from country projects to knowledge work (due to insufficient M&E and best practice gathering). Too little integration of regional grants into national IFAD programme. SENEGAL – Not much knowledge or learning – CSPE recommendation: broaden partnerships for knowledge and cofinancing ZAMBIA – Limited synergies between lending and non-lending (mostly regional and global grants). Relatively few country grants for Zambia. – Not much systematic K&L visible in country itself. RWANDA – Some positive knowledge capturing in IFAD projects, but not beyond. No real knowledge strategy for knowledge partnering and exchange. Some regional grants (e.g. in finance) with workshops in Kigali. Not much mention in CSPE of applied research. VIET NAM – IFAD is about to improve knowledge sharing through establishing a country wide M&E system, partnering with international institutions (such as IFPRI et al.)

Strong partnerships (positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)	**Weak partnerships** (little activity, weaknesses emphasized)
PHILIPPINES – Strong partnership on K&L, grant-based (case study); includes various policy engagements; but outcomes are somewhat controversial; public and IFAD peers are not well involved – Key enabling factor for K&L: CPO well trained and expert in KM GHANA – K&L mostly related to specific projects, long-term Government relationship (IFAD focal point etc.); electronic platform (FIDAfrique)	
SSTC	
BRAZIL – 9 of 24 grants cover SSC activities; but limited information to assess ultimate grant results MOZAMBIQUE – International SSTC workshop in Maputo on China/IFAD SSC partnership ZAMBIA – Regional grants do involve some SSTC activities for Zambians (e.g. exchange visits, training)	CHINA – Need to better define IFAD/China niche in SSTC (CSPE recommendation) and expand cooperation in SSTC in future (as of 2013) ECUADOR – SSTC is not strategic NICARAGUA – There are some partnerships through regional IFAD projects, some SSTC: PROCASUR, Learning routes; but not well integrated in country TURKEY – SSTC has not really taken off yet

6.3 Country examples for strong and weak coordination and cooperation partnerships

Strong partnerships (positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)	**Weak partnerships** (little activity, weaknesses emphasized)
Coordination and cooperation	
General	
MADAGASCAR – Relatively strong coordination and cooperation partnerships, with various local agencies and donors – Strong collaboration with FOs MALI – “Partnerships are at the core of Mali country programme” – Multiple partnerships through long-term alliance with FOs, cofinanced projects (BFS), K&L, and general alignment/donor coordination in joint strategy; – Specific domain focus of IFAD in Mali is important for strategic partnering: IFAD sub-sectoral focus is on micro-finance, irrigation and youth; partnerships exist in all these areas. – CSPE 2012 suggests more systematic involvement of private entrepreneurs and professional organizations	BRAZIL – Need for broader partnering has been emphasized, particularly for scaling up; with various Government institutions, domestic co-financiers and donors; not much private sector involvement, except in one project (Dom Helder Camara project) CHINA – CSPE encourages broader partnerships with other donors, CSOs and private enterprises ETHIOPIA – CSPE identified room for improvement in partnerships, for instance in partnering with CGIAR centres (beyond ILRI where the ICO is located) INDONESIA – Strong partnership with Government and PPPP with MARS (cocoa, vertical value chain). Important cofinancing with ADB in irrigation (innovative IFAD content). Limited effectiveness of partnership with the Environmental and Natural Resources Accounting Project (regional grant). Some work with ICRAF and Asian NGO Coalition. – No strategic approach to partnerships in the past. Absence of strategy and selectivity in 2008 COSOP which was strong on goals, but weak on implementation arrangements. Absence of CO until 2012. – CSPE recommendation: Selectivity in partnerships is key. Assess strengths and weaknesses of partners given high transaction costs in partnership-building. NIGERIA – The main problem is not the quantity of partnering activities (there are many of them), but the range of partners and partnership quality – Partnerships are not sufficiently strategic. Grants not linked with projects. Nigeria should focus on fewer, but more strategic and varied partnerships, broadening the range of partners. – Project vs. programmatic partnerships: partnerships followed projects and programmes and are not COSOP strategy driven; more ‘one-off’ partnerships; CSPE recommendation: more strategic alliance with CSOs, not just for service provision. – There is some cooperation with private sector, but insufficiently exploited right now (particularly private sector as co-financiers) – Very limited strategic partnerships beyond Government and project implementation. One positive example with CSO: Songhai Benin; creating business opportunities and employment for rural youth

Strong partnerships (positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)	**Weak partnerships** (little activity, weaknesses emphasized)
	TURKEY – Negative outlier due to very low partnering, weaknesses in Government; heavily centralized decision-making processes. Negative example for overly centralized Government decision making; Government dominance; few CSO and other empowered decentralized partners (FOs etc.) – No foreign NGOs and few national NGOs. Government programmes unable to attract private sector. – IFAD not present in country; this would be key for a potential collaboration with IFIs (the World Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, EC); no significant bilateral donor presence in Turkey YEMEN – Country context: Country with fragile situations (MFS) – Good IFAD coordination with development partners. Good alignment and harmonization (Paris/Accra). UNDAF process is an important coordination mechanism in the country. But no specific examples of coordination and cooperation partnerships. – Strong COSOP emphasis on partnering since 1997. In retrospect overly ambitious. IFAD CO since 2007. – Private-sector partnerships as a response to weak Government capacities. Since 2008 move to 'private-sector led approach'.
RBA	
BANGLADESH – Some with WFP but not prominent BRAZIL – Good partnership with RBA; UN coordination group. Joint policy engagement on family farming. Joining forces with RBA in SSC and in Africa Brazil Food 'Purchasing from Africans for Africans' Programme (PAA); RBA was strategically emphasized in 2008 COSOP, but latest CSPE (2015) still recommends more work with RBAs. CHINA – Very good long-term collaboration with WFP (used to share office premises, joint programme 1999-2005)). But WFP partnership has been significantly changed and reduced in intensity in recent years. ETHIOPIA – Some recent activities reported with WFP (country) and FAO (regional; grant); but not yet much to show for INDIA – IFAD is working on developing a joint UN country team/UNDAF programme in the North East. INDONESIA – Not much follow-up on RBA cooperation propositions in	ECUADOR – Nothing on RBA, except for suggestion that FAO could be a partner on land issues GAMBIA – Not much collaboration with UN Agencies MADAGASCAR – Some policy engagement and UNDAF participation MOLDOVA – nothing on RBA NEPAL – Not much with RBA; except for FAO as service provider in one project. NIGERIA – not mentioned in CSPE summary SENEGAL – not mentioned in CSPE summary TANZANIA – Not much on RBA, despite shared office space with FAO (no IFAD grants to FAO mentioned); some plans for future cooperation with WFP. Full participation in UN too 'onerous' (time-consuming) for small IFAD CO. GHANA – nothing on RBA KENYA – not much, potential remains underexploited, particularly with FAO

<table>
<tr><th>Strong partnerships
(positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)</th><th>Weak partnerships
(little activity, weaknesses emphasized)</th></tr>
<tr><td>2008 COSOP; except for collaboration with WFP in PIDRA project

MALI
– Some collaboration with RBAs in projects (PIDRN and PIDRK); on formulation (FAO/IC). With WFP in several food security and nutrition activities; outreach to conflict areas.

MOZAMBIQUE
– Strong and long-term collaboration with RBAs, FAO and WFP. First in market support project 2008-11, then in EC funded MDG1c project to promote nutrition. Joint field visits. Still, many coordination issues, complementarities between RBAs have not been optimal.

TURKEY
– Successful policy engagement together with FAO and other partners for G20 meeting (influencing). But in general, weak partnerships with RBAs and UN.

JORDAN
– Some policy engagement under UNDAF and some brokering of dialogue Government – Research Institutions

NIGER
– Relatively strong coordination with UN organizations within the UNDAF context

YEMEN
– UNDAF process is an important coordination mechanism in the country.

PAKISTAN
– UN system is mentioned as major national consultation mechanism where IFAD participates. Some future projects have been signed with WFP and FAO (as of 2007).</td><td>RWANDA
– Some but apparent minor work with WFP on food-for-work

UGANDA
– nothing on RBA

VIET NAM
– Nothing on RBA. One-UN initiative too time-consuming.

MOROCCO
– nothing on RBA</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">IFIs, bi-laterals, and supplementary fund</td></tr>
<tr><td>ETHIOPIA
– Positive long-term collaboration with the World Bank, but the Government blocked cofinancing with AfDB.

MADAGASCAR
– Cofinanced with OFID, EU, GEF and MCA, but not prominently mentioned in CSPE summary

MALI
– Cofinancing strong with the World Bank, EC, WADB, Belgium Fund for Food Security (rate of 115 per cent, up from 51 per cent in 2006); but some difficulties in aligning schedules, including for design.</td><td>BRAZIL
– In 2006 there was weak collaboration with IFIs and bilaterals; in 2015 there was no cofinancing or major collaboration with other international partners (except for GEF).

CHINA
– Particularly weak partnerships with multi- and bilateral partners (partly due to China Govt. preference for division of labour); this contributed to less scaling up, fewer other potential partnership outcomes, and relatively high IFAD transaction costs in China - CSPE recommends broader partnering, including with research, private sector and IFIs</td></tr>
</table>

Strong partnerships (positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)	**Weak partnerships** (little activity, weaknesses emphasized)
MOLDOVA – Cofinancing with like-minded donors (USAID, DANIDA), but below potential and CSPE recommends to extend (cofinancing was not explicitly encouraged in 2007 COSOP) NEPAL – Limited number of partners, but a large cofinancing collaboration with the World Bank; IFAD also worked with ADB and others on the Agriculture Development Strategy. Many other donors prefer to work for themselves (regional division of labour) NICARAGUA – Some significant collaboration with IFIs, but more in terms of bringing in partners than volume (33 per cent); some donor interaction through PRORURAL round table which allows for joint planning of future programmes TANZANIA – ASDP (Agriculture Sector Development Programme) is the key Government/Donor mechanism; important for influence, cooperation and joint/parallel funding/leverage. Recently ASDP experienced some donor fatigue. - Partnering with AfDB in sugar-cane outgrowing scheme, Bugawaya ZAMBIA – Partnerships with other donors largely consultative, little joint action. Strong network of consultations at national level (Agricultural Consultative Forum, ACPG), One UN. But few specific outcomes are mentioned in CSPE. No specific IFAD partnership with other donor is singled out. NIGER – Quite a few cofinancing partnerships with the World Bank, AFD, WADB etc. Working with the World Bank, EU, and AfDB on policy engagement (NRM, FOs and land issues) UGANDA – Significant work with other partners in UJAS process. Good cofinancing with the World Bank and AfDB, in 4 out of 9 projects since 2017 BRAZIL – Collaboration with GEF (Sertão Project); on land degradation in North-East and innovative, sustainable techniques; complementary to IFAD Dom-Helder Camara project (DHCP). ECUADOR – Some collaboration with GEF mentioned JORDAN – Partnership with GEF is promising on climate change and other issues.	ECUADOR – Some cofinancing with GEF and the World Bank, Spanish Trust Fund; became better in recent years GAMBIA – limited donor presence in The Gambia; budget support by other donors; some cofinancing with AfDB INDIA – Some limited cofinancing with the World Bank and DfID; little collaboration with others partly as IFAD is working in region without major overlap with other donors. MOZAMBIQUE – some cofinancing, but overall under-exploited, particularly with the World Bank and AfDB NICARAGUA – Some significant collaboration with IFIs, but more in terms of bringing in partners than volume (33 per cent); some donor interaction through PRORURAL round table which allows for joint planning of future programmes NIGERIA – Not much cofinancing with international partners; nor major interactions SENEGAL – some cofinancing with the World Bank, WADB and EU food facility, but too little to have any leverage KENYA – Cooperation and cofinancing are too little and too scattered, despite KJAS. Problems partly due to importance of budget support under KJAS. CSPE recommendation: partnership opportunities with the World Bank, AfDB, USAID should be more actively pursued. RWANDA – Some cofinancing, but not extended as suggested in COSOP. No cooperation with cofinancing partners beyond finance VIET NAM – Only with GIZ and Luxembourg. Cofinancing is not encouraged by Government.

Strong partnerships (positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)	Weak partnerships (little activity, weaknesses emphasized)
Civil society / NGOs	
BANGLADESH – Strong support for CSO Apex organization PKSF, APEX of CSOs/micro-finance, through project loan funding. BRAZIL – A number of activities with CSOs and FOs that execute and partly cofinancing IFAD activities (e.g. PROCASUR, an NGO started by IFAD). MADAGASCAR – Strong policy engagement and influence: such as on land tenure security; bringing in FOs on agricultural sector programme design; development of national strategy for agricultural finance. Strong influence on shaping policies related to agricultural services (through the climate-smart agriculture), and on vocational training MALI – working with French international organization on prominent project for supporting youth; long-term alliance with FOs MOZAMBIQUE – quite a bit of project-based partnerships with CSOs NEPAL – IFAD uses national and international CSOs strategically as partners for project implementation, since Government is weak. Both through project and grants. It works better through grants. Example ICIMOD grant (mountain development); – Multitude of NGOs and beneficiary associations complicates partnering and synergies in Nepal NICARAGUA – Fund for Strengthening Policies and Strategies (FONDEPOL) was created to facilitate NGOs, universities and consultants. NIGERIA – In general, very limited strategic partnerships beyond Government. One positive example with CSO: Songhai Benin; creating business opportunities and employment for rural youth. ZAMBIA – Many specific project partnerships. Partnerships with NGOs yielded some good results, but these implementation partnerships differ quite a bit in results, depending on capacities. ARGENTINA	CHINA – some partnerships with CSOs, but not well exploited ECUADOR – Rural Dialogue Group (regional grant triggered; consisting of academics, CSOs etc.) is key for IFAD knowledge work and policy influence. But broadening of partners is needed. GAMBIA; – not much work with CSO; IFAD is not strong with NGOs (even when scaling up) NIGERIA – Too much reliance on Government. Crowding out of private sector and CSO. TANZANIA – Gaps in ASDP for working with CSO; better mechanisms needed for partnerships with CSOs (some support through grants to Apex organizations) TURKEY – No foreign NGOs and few national NGOs SUDAN – Weak partnerships with NGOs and research – No vision in COSOP on how to utilize grants and partnerships

Strong partnerships (positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)	**Weak partnerships** (little activity, weaknesses emphasized)
– Many partnership activities for policy influence with CSOs (REAF, FIDAMERICA, PROCASUR). SSC. KENYA – Good partnerships with some CSOs (e.g. AGRA) and CBOs in the context of projects RWANDA – Most work with CSOs is done through projects (as contracted service providers). Much capacity building in projects of cooperatives for production and finance, for local water-shed management committees etc.	
Farmers' associations	
BRAZIL – Working with FOs that execute IFAD activities MADAGASCAR – IFAD brought in FOs in the design of the agricultural sector programme MALI – Very strong work with Farmers Organizations, over a long period (since 1999); FO chosen in 2016 for GAFSP grant – Strongly working on decentralization; capacity building in local communities, decentralization mechanisms NICARAGUA – Strong partnerships with rural producer organizations PHILIPPINES – Three K&L events (KLMs) produced policy statements; FOs and CSOs very engaged on Family Farming SENEGAL – Strong on IFAD partnerships with producer organizations. Capacity building on management, negotiations, market chains, value addition, and M&E NIGER – Strong support for FOs, work at local level with CSOs and CBOs RWANDA – Most work with FOs is done through projects. Much capacity building in projects of cooperatives for production and finance, for local water-shed management committees etc. VIET NAM – Strong work with farmers' and women's unions in projects. IMPP partnered successfully with textile company,	

Strong partnerships (positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)	**Weak partnerships** (little activity, weaknesses emphasized)
associated with Women's Union vocational training centre. DBRP piloted enterprises with Farmers' Union (decorative leaves and flowers).	
Indigenous peoples	
BOLIVIA – Three grants for PRAIA (indigenous peoples). INDIA – Strong focus on Indigenous Peoples ('Scheduled Tribes') in the North East; some good examples of scaling up ARGENTINA – Some ongoing work with indigenous groups VIET NAM – One project (3PAD) with ethnic minorities: Agro-forestry, eco-tourism, agribusiness, PPPP for sustainable forestland use.	ECUADOR – some resentment expressed about *too much* focus on indigenous groups vs. others with similar poverty level
PPPP	
INDIA – Incipient private-sector cooperation; some value chain focus in dairy; piloting with large companies (Tata, Tesco etc.) INDONESIA – PPPP with MARS is prominent, but confined to cocoa sector MADAGASCAR – Strong value chain support; forging of partnerships of farmers' organizations with private sector (processors, exporters etc.) MOLDOVA – Good public-private partnerships with commercial banks, out-grower schemes, BDS enterprise development – Farmer cofinancing: leveraging investments through farm credit MOZAMBIQUE – Innovative project approach in Community Investor Partnerships (ProParcerias). Contract farming. Cofinanced with Netherlands and FAO. Models of PPPP tested and synthesized by local university graduates. TANZANIA – MUVI project of business support services offers valuable lessons of project-based partnering, particularly on PPPP	ETHIOPIA – PPPP – "did not lead to much" GAMBIA – Not much work with private sector NEPAL – CSPE recommendation: partnership paradigm shift is needed towards support for *profitable* enterprises for commercialization and value chains; and towards sufficiently strong and sustainable CSOs and community organizations – Several activities were supported, but too little strategic capacity building of profitable and sustainable enterprises. GHANA – Work with private sector in value chains very deficient (note, this was in 2010), both from IFAD and Government side; need for strengthening advance analytical capacity for planning, plus stronger Government capacities and a different mentality for working with private sector

<table>
<tr><th>Strong partnerships
(positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)</th><th>Weak partnerships
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<tr><td>ZAMBIA
– A number of project specific partnerships. Partnerships with private sector yielded some good results, but these implementation partnerships differ quite a bit in results, depending on capacities.
– Focus on alternative project delivery mechanisms (public/private mix) since 1997 COSOP, but still ‘incipient’, partly due to unclear policy approach of Government to PS participation

KENYA
– Some limited private-sector engagement with Equity Bank (AGRA project)

UGANDA
– PPPP in oil palm development project since 2004/05

VIET NAM
– Strong orientation towards PPPPs and enterprise development since 2008. Some work with private sector, but still at a relatively early stage (as of 2010);
– IFAD influence on PPPP decree and guidelines/manuals for cooperative organizations
– CSPE recommends: stronger market approach, from enabling environment to PS as partner, linking businesses with provinces (vertical approach), linking up with IFIs/IFC for expertise on PS</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Policy engagement (national and project)</td></tr>
<tr><td>BRAZIL
– Policy engagement, particularly on family farming (with Mercosur governments) and in the context of FO support (grant to REAF)

ETHIOPIA (World Bank)
– Policy engagement important; but should be ‘selective’ and related to IFAD investments. Could be reinforced by more systematic K&L activities.

MADAGASCAR
– Strong policy engagement and influence: land tenure security; agricultural sector programme, bringing in FOs; development of national strategy for agricultural finance

MALI
– in Agric. Sector Programme, advocating for FO participation
– Concrete technical and mission support for National Microfinance Strategy Action Plan plus other Micro-Finance related activities

NEPAL
– Policy influence: Strong collaboration with Government and other donors on new 2012 Agricultural Development</td><td>BANGLADESH
– Limited policy ‘resonance’ of Government
– Government bureaucracy heavy, difficult to influence
– Country office staff qualifications are important for developing strong policy links with important ministries

BOLIVIA
– Limited results on policy engagement, except for occasional project impact. CSPE recommends defining a policy engagement strategy based on knowledge acquired and opportunities for scaling up.

ETHIOPIA
– Policy engagement important; but should be ‘selective’ and related to IFAD investments
– Could be reinforced by more systematic K&L activities,

INDONESIA
– Not much institutional incentive for CPM for policy engagement

MOZAMBIQUE
– Not that much policy engagement at national level, due</td></tr>
</table>

Strong partnerships (positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)	**Weak partnerships** (little activity, weaknesses emphasized)
Strategy (ADS), US$500,000 DSF grant (with ADB and others); CSPE recommends follow-up on alignment	to limited ICO capacity. Influence via specific project outcomes and activities.
NICARAGUA – Government policies were influenced, through accumulated knowledge gained from IFAD projects and some special initiatives (round tables). Policy engagement was supported by capacity building.	NIGERIA – Some policy engagement and impact on Rural Finance (RUFIN); under RUFIN project financial service provision to the rural poor was formally accepted by Bank of Agriculture and Central Bank. But in general, limited national policy leverage due to lack of cofinancing and international cooperation.
PHILIPPINES – The three Knowledge and Learning Market events produced policy statements	RWANDA – IFAD provided substantial grants and TA to Rwandan Government for agricultural strategy development since 2004, yet its influence has been very limited; even in areas with ongoing projects (such as finance and enterprise development). Government interest in IFAD advice is not high. But then, the supply of qualified information from the ICO is also quite low.
TURKEY – Successful policy engagement in the context of the G20 meetings (influencing)	SENEGAL – Some project level policy influence (e.g. PROMER II on SME). Not much K&L, so little influence that way.
ZAMBIA – Many good examples of IFAD ‘policy engagement’ and influence, almost all of them project related. Except for dialogue on maize subsidies – but not clear whether any partnership/alliance is behind this.	JORDAN – Long-term relationship with Credit Institution (ACC) but not much policy influence. – Some policy engagement under UNDAF and some brokering of dialogue Government with research institutions
ARGENTINA – Policy influence is most important in Argentina, particularly on family farming and rural poverty. Many partnership activities for this purpose with CSOs (REAF, FIDAMERICA, PROCASUR).	KENYA – Positive: Robust partnership with Government. Focal points in many Ministries. IFAD contributed to Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy process. – But: CSPE on policy engagement: “IFAD has not engaged sufficiently in policy processes and in developing strategic partnerships”. The CO’s overall capacity and resources to engage in policy engagement remain constrained.
GHANA – Some good IFAD policy influence, mostly related to two projects (rural finance and enterprise development); contributed to conducive rural finance policies and meso-institutions. Going further in policy engagement would require stronger analytical capacity and technical skills of country IFAD staff. Cofinancing with World Bank and AfDB was still not sufficient to achieve more leverage and scaling up.	
NIGER – Influencing Microfinance Strategy (March 2004) and National Cereal Banks Management Strategy plus Early Warning Systems; contributions limited due to lack of permanent IFAD presence – Working with the World Bank, EU, and AfDB on policy engagement (NRM, FOs and land issues)	
VIET NAM – IFAD influence on PPPP decree and guidelines/manuals for cooperative organizations	
YEMEN – Some good examples of policy engagement, mostly project related and IFAD driven (e.g. on participation in rural road access; specific resources had been provided	

Strong partnerships (positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)	**Weak partnerships** (little activity, weaknesses emphasized)
for policy engagement). But also policy engagement for better implementation delivery through private sector (EOF, see above). MOROCCO – Influence mainly in terms of IFAD project innovations (such as participatory approaches in irrigation; drinking water supply); some on collective land management SUDAN – Policy engagement and influence on Government limited to project level; suggestion in CSPE to broaden policy engagement. – Policy engagement in project in Gash province - supported through Italian grant on land and water management - led to policy change and enhanced women farmer access to land	
Scaling up	
CHINA – More technical cooperation with MoA at national level could lead to wider scaling up of IFAD innovations – Influence higher at sub-national than national level, partly due to placement of CPM in Rome, and non-senior level ICO staff. CSPE recommendation: more strategic staffing of ICO, CPM to be placed in China. INDIA – The case study “Demand driven partnership with State Government” discusses some success in IFAD transfer of know-how, quality of project implementation and scaling up in North-East India with Indigenous Peoples. INDONESIA – Some scaling up of projects through Government happened in P4K project (with ADB) and in PIDRA MALI – Positive example for scaling up micro-finance through partnerships, with private service provider ABC (this is a profitable company with a social mandate); but also with multiple other providers. PAKISTAN – Good IFAD partnerships with Apex Poverty Alleviation Fund and with Government institutions at federal and provincial levels. This helped with scaling up. SUDAN – Positive replication and scaling up of projects was reported	BRAZIL – Not much happened on broader scaling up. CSPE recommends cooperation with wider range of federal agencies; more cofinancing and knowledge sharing with IFIs (currently no international or domestic private cofinancing (→ little leverage). CHINA – More technical cooperation with MoA at national level could lead to wider scaling up of IFAD innovations; IFAD influence is higher at sub-national than national level, partly due to the placement of CPM in Rome. ECUADOR – Close alignment with Government offers opportunity for IFAD projects to become ‘laboratories’ for rural development; provided non-lending activities are strongly supported. Focus on innovations *and* scaling up, in addition to non-lending. But not happening yet. GAMBIA – IFAD strong in Rural Finance, but limited through official partnerships with finance institutions that are not that effective; they are not interested to sustain risk-sharing mechanisms beyond project end – No research link NIGERIA – Too much reliance on Government. Strong Government cofinancing. Crowding out of private sector and CSO. This limits scaling up. ZAMBIA – Alternative service delivery mechanisms do not yet work too well for scaling up. Limited cofinancing hinders scaling up in livestock project.

Strong partnerships (positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)	**Weak partnerships** (little activity, weaknesses emphasized)
	GHANA – Some cofinancing with the World Bank came too early in a rural finance project, before IFAD piloting of innovations had been done. For this reason scaling up did not work well. – Some partnerships with CSOs are there (international and national) but could be stronger (e.g. in rural finance) and would be needed for better scaling up. – In sum, IFAD innovations scaling up relied too much on IFAD's own resources, rather than co-financiers and Government KENYA – limited scaling up due to unexploited partnership opportunities with other development partners and CSOs PAKISTAN – Innovation and its scaling up may require different partners in government – or beyond - than the usual 'administrators and implementers'

Table 6.4 Country examples for strengths and weaknesses in partnerships with government

Strong partnerships (positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)	**Weak partnerships** (little activity, weaknesses emphasized)
Role of government, alignment, dominant governments, weak governments	
MADAGASCAR – Good collaboration with Government. The IFAD programme support unit in MoA is very useful, also in charge of coordination and policy engagement – Strengthened partner capacities, particularly of various Chambers of Commerce and rural financial institutions CHINA – Strong partnership with MoF at national level, and strong implementation partnerships at sub-national level, mostly with Government institutions. But Government also limits partnership opportunities with others to some extent, particularly on partnering with other donors and cofinancing, and to a lesser extent with CSOs and private sector. MALI – The high-level Mali aid architecture, alignment and harmonization in a crowded agricultural aid sector are very good; there is a common country assistance strategy. – But there are some limitations for aid coordination, absorption and implementation as well as policy engagement *at mid-level Government* MOLDOVA – - Strong IFAD Programme Steering Committee (IPSC) and Implementation Unit (CPIU) in Ministry of Agriculture NICARAGUA – Strong IFAD relationship with the Government is noted but limits non-Governmental relationships to some extent. UGANDA – Good aid alignment through Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy (UJAS) and Government poverty reduction and agricultural strategies. Significant IFAD contribution to alignment and harmonization between 2004 and 2010. GHANA – Strong partnership with Government, including several ministries apart from Agriculture (such as Finance, Trade, Local Government). Reliable counterpart funding. Good Government meso-support in micro-finance. – Good alignment, harmonization and use of country systems. Strong COSOP partnership advocacy in 1999 and 2006 COSOPs helped. – Government coordinated IFAD programme well, supported with IFAD grant ($200,000); pre-ICO (CO opened only in late 2010) KENYA – Robust partnership with Government. Focal points in	BANGLADESH – Limited policy resonance in Government. Government bureaucracy is heavy. The right ICO staffing is important for good working relationship with Government ETHIOPIA – Relatively strong Government role; implies some limitations for IFAD, such as limited partnership opportunities (such as AfDB cofinancing). GAMBIA – Long history of IFAD collaboration in The Gambia. IFAD is well respected in country and by the Government. – But the MoA had major problems in recent years with frequent staff turnover, at all levels. IFAD may also have gotten too much 'stuck' with the Ministry of Agriculture rather than expanding to other Ministries of interest to the Portfolio (e.g. Trade and Commerce; Environment etc.). This is affecting the policy engagement. – Main problem: no IFAD country office, limited IFAD presence INDIA – Focus on work with selected State Governments – Limited policy engagement and too few contacts to central Government (missed chance for scaling up beyond project areas) – Few partnerships at national/federal level NEPAL Country context: Country with fragile situations (MFS) – High instability, political uncertainty, country office staff turn-over – Weak implementation capacity; need to work with CSOs and private sector Alignment and harmonization; strong COSOP intentions, but limited success, due to weak Government; CSO support through Government difficult NIGERIA – High domestic cofinancing (mostly Government; 164 per cent); but not much private cofinancing; too much reliance on Government; not sufficient hiring of private-sector expertise in projects – Projects with typical partnership outputs and outcomes (policy engagement, partnership networking capacity building etc.) still rely too much on Government – Too much reliance on Government. Strong Government cofinancing. Crowding out of private sector and CSO. – Weak federal level Government planning, coordination and oversight capacities. Too little diversity of IFAD partners within Government to achieve knowledge transfer and sustainability.

many Ministries. IFAD contributed to Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy process. NIGER – IFAD has a very close alignment with Government and others, particularly in the post-2004 crisis response process RWANDA – IFAD partnership with Government at all levels is growing, particularly after increased country presence in 2010. Yet need for more active IFAD participation and profile in national working groups. – IFAD provided substantial grants and TA to Rwandan Government for agricultural strategy development since 2004, yet its influence has been very limited; even in areas with ongoing projects (such as finance and enterprise development). – Government interest in IFAD advice is not high. But then, the supply of qualified information from the ICO is also quite low. CSPE rec.: The roles of IFAD HQ, Nairobi regional office and ICO need to be clarified, particularly in terms of backstopping for non-lending. TANZANIA – ASDP is the key Government/donor aid mechanism for agriculture and rural development; important for influence, cooperation and joint and parallel funding as well as leverage. Recently ASDP experienced some donor fatigue. CSPE recommends for IFAD to expand partnerships more strongly beyond Government.	SENEGAL – A country with relatively low agricultural performance. And with politicized agricultural priorities and approaches. Inefficiencies. TURKEY – Negative example for overly centralized Government decision making; Government dominance; few CSOs and other empowered decentralized partners (FOs, etc.) – Country particularly interested in global IFAD experience for regional South-South Cooperation VIET NAM – CSPE suggestion: increase low counterpart funding from Government (at 26 per cent in 2011) YEMEN – Weak Government. Need for widening the range of partners for project implementation. Moving from an unsuitable Government Cooperative Bank to a Public Fund (the EOF) and to work with the Social Fund for Development (which originally was created upon World Bank suggestions). PAKISTAN – Overall, non-lending received little attention in country programme – Work in remote and conflict prone areas may require different forms of partnerships, but no provisions were made
Sub-national: state and local government	
BRAZIL – There is good decentralized work with Governments. 98 per cent Government cofinancing, this appears to be partly state governments. There also appears to be some financing and supervision support from national Development Banks (Paolo Silveri), but we do not have info in CSPE? CHINA – strong implementation partnerships at sub-national level, mostly with regional and local Governments INDIA – Focus on work with selected State Governments MALI – Very strong links to local communities and institutions GHANA – IFAD reached out to sub-national public administration (region and districts)	BOLIVIA – CSPE recommends partnering better in targeted territories, particularly with municipalities, but also with other relevant actors. – Some capacity building of beneficiaries was achieved in certain projects (PROMARENA), but little for local municipalities.

VIET NAM – Important relationships with provincial and local Governments. CSPE suggestion: increase counterpart funding from Government (at 26 per cent in 2016; related IFAD guidelines on targets for MICs are currently [2010] missing) SUDAN – Strong IFAD project partnerships at local level with a network of partners in communities (WUA and CDC) and with the local authorities	

IOE project evaluation datasets

7.1 IE, PPE, PCRV 2006-2016 dataset

Table 1
Cofinancing figures (in US$), ratios and core evaluation criteria for project evaluations (IEs, PPA/PPEs, PCRVs) conducted between 2006-2016 (n=188)

Country	*Type of evaluation*	*Project ID*	*Sum of IFAD total*	*Sum of government total**	*Sum of INT total*	*Sum of domestic partners*	*Total*	*Ratio government financing to IFAD financing*	*Ratio of domestic financiers to IFAD financing*	*Ratio of International cofinancing to IFAD financing*	*Relevance*	*Effectiveness*	*Efficiency*	*Sustainability*
Albania	PE	1100001129	13 667 341	4 152 812	4 609 699	-	22 429 852	30%	0%	34%	5	3	3	3
Albania	PPA	1100001339	7 999 993	6 741 693	9 512 059	4 241 018	28 494 763	84%	53%	119%	3	3	4	3
Argentina	PE	1100000506	16 515 000	11 549 000	8 324 000	-	36 388 000	70%	0%	50%	4	4	4	4
Argentina	PCRV	1100001098	17 500 000	7 500 000	-	22 695 933	47 695 933	43%	130%	0%	4	4	3	4
Argentina	PCRV	1100001279	20 000 000	9 000 000	-	-	29 000 000	45%	0%	0%	3	4	3	4
Armenia	PPA	1100001307	15 300 840	5 988 063	5 521 651	-	26 810 554	39%	0%	36%	4	5	5	5
Armenia	PCRV	1100001411	12 400 148	7 019 612	11 998 590	-	31 418 350	57%	0%	97%	4	5	5	4
Azerbaijan	PCRV	1100001148	8 999 993	887 181	110 486	-	9 997 660	10%	0%	1%	4	4	4	4
Azerbaijan	PPA	1100001289	12 554 968	4 210 317	7 392 918	-	24 158 203	34%	0%	59%	4	4	5	3
Azerbaijan	PCRV	1100001398	17 195 917	14 629 042	-	-	31 824 959	85%	0%	0%	4	3	3	3
Bangladesh	PCRV	1100001165	21 973 000	4 767 000	7 545 000	-	34 285 000	22%	0%	34%	5	5	4	4
Bangladesh	PCRV	1100001322	24 946 873	9 954 241	4 751 552	-	39 652 666	40%	0%	19%	5	5	5	4
Bangladesh	PCRV	1100001355	19 450 366	2 591 068	62 489 501	6 210 614	90 741 549	13%	32%	321%	4	4	5	4
Bangladesh	PPE	1100001402	35 030 946	59 996	-	-	35 090 942	0%	0%	0%	4	5	5	4

Country	*Type of evaluation*	*Project ID*	*Sum of IFAD total*	*Sum of government total**	*Sum of INT total*	*Sum of domestic partners*	*Total*	*Ratio government financing to IFAD financing*	*Ratio of domestic financiers to IFAD financing*	*Ratio of International cofinancing to IFAD financing*	*Relevance*	*Effectiveness*	*Efficiency*	*Sustainability*
Belize	PE	1100001067	2 293 379	1 065 579	3 400 802	-	6 759 760	46%	0%	148%	5	3	3	4
Benin	PE	1100001127	13 113 725	2 270 473	3 904 082	88 523 184	107 811 464	17%	675%	30%	4	3	4	3
Benin	PCRV	1100001211	10 008 519	2 646 222	10 009 219	23 443 477	46 107 437	26%	234%	100%	4	3	3	3
Benin	PCRV	1100001250	10 005 178	4 783 054	-	18 091 753	32 879 985	48%	181%	0%	5	4	3	4
Bhutan	PPA	1100001296	14 006 653	4 027 335	1 618 659	-	19 652 647	29%	0%	12%	5	5	4	4
Bolivia	PPA	1100001145	12 042 464	2 916 096	-	-	14 958 560	24%	0%	0%	4	5	3	4
Bosnia	PCRV	1100001342	12 616 825	4 267 828	5 950 891	-	22 835 544	34%	0%	47%	4	4	4	4
Brazil	PPE	1100001335	30 500 331	30 000 113	-	-	60 500 444	98%	0%	0%	5	4	4	5
Burkina Faso	PCRV	1100001103	9 375 913	2 448 264	-	-	11 824 177	26%	0%	0%	4	4	3	5
Burkina Faso	PE	1100001132	11 440 000	19 750 000	79 800 000	1 582 018	112 572 018	173%	14%	698%	5	5	4	4
Burkina Faso	PCRV	1100001220	12 067 094	6 314 556	8 484 114	-	26 865 764	52%	0%	70%	5	4	4	4
Burkina Faso	PCRV	1100001247	16 028 700	9 440 500	12 843 861	375 000	38 688 061	59%	2%	80%	5	5	4	5
Burkina Faso	PCRV	1100001368	11 437 492	2 623 860	4 999 906	173 075	19 234 333	23%	2%	44%	4	3	2	2
Burundi	PPA	1100001105	19 998 285	4 762 055	9 465 192	-	34 225 532	24%	0%	47%	5	5	5	4
Burundi	PCRV	1100001291	16 367 725	1 686 141	14 602 398	4 080 602	36 736 866	10%	25%	89%	5	5	3	4

Country	Type of evaluation	Project ID	Sum of IFAD total	Sum of government total*	Sum of INT total	Sum of domestic partners	Total	Ratio government financing to IFAD financing	Ratio of domestic financiers to IFAD financing	Ratio of International cofinancing to IFAD financing	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Sustainability
Burundi	PCRV	1100001358	13 977 671	3 837 079	-	141 201	17 955 951	27%	1%	0%	5	5	4	4
Cambodia	PPA	1100001175	9 994 469	3 123 238	9 733 691	11 575 327	34 426 725	31%	116%	97%	4	4	4	4
Cambodia	PPA	1100001261	15 492 951	1 687 232	2 439 492	-	19 619 675	11%	0%	16%	4	4	4	3
Cambodia	PCRV	1100001350	12 014 359	507 871	1 162 957	-	13 685 187	4%	0%	10%	5	4	3	4
Cameroon	PCRV	1100001136	11 757 225	2 755 315	-	-	14 512 540	23%	0%	0%	4	3	3	3
Cameroon	PCRV	1100001238	13 128 011	8 549 350	-	4 223 014	25 900 375	65%	32%	0%	3	3	2	3
Cape Verde	PCRV	1100001015	13 498 289	22 596 454	-	-	36 094 743	167%	0%	0%	4	5		4
Chad	PCRV	1100001144	11 673 600	1 943 000	4 014 000	-	17 630 600	17%	0%	34%	4	4	4	4
Chad	PCRV	1100001259	13 000 306	1 311 255	-	-	14 311 561	10%	0%	0%	4	2	2	2
Chad	PCRV	1100001283	13 206 924	1 843 374	-	-	15 050 298	14%	0%	0%	3	2	2	NA
China	PE	1100001048	26 499 262	26 347 519	2 823 511	-	55 670 292	99%	0%	11%	5	6	5	5
China	PE	1100001123	28 990 000	66 954 000	10 400 000	-	106 344 000	231%	0%	36%	5	5	5	4
China	PE	1100001153	30 434 000	65 638 000	11 200 000	-	107 272 000	216%	0%	37%	5	6	5	5
China	PPA	1100001223	28 966 000	54 057 000	7 280 000	1 200 000	91 503 000	187%	4%	25%	3	4	4	4
China	PPA	1100001227	14 668 612	405 949	-	-	15 074 561	3%	0%	0%	4	5	4	5
China	PCRV	1100001323	25 148 199	29 866 326	-	-	55 014 525	119%	0%	0%	5	5	5	5
Colombia	PE	1100000520	16 000 000	9 662 000	288 000	-	25 950 000	60%	0%	2%	6	5	6	5

Country	Type of evaluation	Project ID	Sum of IFAD total	Sum of government total*	Sum of INT total	Sum of domestic partners	Total	Ratio government financing to IFAD financing	Ratio of domestic financiers to IFAD financing	Ratio of International cofinancing to IFAD financing	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Sustainability
Colombia	PCRV	1100001294	19 999 535	12 075 938	-	141 943	32 217 416	60%	1%	0%	5	4	5	5
Comoros	PCRV	1100001241	7 253 694	1 387 408	983 123	-	9 624 225	19%	0%	14%	4	3	3	3
Congo	PCRV	1100001216	11 909 288	3 243 258	-	1 550 000	16 702 546	27%	13%	0%	4	2	1	3
Congo	PCRV	1100001327	8 407 222	4 912 625	7 489 343	21 079 568	41 888 758	58%	251%	89%	3	3	3	3
Cote d'Ivoire	PCRV	1100001133	11 173 701	2 851 864	-	-	14 025 565	26%	0%	0%	4	4	4	3
Djibouti	PPA	1100001236	3 596 867	1 168 386	101 000	-	4 866 253	32%	0%	3%	4	4	4	3
Djibouti	PCRV	1100001366	6 000 000	2 798 417	3 362 111	-	12 160 528	47%	0%	56%	5	4	4	4
Dominican Republic	PE	1100001068	12 000 309	5 069 179	-	-	17 069 488	42%	0%	0%	5	4	3	4
DR Congo	CSPE/PCRV	1100001244	14 761 534	1 828 492	6 009 182	-	22 599 208	12%	0%	41%	3	3	3	3
DR Congo	PPE	1100001311	15 828 323	4 000 778	6 255 464	-	26 084 565	25%	0%	40%	3	3	2	3
Ecuador	PCRV	1100001297	14 842 342	9 452 190	-	-	24 294 532	64%	0%	0%	5	4	4	4
Egypt	PPE	1100001204	18 484 767	35 865 644	400 000	-	54 750 411	194%	0%	2%	4	4	3	4
El Salvador	PCRV	1100001215	19 999 904	5 112 265	-	91 551	25 203 720	26%	0%	0%	5	5	5	4
Eritrea	PCRV	1100001359	20 588 182	12 943 323	-	-	33 531 505	63%	0%	0%	5	4	4	4
Ethiopia	PE	1100000342	17 450 000	1 770 000	-	189 140	19 409 140	10%	1%	0%	5	3	3	2
Ethiopia	PE	1100001173	25 689 944	4 459 828	37 498 310	-	67 648 082	17%	0%	146%	5	5	4	5
Ethiopia	PCRV	1100001237	19 999 885	9 955 062	30 000 201	-	59 955 148	50%	0%	150%	5	4	4	4

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Ethiopia	PCRV	1100001292	27 204 900	7 894 665	-	-	35 099 565	29%	0%	0%	3	3	3	3
Ethiopia	PPA	1100001458	39 010 000	19 703 500	80 006 200	832 103	139 551 803	51%	2%	205%	4	5	5	4
Georgia	PE	1100001035	6 570 288	4 391 437	15 035 678	-	25 997 403	67%	0%	229%	4	3	4	3
Georgia	PPA	1100001147	7 999 987	1 159 580	73 657	637 500	9 870 724	14%	8%	1%	2	2	2	2
Georgia	PPA	1100001325	9 999 742	7 304 994	14 499 859	-	31 804 595	73%	0%	145%	4	4	4	4
Ghana	PE	1100000477	10 061 000	1 255 300	-	-	11 316 300	12%	0%	0%	4	2	4	2
Ghana	PE	1100001124	11 595 326	1 949 417	-	-	13 544 743	17%	0%	0%	4	4	4	3
Ghana	CPE/PPA	1100001134	11 002 000	1 358 000	10 144 000	-	22 504 000	12%	0%	92%	4	5	4	5
Ghana	PCRV	1100001183	12 335 055	47 247 739	-	-	59 582 794	383%	0%	0%	3	4	3	4
Ghana	PCRV	1100001187	11 245 121	7 836 667	10 011 250	-	29 093 038	70%	0%	89%	6	5	4	4
Grenada	PCRV	1100001181	4 193 682	1 277 333	2 191 425	33 130 000	40 792 440	30%	790%	52%	4	3	2	3
Guatemala	PCRV	1100001085	15 004 000	5 958 000	5 043 000	-	26 005 000	40%	0%	34%	5	4	3	4
Guatemala	PCRV	1100001274	30 000 000	8 000 000	10 000 000	-	48 000 000	27%	0%	33%	4	2	1	2
Guinea	PE	1100001003	10 014 000	3 727 000	4 482 000	-	18 223 000	37%	0%	45%	5	2	2	3
Guinea	PCRV	1100001135	14 015 248	5 791 304	-	4 626 369	24 432 921	41%	33%	0%	4	3	2	3
Guinea-Bissau	PCRV	1100001278	4 681 830	894 860	-	-	5 576 690	19%	0%	0%	5	3	2	3
Haiti	PCRV	1100001070	15 357 000	4 743 000	-	-	20 100 000	31%	0%	0%	4	3	3	3

Country	*Type of evaluation*	*Project ID*	*Sum of IFAD total*	*Sum of government total**	*Sum of INT total*	*Sum of domestic partners*	*Total*	*Ratio government financing to IFAD financing*	*Ratio of domestic financiers to IFAD financing*	*Ratio of International cofinancing to IFAD financing*	*Relevance*	*Effectiveness*	*Efficiency*	*Sustainability*
Honduras	PCRV	1100001128	16 500 292	4 677 941	4 500 035	431 085	26 109 353	28%	3%	27%	4	4	3	3
Honduras	PCRV	1100001198	20 000 000	4 300 000	7 000 000	-	31 300 000	22%	0%	35%	4	4	3	3
India	IE	1100001063	22 999 702	8 125 192	10 539 184	-	41 664 078	35%	0%	46%	4	4	3	3
India	PPA	1100001121	21 960 999	-	23 543 427	-	45 504 426	0%	0%	107%	5	5	5	4
India	PPA	1100001226	39 920 091	20 922 602	-	-	60 842 693	52%	0%	0%	3	4	4	3
India	PCRV	1100001381	30 168 971	4 210 375	-	-	34 379 346	14%	0%	0%	3	2	2	3
Jordan	CPE/PPA	1100001071	4 002 846	5 045 304	-	-	9 048 150	126%	0%	0%	4	3	3	3
Jordan	PPA	1100001092	10 143 093	5 411 783	12 567 191	-	28 122 067	53%	0%	124%	4	4	4	4
Kenya	PCRV	1100001114	10 918 885	3 059 350	4 102 081	-	18 080 316	28%	0%	38%	4	4	3	4
Kenya	PCRV	1100001234	16 739 540	4 089 125	4 866 489	530 703	26 225 857	24%	3%	29%	5	5	4	5
Kenya	PCRV	1100001243	21 496 502	2 244 074	-	-	23 740 576	10%	0%	0%	5	5	3	4
Kenya	PCRV	1100001330	23 929 984	2 660 189	-	5 388 273	31 978 446	11%	23%	0%	4	4	4	4
Korea DPR	PE	1100001154	24 442 300	10 151 100	7 179 300	-	41 772 700	42%	0%	29%	4	5	3	4
Kyrgyzstan	PPA	1100001434	9 000 000	3 543 000	10 852 000	-	23 395 000	39%	0%	121%	5	5	4	4
Laos	PE	1100001207	13 413 663	4 205 908	3 524 952	-	21 144 523	31%	0%	26%	5	4	5	4
Laos	PPA	1100001301	20 490 063	4 624 879	3 331 068	-	28 446 010	23%	0%	16%	5	4	5	4
Laos	PCRV	1100001396	2 994 228	1 878 925	13 473 288	-	18 346 441	63%	0%	450%	5	4	3	3
Lesotho	PPA	1100001150	10 129 436	1 885 293	-	-	12 014 729	19%	0%	0%	5	4	3	4

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Madagascar	PCRV	1100001239	14 500 119	5 992 130	7 663 705	-	28 155 954	41%	0%	53%	4	4	4	4
Malawi	PPE	1100001164	14 779 747	1 782 826	-	-	16 562 573	12%	0%	0%	4	3	2	4
Mali	PCRV	1100001356	11 335 827	2 965 205	8 528 980	-	22 830 012	26%	0%	75%	5	3	3	3
Mauritania	PE	1100001179	11 326 700	8 117 000	3 489 900	-	22 933 600	72%	0%	31%	4	3	3	3
Mauritania	PCRV	1100001180	10 128 402	1 415 853	-	-	11 544 255	14%	0%	0%	4	4	3	4
Mauritania	PPA	1100001255	11 408 000	8 151 000	14 358 000	4 000 000	37 917 000	71%	35%	126%	6	5	3	4
Mauritius	PPA	1100001093	11 116 523	5 267 163	-	-	16 383 686	47%	0%	0%	4	4	3	4
Mauritius	PCRV	1100001357	6 001 331	7 847 624	1 078 741	-	14 927 696	131%	0%	18%	4	3	2	3
Mexico	PE	1100000494	10 415 000	6 760 000	-	-	17 175 000	65%	0%	0%	5	4	3	2
Mexico	PCRV	1100001141	25 000 000	30 000 000	-	-	55 000 000	120%	0%	0%	3	2	2	3
Mexico	PCRV	1100001268	15 000 000	9 000 000	4 000 000	-	28 000 000	60%	0%	27%	4	2	2	1
Mexico	PCRV	1100001349	24 973 000	7 985 000	-	2 446 300	35 404 300	32%	10%	0%	4	3	4	3
Moldova	PPA	1100001340	13 024 000	4 472 000	-	-	17 496 000	34%	0%	0%	4	4	5	4
Moldova	PCRV	1100001449	13 243 207	4 173 286	-	-	17 416 493	32%	0%	0%	5	5	5	4
Mongolia	PE	1100000502	5 038 000	442 000	-	716 527	6 196 527	9%	14%	0%	5	3	4	2
Mongolia	PPA	1100001205	14 806 136	2 693 036	-	-	17 499 172	18%	0%	0%	4	4	4	3
Morocco	PE	1100000356	22 215 100	17 648 500	12 667 200	1 910 335	54 441 135	79%	9%	57%	4	5	5	3
Morocco	PCRV	1100001010	19 520 000	29 900 000	-	900 000	50 320 000	153%	5%	0%	5	4	4	4

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Morocco	PPA	1100001178	18 027 553	11 966 010	169 396	-	30 162 959	66%	0%	1%	5	5	4	4
Morocco	PCRV	1100001230	6 360 503	2 545 242	332 682	990 000	10 228 427	40%	16%	5%	5	4	3	4
Morocco	PCRV	1100001388	18 756 464	8 287 830	-	500 000	27 544 294	44%	3%	0%	5	4	4	3
Mozambique	PE	1100000359	12 403 000	3 608 000	4 115 000	1 651 250	21 777 250	29%	13%	33%	5	3	3	4
Mozambique	IE	1100001184	18 000 348	3 373 286	9 209 266	-	30 582 900	19%	0%	51%	4	4	4	4
Mozambique	PCRV	1100001267	9 459 565	2 217 940	21 795 808	-	33 473 313	23%	0%	230%	3	3	3	3
Nepal	PCRV	1100001285	14 707 749	1 062 060	-	-	15 769 809	7%	0%	0%	5	5	4	4
Nicaragua	PPE	1100001120	14 200 000	2 878 000	3 500 000	1 100 400	21 678 400	20%	8%	25%	5	4	4	5
Nicaragua	PCRV	1100001256	14 000 001	3 004 544	3 995 456	-	21 000 001	21%	0%	29%	4	3	3	4
Niger	PE	1100000434	14 900 000	3 700 000	1 400 000	2 900 000	22 900 000	25%	19%	9%	4	2	2	2
Niger	PCRV	1100001221	10 003 439	3 782 544	3 774 986	-	17 560 969	38%	0%	38%	5	5	4	4
Niger	PCRV	1100001443	16 000 466	10 862 406	34 675 902	-	61 538 774	68%	0%	217%	5	4	5	4
Niger	PCRV	1100001591	13 000 482	1 348 652	21 360 270	-	35 709 404	10%	0%	164%	5	5	5	4
Nigeria	PPA	1100001196	42 900 001	70 500 000	3 200 000	2 810 000	119 410 001	164%	7%	7%	5	5	4	4
Pakistan	PE	1100000524	16 490 000	8 508 000	-	1 538 469	26 536 469	52%	9%	0%	4	5	4	3
Pakistan	PCRV	1100001078	17 154 043	4 531 753	-	-	21 685 796	26%	0%	0%	4	2	2	3
Pakistan	PPA	1100001245	21 766 389	8 969 363	-	-	30 735 752	41%	0%	0%	4	4	4	4
Pakistan	PCRV	1100001324	26 456 496	-	-	80 351	26 536 847	0%	0%	0%	5	5	5	4

Country	Type of evaluation	Project ID	Sum of IFAD total	Sum of government total*	Sum of INT total	Sum of domestic partners	Total	Ratio government financing to IFAD financing	Ratio of domestic financiers to IFAD financing	Ratio of International cofinancing to IFAD financing	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Sustainability
Pakistan	PCRV	1100001385	26 389 066	3 030 565	-	-	29 419 631	11%	0%	0%	4	4	5	2
Pakistan	PCRV	1100001413	35 006 314	-	-	-	35 006 314	0%	0%	0%	5	5	6	5
Panama	PCRV	1100001199	24 999 692	8 000 301	-	6 991 600	39 991 593	32%	28%	0%	4	3	3	3
Paraguay	PCRV	1100001333	15 116 028	2 717 584	-	404 780	18 238 392	18%	3%	0%	5	5	4	4
Peru	PE	1100001044	18 922 518	11 971 412	-	465 524	31 359 454	63%	2%	0%	6	4	5	5
Peru	PCRV	1100001240	24 585 386	9 892 779	-	1 762 048	36 240 213	40%	7%	0%	5	5	3	5
Philippines	PE	1100000486	9 240 000	13 190 000	19 060 000	-	41 490 000	143%	0%	206%	5	4	4	3
Philippines	PE	1100001066	15 539 800	2 613 400	-	-	18 153 200	17%	0%	0%	5	4	3	4
Philippines	PPA	1100001137	14 805 000	6 766 000	-	2 262 000	23 833 000	46%	15%	0%	5	5	4	5
Philippines	PPE	1100001253	21 700 788	654 672	891 705	9 513 000	32 760 165	3%	44%	4%	4	4	4	4
Romania	PE	1100001052	16 464 350	5 567 484	5 086 875	-	27 118 709	34%	0%	31%	4	4	4	3
Rwanda	PCRV	1100001149	15 927 404	4 781 325	12 168 199	-	32 876 928	30%	0%	76%	5	4	4	3
Rwanda	PCRV	1100001232	16 262 539	2 524 272	5 663 838	821 398	25 272 047	16%	5%	35%	5	4	4	3
Rwanda	PCRV	1100001276	14 914 105	2 652 136	-	-	17 566 241	18%	0%	0%	5	4	4	3
Rwanda	PPA	1100001320	13 909 935	6 433 372	14 817 766	248 000	35 409 073	46%	2%	107%	6	5	5	4
Sao Tome et Principe	PCRV	1100001027	12 978 882	2 181 918	1 451 398	-	16 612 198	17%	0%	11%	5	5	3	5
Solomon Islands	PCRV	1100001565	3 995 540	926 722	25 474 231	-	30 396 493	23%	0%	638%	4	4	3	4

Country	*Type of evaluation*	*Project ID*	*Sum of IFAD total*	*Sum of government total**	*Sum of INT total*	*Sum of domestic partners*	*Total*	*Ratio government financing to IFAD financing*	*Ratio of domestic financiers to IFAD financing*	*Ratio of International cofinancing to IFAD financing*	*Relevance*	*Effectiveness*	*Efficiency*	*Sustainability*
Sri Lanka	IE	1100001254	22 310 900	3 433 700	4 660 000	-	30 404 600	15%	0%	21%	5	5	4	4
Sri Lanka	PCRV	1100001346	29 877 163	3 607 634	-	3 330 053	36 814 850	12%	11%	0%	3	3	3	3
Sri Lanka	PCRV	1100001351	4 697 000	-	-	-	4 697 000	0%	0%	0%	4	3	3	3
Sudan	PCRV	1100001140	18 023 915	5 059 465	16 131 000	1 062 898	40 277 278	28%	6%	89%	5	4	4	4
Sudan	PPA	1100001263	24 945 703	13 622 430	-	-	38 568 133	55%	0%	0%	3	3	4	2
Swaziland	PCRV	1100001159	14 957 984	20 264 892	81 322 143	-	116 545 019	135%	0%	544%	4	3	2	3
Syria	PCRV	1100001073	20 166 210	18 005 315	64 986 641	-	103 158 166	89%	0%	322%	4	4	3	3
Syria	PCRV	1100001233	17 550 679	9 109 022	19 490 544	-	46 150 245	52%	0%	111%	5	2	2	2
Syria	PCRV	1100001357	6 001 331	7 847 624	1 078 741	3 778 816	18 706 512	131%	63%	18%	4	3	3	3
Tanzania	PE	1100001086	17 054 000	3 795 000	4 409 000	-	25 258 000	22%	0%	26%	6	4	4	4
Tanzania	PE	1100001151	16 342 100	3 092 205	4 336 546	-	23 770 851	19%	0%	27%	4	5	3	3
Tanzania	PE	1100001166	16 345 006	5 922 761	30 572 986	-	52 840 753	36%	0%	187%	4	5	4	4
Tunisia	PCRV	1100001213	23 243 633	19 723 000	6 986 763	-	49 953 396	85%	0%	30%	4	3	4	4
Tunisia	PCRV	1100001299	20 490 011	14 790 955	5 023 942	-	40 304 908	72%	0%	25%	5	4	4	3
Turkey	PPA	1100001189	13 078 584	7 061 959	9 902 410	-	30 042 953	54%	0%	76%	4	4	5	
Uganda	PCRV	1100001021	19 900 000	6 940 000	-	-	26 840 000	35%	0%	0%	5	5	3	5
Uganda	PE	1100001060	12 588 046	2 523 421	5 532 912	-	20 644 379	20%	0%	44%	6	4	5	3

Country	Type of evaluation	Project ID	Sum of IFAD total	Sum of government total*	Sum of INT total	Sum of domestic partners	Total	Ratio government financing to IFAD financing	Ratio of domestic financiers to IFAD financing	Ratio of International cofinancing to IFAD financing	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Sustainability
Uganda	CPE/PPA	1100001122	13 219 700	2 833 500	-	-	16 053 200	21%	0%	0%	5	5	5	4
Uganda	PCRV	1100001158	17 500 000	21 570 000	68 860 000	-	107 930 000	123%	0%	393%	4	4	3	3
Uganda	PCRV	1100001197	18 429 231	1 453 013	-	-	19 882 244	8%	0%	0%	4	4	4	3
Uganda	PCRV	1100001419	31 986 391	6 122 129	43 830 006	341 377	82 279 903	19%	1%	137%	4	4	5	4
Uruguay	PPA	1100001161	14 000 000	10 500 000	-	457 000	24 957 000	75%	3%	0%	5	5	3	5
Venezuela	PE	1100000521	11 986 600	7 129 900	2 802 000	-	21 918 500	59%	0%	23%	5	4	5	5
Venezuela	PCRV	1100001186	12 999 656	4 000 548	-	181 195	17 181 399	31%	1%	0%	4	3	3	4
Venezuela	PCRV	1100001252	15 000 344	4 000 226	4 000 006	-	23 000 576	27%	0%	27%	4	4	4	4
Viet Nam	CPE/PCRV	1100001091	15 432 792	3 697 983	-	-	19 130 775	24%	0%	0%	5	5	5	5
Viet Nam	CPE/PPA	1100001202	20 906 000	4 493 000	5 033 000	-	30 432 000	21%	0%	24%	5	5	4	5
Viet Nam	PCRV	1100001272	24 751 650	14 032 044	-	-	38 783 694	57%	0%	0%	5	4	5	4
Viet Nam	PCRV	1100001374	26 388 000	5 210 000	4 502 000	-	36 100 000	20%	0%	17%	5	5	5	5
Yemen	PE	1100001075	12 109 135	3 911 249	1 000 544	-	17 020 928	32%	0%	8%	4	3	3	2
Yemen	PCRV	1100001095	12 241 362	4 069 035	664 578	-	16 974 975	33%	0%	5%	4	4	3	3
Yemen	PCRV	1100001195	21 514 578	2 549 188	-	-	24 063 766	12%	0%	0%	5	5	4	4
Yemen	PCRV	1100001269	14 349 089	8 196 652	-	-	22 545 741	57%	0%	0%	4	5	3	4
Yemen	PCRV	1100001293	12 908 140	1 047 791	-	-	13 955 931	8%	0%	0%	5	4	3	4
Yemen	PCRV	1100001403	16 582 329	5 971 511	19 599 550	-	42 153 390	36%	0%	118%	4	4	3	3

Country	Type of evaluation	Project ID	Sum of IFAD total	Sum of government total*	Sum of INT total	Sum of domestic partners	Total	Ratio government financing to IFAD financing	Ratio of domestic financiers to IFAD financing	Ratio of International cofinancing to IFAD financing	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Sustainability
Zambia	PPA	1100001039	12 632 604	1 550 019	1 812 016	-	15 994 639	12%	0%	14%	3	2	2	2
Zambia	PCRV	1100001280	13 811 012	3 187 401	-	-	16 998 413	23%	0%	0%	4	4	3	4

* Includes beneficiary contributions.
Source: IFAD GRIPS; IOE evaluation database.

7.2 IE, PPE, PCRV in CSPE-evaluated countries 2006-2016 dataset

Table 1
Project evaluations (IEs, PPA/PPEs, PCRVs) conducted in countries that had a CSPE between 2006-2016 (n=96)

Country	*Number of evaluations*	*IFAD financing*	*Government* cofinancing*	*Domestic partner cofinancing*	*International cofinancing*	*Ratio government financing to IFAD financing*	*Ratio of domestic financiers to IFAD financing*	*International cofinancing to IFAD financing*
Argentina	3	54 015 000	28 049 000	-	8 324 000	52%	0%	15%
Bangladesh	4	101 401 185	17 372 305	26 936 951	74 786 053	17%	27%	74%
Bolivia	1	12 042 464	2 916 096	-	-	24%	0%	0%
Brazil	1	30 500 331	30 000 113	-	-	98%	0%	0%
China	6	154 706 073	243 268 794	6 210 614	31 703 511	157%	4%	20%
DR Congo	2	30 589 857	5 829 270	-	12 264 646	19%	0%	40%
Ecuador	1	14 842 342	9 452 190	-	-	64%	0%	0%
Ethiopia	5	129 354 729	43 783 055	22 629 568	147 504 711	34%	17%	114%
Ghana	5	56 238 502	59 647 123	979 572	20 155 250	106%	2%	36%
India	4	115 049 763	33 258 169	130 058 414	34 082 611	29%	113%	30%
Jordan	2	14 145 939	10 457 087	-	12 567 191	74%	0%	89%
Kenya	4	73 084 911	12 052 738	-	8 968 570	16%	0%	12%
Madagascar	1	14 500 119	5 992 130	91 551	7 663 705	41%	1%	53%
Mali	1	11 335 827	2 965 205	-	8 528 980	26%	0%	75%
Moldova	2	26 267 207	8 645 286	4 348 469	-	33%	17%	0%
Morocco	5	84 879 620	70 347 582	80 351	13 169 278	83%	0%	16%
Mozambique	3	39 862 913	9 199 226	832 103	35 120 074	23%	2%	88%

Country	Number of evaluations	IFAD financing	Government* cofinancing	Domestic partner cofinancing	International cofinancing	Ratio government financing to IFAD financing	Ratio of domestic financiers to IFAD financing	International cofinancing to IFAD financing
Nepal	1	14 707 749	1 062 060	-	-	7%	0%	0%
Nicaragua	2	28 200 001	5 882 544	4 000 000	7 495 456	21%	14%	27%
Niger	4	53 904 387	19 693 602	-	61 211 158	37%	0%	114%
Nigeria	1	42 900 001	70 500 000	-	3 200 000	164%	0%	7%
Pakistan	6	143 262 308	25 039 681	16 345 205	-	17%	11%	0%
Philippines	4	61 285 588	23 224 072	4 223 014	19 951 705	38%	7%	33%
Rwanda	4	61 013 983	16 391 105	637 500	32 649 803	27%	1%	54%
Sudan	2	42 969 618	18 681 895	870 304	16 131 000	43%	2%	38%
Tanzania	3	49 741 106	12 809 966	-	39 318 532	26%	0%	79%
Turkey	1	13 078 584	7 061 959	-	9 902 410	54%	0%	76%
Uganda	6	113 623 368	41 442 063	37 756 369	118 222 918	36%	33%	104%
Viet Nam	4	87 478 442	27 433 027	1 200 000	9 535 000	31%	1%	11%
Yemen	6	89 704 633	25 745 426	1 069 398	21 264 672	29%	1%	24%
Zambia	2	26 443 616	4 737 420	431 085	1 812 016	18%	2%	7%

* Includes beneficiary contributions.
Source: IFAD GRIPS; IOE evaluation database.

7.3 CSPE 2006-2016 dataset

Table 1
Cofinancing ratios (government, other domestic financiers, and international) and selected IOE ratings by portfolio evaluated by CSPE between 2006-2016

Country	*Country classification at time of evaluation*	*Region*	*CSPE publication*	*CSPE coverage*	*Ratio government financing to IFAD financing*	*Ratio of other domestic financiers to IFAD financing*	*Ratio of International cofinancing to IFAD financing*	*Partnership building*	*COSOP performance*	*Overall IFAD-government partnership*
Argentina	UM	LAC	2010	1988-2008	73%	0%	16%	4	4	4
Bangladesh	LM	APR	2015	2004-2014	37%	13%	74%	4	5	5
Bolivia	LM	LAC	2014	2005-2012	55%	0%	47%	3	4	4
Brazil 1	UM	LAC	2008	1997-2007	93%	43%	0%	3		
Brazil 2	UM	LAC	2015	2008-2015	157%	40%	12%	4	n.r.	5
China	UM	APR	2014	1999-2013	132%	9%	8%	4	5	5
Congo, The Democratic Republic	L*	WCA	2016	2003-2015	18%	0%	46%	3	3	
Ecuador	UM	LAC	2013	1997-2012	73%	19%	71%	3	3	3
Ethiopia 1	L	ESA	2009	1997-2007	37%	13%	75%	5		
Ethiopia 2	L	ESA	2016	2008-2015	33%	37%	72%	4	5	5
Gambia	L	WCA	2016	2004-2014	17%	1%	77%	3	3	3
Ghana	LM	WCA	2011	1998-2010	94%	15%	104%	4	4	4
India 1	L	APR	2010	1987-2009	50%	77%	25%	3	5	5
India 2	LM	APR	2016	2010-2015	69%	86%	11%	3	4	4
Indonesia	LM	APR	2014	2004-2012	28%	4%	32%	3	3	3
Jordan	UM	NEN	2012	1996-2011	75%	1%	76%	4	3	3

Country	Country classification at time of evaluation	Region	CSPE publication	CSPE coverage	Ratio government financing to IFAD financing	Ratio of other domestic financiers to IFAD financing	Ratio of International cofinancing to IFAD financing	Partnership building	COSOP performance	Overall IFAD-government partnership
Kenya	L	ESA	2011	2000-2011	19%	63%	31%	4	4	4
Madagascar	L	ESA	2013	2000-2012	28%	0%	58%	5	5	5
Mali 1	L	WCA	2007	1997-2006	30%	1%	51%	3		
Mali 2	L	WCA	2013	2007-2012	50%	0%	115%	5	4	4
Moldova, Republic of	LM	NEN	2014	1992-2012	39%	9%	15%	4	3	4
Morocco	LM	NEN	2008	1999-2006	97%	0%	32%	4		
Mozambique 1	L	ESA	2010	1993-2009	49%	1%	34%	4	5	4
Mozambique 2	L*	ESA	2017	2010-2016	32%	6%	47%	5	4	
Nepal	L	APR	2013	1992-2012	31%	2%	133%	4	4	4
Nicaragua	LM*	LAC	2017	1999-2016	25%	11%	33%	4	4	
Niger	L	WCA	2011	1997-2009	34%	1%	73%	5	4	4
Nigeria 1	L	WCA	2009	1998-2008	105%	10%	11%	4		
Nigeria 2	LM	WCA	2016	2008-2016	69%	2%	5%	3	4	4
Pakistan	L	APR	2008	1990-2007	170%	3%	57%	4		
Philippines	LM*	APR	2017	2003-2015	63%	3%	84%	4	4	
Rwanda	L	ESA	2012	2000-2010	28%	3%	43%	4	5	5
Senegal	LM	WCA	2014	2004-2013	53%	0%	43%	4	4	4
Sudan	LM	NEN	2009	1994-2007	38%	1%	37%	3		

Country	*Country classification at time of evaluation*	*Region*	*CSPE publication*	*CSPE coverage*	*Ratio government financing to IFAD financing*	*Ratio of other domestic financiers to IFAD financing*	*Ratio of International cofinancing to IFAD financing*	*Partnership building*	*COSOP performance*	*Overall IFAD-government partnership*
Tanzania, United Republic of	L	ESA	2015	2004-2014	20%	0%	92%	4	4	4
Turkey	UM	NEN	2016	2003-2015	43%	0%	13%	3	4	4
Uganda	L	WCA	2013	1997-2011	246%	95%	120%	5	4	4
Viet Nam	LM	APR	2011	2000-2010	26%	2%	9%	4	5	5
Yemen	LM	NEN	2012	2000-2010	29%	6%	60%	4	4	4
Zambia	LM	ESA	2014	2003-2013	24%	4%	20%	4	4	4

* refers to countries whose classification at 2015 was known.
Note: there are 40 CSPEs in this list. 4 were not reviewed.
Source: IFAD GRIPS; IOE evaluation database.

Additional supporting tables and figures

8.1 CSPE data set analysis

Table 1
CSPE sample composition by country classification

	LIC	*MIC*	*Total*
APR	3	6	9
ESA	7	1	8
LAC	0	6	6
NEN	0	6	6
WCA	4	3	7
Total	14	22	36

Source: CSPE review, see data in annex VII.3 table 1.

Table 2
Partnership-building ratings, country classification and ICO presence country 2006-2016

Country	*Evaluation Year*	*Partnership-building rating*	*COSOP performance rating*	*Overall IFAD-government partnership*	*Country classification – LIC (L) / MIC (LM/UM)*	*Year of ICO presence*
Brazil	2006	3			UM	2011
Mali	2006	3			L	2011
Morocco	2006	4			LM	2016
Ethiopia	2007	5			L	2005
Pakistan	2007	4			L	2011
Nigeria	2008	4			L	2005
Sudan	2008	3			LM	2005
Argentina	2009	4	4	4	UM	-
India	2009	3	5	5	L	2001
Mozambique	2009	4	5	4	L	2011
Niger	2009	5	4	4	L	2014
Ghana	2010	4	4	4	LM	2010
Kenya	2010	4	4	4	L	2008
Rwanda	2010	4	5	5	L	2010
Viet Nam	2010	4	5	5	LM	2005
Yemen	2010	4	4	4	LM	2007
Jordan	2011	4	3	3	UM	-
Uganda	2011	5	4	4	L	2008
Ecuador	2012	3	3	3	UM	-
Indonesia	2012	3	3	3	LM	2015

Country	Evaluation Year	Partnership-building rating	COSOP performance rating	Overall IFAD-government partnership	Country classification – LIC (L) / MIC (LM/UM)	Year of ICO presence
Madagascar	2012	5	5	5	L	2008
Mali	2012	5	4	4	L	2011
Nepal	2012	4	4	4	L	2008
Bolivia	2013	3	4	4	LM	2004
China	2013	4	5	5	UM	2005
Moldova	2013	4	3	4	LM	-
Senegal	2013	4	4	4	LM	2005
Zambia	2013	4	4	4	LM	2012
Bangladesh	2014	4	5	5	LM	2012
Tanzania	2014	4	4	4	L	2004
Brazil	2015	4	n.r.	5	UM	2011
Ethiopia	2015	4	5	5	L	2005
Gambia	2015	3	3	3	L	-
India	2015	3	4	4	LM	2001
Nigeria	2015	3	4	4	LM	2005
Turkey	2015	3	4	4	UM	-
DR Congo	2016	3	3		L	2005
Mozambique	2016	5	4		L	2011
Nicaragua	2016	4	4		LM	-
Philippines	2016	4	4		LM	2009

Source: IOE ratings database 2017; World Bank Country & Lending Groups FY 2017.

Legend

	CSPE were not included in analysis

Table 3

Frequency of partnership-building ratings by rating and region from CPEs/CSPEs conducted between 2006 and 2016

Region	Rating: 3 Frequency	3 % of total	4 Frequency	4 % of total	5 Frequency	5 % of total	Total	Average
APR	3	33%	6	67%			9	3.7
ESA			6	60%	4	40%	10	4.4
LAC	3	50%	3	50%			6	3.5
NEN	2	33%	4	67%			6	3.7
WCA	4	44%	3	33%	2	22%	9	3.8
Total	12	30%	22	55%	6	15%	40	3.9

Source: IFAD IOE ratings database (2017) – compiled from data in annex VII.3 table 1.

8.2 Partnership-building rating and CSPE review analysis

Figure 1
Combination of partnership categories and partnership ratings



Source: annex V.1 table 1; annex VIII table 2.

Table 1
Partnership outcomes identified in countries where government support for IFAD collaboration with partners is strong or weak

IFAD collaboration with and support for government	*Outcomes*				
	Influencing	*Scaling up and mainstreaming*	*Complementarities and synergies*	*Knowledge and innovation*	*Sustainability and ownership*
Strong (central and/or sub-national)	Brazil* Ghana Madagascar Mali Nicaragua Niger Nigeria*	China Mali Nigeria* Sudan	China Mali Moldova Nicaragua Niger Uganda Nigeria	Brazil* India* Madagascar Mali Moldova Nicaragua Niger	China India* Mali Moldova Rwanda Uganda
Weak	Nepal Yemen		Nepal Yemen	Nepal	

*Weak with central government and strong with sub-national units.
Source: CSPE review - cross-tabulation of annex V.1 table 1 and annex VI.4.

8.3 Partnership-building rating, government support and ICO presence analysis

Government support and partnership-building rating analysis

Table 1.1
Number and percentage of CSPE countries identified to have strong government support by country classification

Country classification	*Strong IFAD collaboration with and support for:*	
	Central government	Sub-national government
LICs	5 (71.4%)	1 (12.5%)
MICs	2 (28.6%)	7 (87.5%)
Total	7	8

Source: annex VI.4; annex VIII table 2.

Table 1.2
Average partnership-building rating of CSPE countries identified to have strong government support by country classification

Country classification	*Strong IFAD collaboration with and support for:*	
	Central government	Sub-national government
LICs	4.4	5
MICs	4	3.7
Overall average	4.3	3.9

Source annex VI.4; annex VIII table 2.

ICO presence and partnership-building rating analysis

Table 2.1
Number and percentage of CSPE countries with or without ICOs at time of evaluation by country classification

Country classification	*ICO*	
	Present	Not present
LICs	11 (%)	4 (%)
MICs	13 (%)	9 (%)
Total	24	13

Source: annex VIII table 2.

Table 2.2
Average partnership-building rating of CSPE countries with or without ICOs at time of evaluation by country classification

Country classification	*ICO*	
	Present	Not present
LICs	4.2	3.8
MICs	3.7	3.6
Total	3.9	3.6

Source: annex VIII table 2.

Lessons from other IFIs

Overview

1. Several other IFIs have addressed partnership performance in their evaluations in recent years. But only the ADB carried out a fully-fledged partnership evaluation (2016), focusing on its corporate and global partnerships and their effectiveness in cofinancing, knowledge management, and coordination. Until 2015, the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank Group had a strong programme of evaluations of Global Partnerships, such as the GEF, the Climate Investment Funds, or the Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP) of which a total of 26 were done. Certain other partnership aspects were included in its regular evaluations but without clear guidelines. Since then, IEG has moved to mainstream the evaluation of partnerships systematically as a cross-cutting theme in its evaluations, and to strengthen its overall partnership evaluation methods and capacities. The AfDB's Comprehensive Evaluation of Development Results of October 2016 includes some comments on partnerships at country level. AfDB also carried out a Trust Fund evaluation in 2013. GEF assessed its partnership recently in the context of an evaluation of GEF Programmatic Approaches (2017).

2. Many of the findings and lessons learned in these evaluations refer to management and effectiveness of trust funds and global partnership programmes that are of relevance for IFAD's grants programmes. There are also important lessons with high relevance for IFAD on other institutions' experience and lessons with partnerships in cofinancing, knowledge management, PPPPs and CSOs. Specific lessons on fragile states and for small states were found in two IEG evaluations that may be of interest in these environments. Several evaluations included some general best practices for partnerships and limitations. These lessons will be presented in a summarized form in the following.

Lessons from IFI evaluations of partnerships

3. **Trust funds.** Multi- and bilateral trust funds, their management and value-addition to the regular loan programme are an important partnership theme for the MDBs. These trust funds are comparable to IFAD supplementary funding and grant programmes. In an evaluation of ADB's three financing partnership facilities[1] in the areas of water, regional cooperation and integration, and clean energy, ADB found clear **advantages of consolidating individual trust funds in operational platforms**. These could be achieved through diversifying the sources of finance thereby improving relevance and financial sustainability and through efficiency gains from increased economies of scale in trust fund management. But issues remained in terms of complex administrative modalities and chronic implementation delays at project level in these financing partnership facilities.

4. In a similar vein, the 2013 AfDB evaluation of procedural effectiveness of trust funds identified unrealistic expectations at fund establishment on delivery of results and **high transaction costs** for trust fund management that are not covered by additional administrative resources. It also found weak internal AfDB performance indicators on trust fund disbursements, costs and processing times. Particular problems were encountered in working with CSOs in trust funds, as the AfDB does not have sufficient capacity and resources to discern NGOs' administrative capacity and provide "on the ground" support when necessary.

5. The 2011 World Bank Group evaluation of Trust Fund Support for Development led to the conclusion that, **while trust funds can add value by providing coordinated grant financing, the interests among donors, recipients and**

[1] Financing Partnership Facilities are defined as operational "platforms" for strategic, long-term and multi-partner cooperation that link various forms of assistance in a coordinated manner for well-defined purposes.

the World Bank may diverge on fund allocation decisions and management. Notably, many trust funds of global scope at the World Bank were found to involve insufficient recipient participation and clear outcome objectives, and often did not consistently work in accordance with aid effectiveness principles of country ownership and donor coordination. Separate umbrella trust fund arrangements for regional and global, country, and multi-donor/multi-recipient trust fund management are expected to strengthen effectiveness, efficiency and accountability for results.

6. **Global partnerships.** Since the early 2000s, the World Bank has developed a strong capacity for evaluations of global partnerships. A 2015 review of these evaluations[2] summarized four main challenges to the relevance and effectiveness of these global partnership programmes that were frequently observed: (i) There is a risk of **proliferation of uncoordinated partnership initiatives with inappropriate earmarking**, and parallel budgeting and approval processes. It is also not always clear that dedicated programmes raise overall development funding. Rather, the basic assumption is that donor aid budgets are fixed; (ii) Such global programmes may **miss opportunities to link up with the Bank's mainstream work and in particular its country programmes**; (iii) How can effective oversight and accountability be ensured in these global partnerships? **Many global and regional activities are neither tracked in any portfolio database nor expected to produce results**; and (iv) Many of these global programmes **miss clear goals and indicators and independent evaluations**.

7. **Cofinancing**. Lessons on cofinancing as a major partnership activity are largely related to the definition of cofinancing, the additionality of resources mobilized through cofinancing, their effectiveness and transaction costs, and the measurement and reporting of cofinancing results.

8. In recent years, ADB has achieved a relatively high cofinancing ratio and cofinanced projects performed better according to the 2016 partnership effectiveness evaluation. But it was also noted that the definition of cofinancing was changed to include certain parallel project components by other donors and commercial cofinancing categories that are 'debatable', partly pushed by ambitious ADB targets. **While a lot of collaborative cofinancing does not mobilize additional resources,** the evaluation pointed out that **cofinancing facilitates coordination and ultimately better project results**. But there were also reports on difficulties and complexities in administration, reporting and partner relations management in cofinancing. A common problem was inadequate accounting of partner contributions in cofinanced projects. Moreover, reporting cofinancing as value-addition – such as for policy influence and scaling up – would require different reporting systems and parameters.

9. In a similar vein, the AfDB comprehensive evaluation of development results found that AfDB **cofinancing is not sufficiently oriented towards mobilizing additional resources** for the Bank and projects, although positive practices were encountered in some cases. One example of this was promoting and attracting private-sector financing into PPPs. But in general, leveraging in projects was more ad-hoc than driven by strategic goals set forth in the country strategies.

10. The IEG evaluation on World Bank engagement in small states (2016) shows that, **even under supportive and favourable circumstances, cofinancing can be complicated**. World Bank and ADB cofinanced a number of specific projects in the Pacific Islands and worked to harmonize procedures along with alternating lead

[2] IEG (2015). *Opportunities and Challenges from Working in Partnership: Findings from IEG's Work on Partnership Programs and Trust Funds.* A learning focused note of World Banks findings on global and regional partnership programmes over the last 10 years. World Bank. Washington, DC.

roles in specific sectors and countries. This was done in the context of the Pacific Regional Infrastructure Facility that coordinates efforts supporting infrastructure financing in the region (funded mainly by Australia and New Zealand). The facility also conducts research and analysis on infrastructure needs and priorities and provides technical assistance – which offers a good basis for achieving policy influence and scaling up beyond projects. In the end, it was concluded that cofinancing was 'helpful', yet that it remains challenging to put joint financing between the ADB and the World Bank into practice, especially in terms of applicable rules and procedures on procurement.

11. **Knowledge partnerships** in ADB take a large share of the Bank's corporate partnerships portfolio (62 per cent – considerably more than was found at country level in this ESR for IFAD), and their numbers doubled between 2009 and 2015. Yet the quality of these knowledge partnerships is often deemed problematic, without clear results frameworks, poor reporting and dispersed management. For instance, **introducing knowledge hubs proved mostly unsuccessful due to poor design and focus, under-funding, and lack of linkages** with ADB technical staff. In contrast, effective knowledge partnership in ADB consisted of collaboration on specific initiatives that led to more systematic and joint project preparation and implementation, engagement of high-level staff in conferences and policy engagement, completion of a series of publications or events, sometimes with joint funding. In sum, what worked in ADB was to **promote clarity and to link up knowledge partnerships with ADB technical expertise, project preparation and high-profile engagement.**

12. The AfDB evaluation focused more on influence of its knowledge work on policies and strategies. It concluded that, mostly due to insufficient communication, the knowledge partnerships did not work optimally, which meant that the Bank's results were not fully leveraged to country needs and that the Bank is still perceived as a financier rather than a provider of knowledge and advice. The exception was **fragile situations in which the Bank was able to use its brand and relationships to engage in influential policy dialogue**. By contrast, no specific patterns emerged for MICs and LICs.

13. In its support for promoting global data partnerships and evidence for country policy decision making, the World Bank identified **well-aligned partnership engagements as a cornerstone of its success**, in addition to technical expertise, sustainable approaches and linking global and national needs.[3] But changes in the global partnership landscape and the emergence of new development partners increasingly reduce the World Bank's effectiveness at the country level in supporting data production, promoting open data, building statistical capacity and encouraging country clients to share data in a system-wide approach.

14. In terms of knowledge partnerships, the World Bank evaluation on urban transport (2017) found that although the World Bank Group's finance is small compared to the unmet need, it has proven its ability to use its knowledge and convening power to spread good practices and promote South-South learning, because of the **continuity of the support** and the **capacity building** provided.

15. **PPPP.** Lessons and best practices on PPP/PPPPs from the World Bank/IEG and the Institute of Development Studies are clear in their conclusions that designing, structuring, and implementing PPPs remains a challenging and complex endeavour that requires a good rationale, clear roles and participation for all actors, and follow-up for sustainability. The IEG 2015 evaluation on Support for Private Partnerships firmly sees their **success as mainly dependent on the enabling**

[3] Data and Evidence: The Foundation of Development Policy, IEG Evaluation (2017).

environment they are embedded in and the role and capacity of the public sector for reform and support.

16. The four main lessons from **IEG's PPP evaluation** (2015) are that, first, most of the upstream work aimed at sector reform failed in almost half of the cases because of the **complexity and political implications of the reform processes**. At the project level, contingent liabilities for governments that emerge from PPPs are rarely fully quantified, although project design tends to give attention to ensuring adequate risk sharing. Secondly, **strong government commitment and the availability of a government champion** to promote the PPP agenda and ensure inter-ministerial coordination were the most important drivers of success for upstream work. Countries need to be sufficiently mature and ready to apply the concept of PPPs well. Third, **capacity building for PPPs** and building the **legal and institutional framework** were found to be the second most frequently addressed enabling factors. Fourth, the market structure of a sector must create conditions for the private sector to operate and regulatory bodies should be competent and protect operators from political interference. Frequent **stakeholder consultation** and **active involvement of local staff** likewise contributed to the success of policy reform. And **staying engaged beyond financial closure of a PPP** is a strategic necessity.

17. **IEG's evaluation on urban transport** (2017) underlined the **importance of linking upstream PPP reform work and downstream projects** through better communication between the Bank's various agencies and departments, and added that the financial sustainability of the participating private partner is key for provision of services.

18. In its **2015 study for IFAD** on "Brokering Development: Enabling Factors for Public-Private-Producer Partnerships (PPPP) in Agricultural Value Chains" (2015), the Institute of Development Studies concluded that **PPPPs require a clear rationale and objectives, that incentives of partners should be well aligned, and that partners with the right competencies should be identified**, e.g. through competitive bidding, partner due diligence processes, or working with already established partners.

19. PPPP outcomes would depend on critical aspects of design, in particular risk-sharing and mechanisms that manage, mitigate or share these risks and that address unequal power relations that exist in vertically coordinated value chains. All partners, including farmers and their organizations, need to have ownership of the PPPP, with clear roles and responsibilities that reflect their priorities and interests. For the public sector a proactive approach should be taken to assure public accountability and transparency. Agreements are needed for partners to feel confident that the other partners will perform theirs. Building trust is of paramount importance in PPPPs.

20. To make PPPPs sustainable, capacity needs to be built to respond to changes in complex market systems, challenges as well as opportunities, and to adapt to the unexpected. This includes performance monitoring, with indicators that reflect joint PPPP objectives, and spaces for communication, negotiation and conflict resolution. While agricultural value chain PPPPs are time-limited interventions they need to modify the incentives, capabilities and behaviour of different actors to ensure that they will continue their roles in the long term.

21. Related to PPPPs, but from a slightly different angle, **ADB's partnership effectiveness evaluation** pointed out that in the new partnership world ADB's function would be increasingly to convince larger companies to change certain market behaviours, including related to smallholder farmers. This would be partly through working with CSOs in shifting civil society-private sector relationships towards constructive engagement.

22. **Civil society**. Administrative lessons are at the centre of ADB's partnership effectiveness evaluation for working with CSOs. As ADB engages CSOs mostly as contractors, procurement issues assume high importance. Engaging with CSOs is found to be highly time-consuming and staff intensive. CSOs often lack the capacity to comply with ADB procurement and reporting requirements (as do many UN organizations). This limits ADB's partnership effectiveness and efficiency with CSOs considerably.

23. At a different level, a recent approach paper for the **IEG Evaluation of Engaging Citizens for Better Development Results** (2017) systematically reviewed lessons learned on engagement with CSO and citizens and pointed to important lessons and variations in the effectiveness of citizen engagement - through CSOs and other forms - depending on the context, the nature of the intervention, and type of outcome. The essence of these reviews is that **citizen engagement can lead to improved outcomes in some circumstances, but that no effects or even adverse effects are also possible**. Much depends on the type of development outcome pursued, the vehicle for participation, a variety of contextual factors, and the quality of implementation.

24. The strongest positive evidence for effective collaboration links citizen engagement to improved delivery of public services such as water, health, and education. Citizen engagement can contribute to increase access to and quality of services, and make them more responsive to user needs. There is also evidence of positive outcomes in areas such as empowerment, social inclusion, and cohesion; local public goods such as public safety; and processes for citizen participation in public financial management and natural resource management. But there were often no results, or even negative outcomes, in the form of state failure to respond to citizens' claims, instances of participatory processes that were manipulative or unrepresentative, and violent oppression of citizen demands.

25. Contextual factors often explain mixed outcomes of citizen engagement. There are demand-side factors (people's willingness and capacity to engage) and supply-side factors (politicians' and officials' willingness and capacity to respond to citizen voice and participation); and legal, economic, and political factors (history, power relations, legal frameworks, and so on). Inequality and the possibility of elite capture are often highlighted as contextual factors that may cause negative outcomes. Often **the adoption of measures to ensure that beneficiaries are adequately informed and consulted (transparency and involvement) is seen as a powerful way to ensure positive results**.

26. **Lessons in MFS and small states**. The World Bank Group experience with "Engagement in Situations of Fragility, Conflict, and Violence" (IEG evaluation of 2016) raises two principle lessons on working with UN agencies and with multi-donor trust funds.

27. Strong World Bank Group-United Nations partnership would have been particularly important in the fragility, conflict and violence context, as the United Nations agencies have political and security-related skills and contacts that the World Bank needs to leverage, and the UN is the prime actor on the humanitarian front. But the evaluation found that partnerships with UN agencies were not systematic and their frequency and effectiveness varied across the countries and themes. The existing system did not encourage building partnerships because of perceived high transaction costs, lack of strong staff incentives, incompatibility of the fiduciary and legal frameworks, and competition for influence and limited donor resources. A more nuanced strategic and technical dialogue would be needed to delineate respective roles and comparative advantages.

28. **Multi-donor trust funds were seen as vital strategic tools in these fragile environments**, but their **effectiveness was found to be limited** due to weak links to the rest of the World Bank portfolio. Global thematic trust funds (such as

the State and Peace-Building Fund and the Global Program of Forced Displacement) were helpful in supporting synergies in the fragility, conflict and violence context. However, their impact (particularly in MICs) was diminished by their fragmentation.

29. A 2016 IEG clustered CPE evaluated small states with populations of less than 1.5 million. It found that effective ways for development partners to join forces are particularly important in small states, where financing from partners is often more of a lifeline to economic viability than in larger states.

30. Given small states' limited capacity for coordinating donor support, coordinated action among development partners crucially lowers transactions costs for client countries. The programmes reviewed used a number of vehicles and modalities that facilitated unified or at least coordinated support (including for forums for regular coordination among key donors, used notably in the Pacific and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States). More engagement at a regional or multi-country level was, for instance, facilitated through multi-country vehicles for strategy, analytic and advisory activities, and financing that could address shared agendas in a harmonized way. For instance, the World Bank was one of multiple partners supporting the Caribbean Growth Forum, a process for identifying and acting on constraints to competitiveness in which a regional platform underpinned country-specific reform agendas.

31. A striking example of clarifying and simplifying the donor interface on policy reforms with the government was in Tonga, where ADB, the World Bank, and the EU initially decided to provide budget support on an individual basis to offset the negative impact of the global crisis on remittances. Overall, these programmes had several pages of separate policy conditions. At the Government's request, the World Bank took the lead to propose a coordinated approach with a common framework with fewer conditions.

Good partnership practices

32. Good partnership practices depend very much on the type and modality of partnerships and engagement and the context. But there are general lessons that were drawn in some evaluations. The Joint Evaluation of Agriculture and Rural Development in Africa by IFAD and AfDB of 2009, whose findings are already incorporated in the 2012 IFAD Partnership Strategy, pointed to the principle needs for **partnerships to be programmatic, to have clear objectives, and be results-oriented, time-bound, and sufficiently resourced**.

33. General conclusions from the ADB evaluation emphasized **flexible engagement rules** that may enable strengthening ties with partners over time. Secondly, the ADB evaluation found that its **formal partnerships are more often effective than non-formal ones**. Third, where partnerships allow players to **capitalize on synergies and coordination and to minimize overlaps**, positive results could be expected. Gains from aligning interests and tapping into partner strengths allow them to have a stronger voice with the government in promoting reforms, for example. The evaluation also pointed out that one of the main advantages of ADB as a partner is that it is valued by others for its technical expertise and good working relationship with governments.

34. Related to the point on flexible engagement, the ADB evaluation notes that **partnerships for development tend to be fluid**. Partnerships may begin as a strategic coordination partnership among donors to harmonize or boost synergy in a country and then be transformed into finance or K&L partnerships. Partnerships with CSOs or the private sector often begin in loan-funded projects with specific delegated implementation tasks, before being expanded to wider collaborative partnerships for sectoral capacity building or policy engagement, possibly including grant or other financing mechanisms.

35. The ADB evaluation also pointed to the positive effect of applying two partnership principles, those of **mutuality** and **organizational identity**. Mutuality refers to the need for horizontal coordination and accountability among partners and equality in decision-making, without hierarchical relations. Organizational identity is the ability of each organization to maintain its core values, distinct organizational entity and constituencies over time with the partnership.

36. AfDB's comprehensive evaluation found that effective engagement in partnerships depended mostly on the existence of an established framework of country coordination partnerships. Where they did not exist, the Bank had not taken counter-initiatives, such as with emerging donors. Secondly, the presence of the Bank country office provided a positive context for a better understanding of country constraints and needs. In particular it allowed for improved dialogue and consultation with a diversity of stakeholders. In fragile situations, longstanding partnerships facilitated the Bank's work, despite the challenges of working in settings constrained by limited capacity or resources.

Limitations to partnering

37. A recent GEF evaluation on Programmatic Approaches (2017)[4] identified the complexity of several of its programmes as an issue of concern for performance, including the increased number of partner agencies. In order to enhance its impact and to provide integrated solutions to environmental challenges, GEF increasingly engages in programmatic approaches. The multi-dimensional nature of programmes has generated greater need for multiple partners, coordination and management, with implications for efficiency, results and performance.

38. But the evaluation clearly shows that complexity is the most significant challenge to programme performance. In particular, multi-agency programmes face major obstacles, posed by their different mandates, operating practices and M&E systems. Unless management and supervision systems for programmes are substantially improved and more appropriately resourced, programmes are unlikely to perform as anticipated.

39. For ADB, partnerships are clearly hampered by cumbersome and inflexible ADB procedures, insufficient staff resources assigned to project supervision and lack of harmonization of ADB procedures with partners' procurement and disbursement procedures. Moreover, ADB's organizational structure for partnerships developed organically, rather than by design, and it has turned into a rather fragmented model. There is now duplication of efforts for partner relations and management of trust funds.

Evaluating partnerships

40. During the November 2017 meeting of the Evaluation Coordination Group several methodological issues around partnership evaluations were raised.

41. ADB noted as a limitation that evaluations were not able to capture the contributions of partners, mainly because of insufficient result frameworks and because mutual results were insufficiently tracked.

42. IEG pointed out that they found it methodologically difficult to evaluate certain partnership outcomes, such as "convening power". Partnership evaluations did not work particularly well in the World Bank/IEG country programme evaluations in the past, because they were crowded out by the multitude of issues that the evaluations had to address. In general, as partnership evaluations were increasingly mainstreamed into IEG evaluations at all levels, they found it necessary to build better capacity to evaluate partnerships and to better define

[4] Evaluation of programmatic approaches in the GEF Volume I – Main report 3 May 2017 (prepared by the Independent Evaluation Office of GEF).

country-specific partnerships and evaluation criteria. Also IEG has invested in strengthening staff capacity to evaluate partnerships, which includes having dedicated staff with special skills, such as social networking analysis.

43. For GEF, important aspects to look at in partnerships and partnership value addition – and to be included in results-based frameworks and evaluations - would be their strategic relevance, value-for-money, efficiency of governance arrangements, comparative advantages, sustainability and contributions to transformational impacts.

Key lessons

- The proliferation of uncoordinated partnership initiatives in global partnership programmes can be reduced by linking those initiatives with country programmes and establishing effective oversight, setting goals and tracking results.
- Cofinancing often does not mobilize additional resources but it facilitates coordination and ultimately better project results.
- Effective knowledge partnerships avoid ambiguity and build strong links with the organization's technical expertise, project preparation and high-profile engagement.
- PPPP success mainly depends on the enabling policy and governance environment they are embedded in and the role and capacity of the public sector for reform and support.
- Frequent stakeholder consultation and active involvement of local staff likewise contributed to their success.
- Staying engaged beyond financial closure of a PPPP is a strategic necessity.
- PPPPs require clear rationale and objectives, that incentives of partners are well aligned, and that partners with the right competencies are identified, e.g. through competitive bidding, partner due diligence processes, or working with already established partners.
- Partnerships with CSOs and citizen engagement can lead to improved outcomes in some circumstances, but no effects, or even adverse effects, are also possible.
- Flexible engagement over time may enable strengthening ties with partners.
- Formal partnerships are more often effective than non-formal ones.
- Where partnerships allow players to capitalize on synergies and coordination and to minimize overlaps, positive results can be expected.
- IFAD has to utilize and build up the comparative strengths of different types of partners for development effectiveness.

Case studies

Country: Argentina
Case: Partnership for family farming

IFAD-Mercosur partnership for family farming: IFAD policy engagement in Argentina - financed mainly through grants - has played a pivotal role in promoting rural development and family farming in the country and has contributed to achieving deep-seated institutional change. Policy engagement in Argentina was three-pronged through: (i) IFAD activities in Mercosur; (ii) the activities of IFAD-funded projects; and (iii) IFAD's direct support to the rural-poverty debate financed by a grant at the national level.

IFAD-Mercosur policy engagement deserves particular attention. Since 1999 IFAD has supported policy dialogue on rural development in the Southern cone with five consecutive sub-regional grants to the IFAD-Mercosur programme. Argentina is a founding member of Mercosur and has actively participated in the meetings of the Commission on Family Farming of Mercosur (REAF). Therefore, IFAD-Mercosur activities had a direct impact on policy dialogue in Argentina. The IFAD-Mercosur partnership is characterised by two phases: the first served to promote convergence of policies on family agriculture among member countries; the second to promote the effective participation of small farmers' associations in decision-making processes on rural development policies in member countries.

Within the framework of REAF, IFAD has contributed to generating debate on rural poverty in Argentina and raised the sector’s profile in a country that has traditionally been oriented towards agroindustry for export. IFAD's policy dialogue helped to link various sectors of the Federal Government and the Provincial Governments involved in poverty eradication. In particular, at the federal government level, IFAD contributed to expanding the concept of rural development and family agriculture to the Ministry of Economy and Production and to the Secretariat for Budget. The rural poverty debate, the participatory approach of the Government and the push of rural associations in search of political participation led the Government of Argentina to create the National Forum for Family Agriculture in 2006 through Resolution 132/06. This Forum brings together more than 900 small and medium-sized rural producers from all over the country who associate some 180,000 families and provide a fundamental platform to discuss development policies in this sector.

IFAD, in conjunction with the Inter-American Development Bank, supported the creation and structure of a Sub-secretariat for Rural Development and Family Agriculture, which was raised to the Secretariat level in October 2009 with the creation of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries. Furthermore, IFAD contributed to the creation of a national section of the REAF in Argentina and the Provincial Fora of Family Agriculture. The latter have contributed not only to increasing the dialogue between rural organizations and the Government, but also have strengthened the dialogue between social movements. The establishment of these institutions suggests the sustainability of IFAD policy engagement in Argentina and the probable achievement of long-term policy results.

Country: Brazil
Case: Knowledge partnership with GEF
Project: The Sustainable Land Management in the Semi-Arid Sertão Project (complimentary to Dom Hélder Câmara Project)
Implementation period: 2007-2013
Main documents: Final evaluation GEF[1] – The IFAD-GEF Advantage[2]–PPE Dom Hélder Câmara Project[3]

Project objectives and rational: The sustainable Land Management in the Semi-Arid Sertão Project was designed as a complementary initiative to the IFAD-financed Dom Helder Câmara Project (DHCP) to work in various areas of the semiarid north-eastern Brazil. It is financed by GEF. The project has a budget of US$15.5 million, of which US$5.8 million is provided by GEF through a grant and US$10.0 million through the Government of Brazil. It started in early 2009. Taking into consideration the problem of land degradation and its causes, the overall goal of the Sertão Project was to minimize the causes and negative impacts of degradation of both the land and the integrity of the Caatinga biome, through the implementation of sustainable land use systems.

Government ownership and alignment: The Sertão Project proved to be consistent with national environmental policies in Brazil. It is considered as a concrete contribution to the implementation of the National Programme to Combat Desertification. Project actions fall under the Thematic Areas of Poverty and Inequality Reduction and Sustainable Expansion of Production Capacity (BRASIL-MMA, 2005). The project was well aligned with the principles and guidelines of the National Biodiversity Policy. This alignment shows that, beyond country ownership of the broader objectives of the project, there was consistency between the project objectives and the national government objectives of preserving the Caatinga biome and reducing poverty, which already existed.

IFAF-GEF complementarities in strategies and policies: The GEF-IFAD partnership in Brazil is based on the willingness to integrate the major issues linked to land and natural resource degradation into development initiatives aimed at poverty reduction and productive activities. More precisely, IFAD supports GEF in the consolidation of its portfolio for land degradation and strengthening the capacity necessary for the protection of the global environment. The project also maintains consistency with the IFAD Strategy on Natural Resources Management, Environmental Protection and Poverty Reduction, by promoting social development, the equity of gender issues, the generation of income, environmental sustainability and good governance. The GEF and IFAD partnership in this project reflects complementarities in strategies and policies such as South-south Cooperation and scaling up.

IFAD-GEF strategic objectives: The project objectives were consistent with the GEF focus area "Land Degradation" and Operational Strategy on Sustainable Land Management (defined in GEF 3 – OP 15).[4] It is also consistent with IFAD Priority: Strategic Objective 5 of the 2011-2015 Strategic Framework – A base of natural and economic resources for rural women and men more responsive to climate change, environmental degradation and the transformation of markets.

IFAD, through its policies and strong track record of working with rural women and men and their institutions, as well as its alliances with sector experts, offered GEF the unique entry points to achieve its goals and scale up its support. GEF played a critical role in deepening IFAD's engagement with environmental and climate change concerns.

IFAD supervision and technical support: Starting in 2009, supervision was directly by IFAD. There were also visits by the IFAD staff responsible for liaising with GEF that were also much appreciated by the project team, as the issues of greatest concern to the GEF were brought to the fore more directly. In addition to these initiatives in the area of supervision, IFAD also helped by providing technical support. It was this IFAD support that helped define an environmental and production planning methodology and, subsequently, allowed for the organization of a small training programme on this subject.

[1] Sustainable Land Management in the Semi-Arid Sertão Project -Sertão Project, Grant Agreement GEF-FSP-002-BR, Final Evaluation, 2014.
[2] The IFAD-GEF Advantage Partnering for a sustainable world, 2014. a review prepared by the IFAD Environment and Climate Division based on project documentation.
[3] Project Evaluation, 2011.
[4] The GEF-3 corresponds to the Plan for the period July 2002-June 2006.

This initiative was able to train 84 people, mostly technical staff from the assistance organization teams.

South-South and Triangular Cooperation: SSTC has increasingly been recognized as a key priority for IFAD to achieve its mandate of rural poverty reduction. In this regard, a series of exchanges took place within the framework of the project. Under IFAD's coordination, a team from the Cape Verdean programme visited Brazil and were familiarized with the work implemented by the Sertão project and a team from this latter visited Cape Verde. The project also caught the attention of the Senegalese ambassador to Brazil, who took the initiative to invite project representatives to make a presentation of their work in Senegal. The project also hosted a group of 28 leaders of farmers, peasants and indigenous organizations from seven South American countries. In August 2012, the Central Sertão region was visited by a Kenyan researcher - a partner of Embrapa Sheep and Goats, who was interested in the subject of raising these animals and recovering degraded areas.

Scaling up: Considering the achievement of the Sertão project in identifying and using innovative practices in resources management of the Caatinga biome, some results are being replicated both in its coverage area and elsewhere, building on various types of projects and state government programmes. Moreover, the project conducted a series of activities to reach a wider audience and replicate its results. These range from the creation of social organizations, such as OCS – Social Control Organization for Organic Production and Participatory Organization for Organic Compliance Assessment - OPACs, that have the potential to increase the number of households adopting organic production, to training processes involving large audiences in workshops, exchanges and learning events).[5]

Knowledge: The Sertão Project generated and implemented innovative, sustainable production practices. It also financed a range of complementary activities such as experimental learning and environmental incentives, the introduction of environmental education in schools, monitoring of environmental effects in georeferenced territories, gas emission inventories of bio-digesters and experimental treatment of wastewater for application in vegetable production.

Sustainability: Through the IFAD-GEF partnership, the Sertão Project was successful in generating sustainable production practices as a means to address and incorporate the environmental dimension into the conversations and practice of beneficiary women and men farmers. Project benefits not only led to changes in habits when dealing with natural resources, but also increased the awareness of the need to maintain them, making references to combating land degradation in the semi-arid region.

Further IFAD-GEF outcomes

The IFAD project and GEF collaborated to *improve water management* (a critical resource in the arid north-east) of some 3,466 families.[6] It contributed to improving the lives of 11,727 families through better management of natural resources. It also led to the *strengthening of local organizations, market access and poverty reduction.* Project results include improved food security, increased value of local resources, and enhanced self-esteem among households involved. The project developed markets for indigenous and organic products. It supported production initiatives that started to generate additional income because they increased diversity and productivity, but also because they promoted access to new markets.

[5] Sustainable Land Management in the Semi-Arid Sertão Project -Sertão Project, Grant Agreement GEF-FSP-002-BR, Final Evaluation.

[6] The IFAD-GEF Advantage Partnering for a sustainable world (Innovative certification process in Brazil).

Country: India

Case: Demand-driven partnership with state governments
Main sources: CSPE 2010 – CSPE 2016 – COSOP Review Report 2015 – COSOP 2018-2024 *(under development)* - India Country Programme Manager Rasha Omar, India Programme Officer, Aissa Toure

Context: IFAD has been working in India for more than 30 years. India - a federal union of twenty-nine states and seven union territories - is IFAD's largest borrower and one of its main contributors. Since 1979 IFAD has financed 28 projects through 32 loans. The national counterpart funding has been 27.4 per cent of total portfolio costs. External donor cofinancing mainly took place until the beginning of the last decade to a level of 14 per cent. The balance of funding came from national financial institutions and foundations and beneficiaries' contributions. IFAD opened its country office in New Delhi in 2001 and has an out-posted CPM since 2016. IFAD is working at the grass-roots level, targeting its activities to the poorest and most vulnerable groups in rural society, such as small-scale and marginal farmers, women, tribal communities and scheduled castes.

Comparative advantage of IFAD: In a large lower middle-income country like India, beyond IFAD's financing role there has been demand from the government for IFAD to be an active player bringing in its comparative advantage. The multidimensional intervention paradigm of the IFAD-funded portfolio (combining social capital, agriculture development, non-agriculture livelihoods, and financial services) responds well to structural poverty issues in the targeted areas. As an IFI that works exclusively in the area of agriculture and rural transformation, the Government views IFAD as a partner of choice in piloting innovations that contribute to the goal of doubling farmers' incomes, in real terms, by 2022, particularly in geographic areas where agricultural productivity is lagging and poverty incidence is higher. State governments value IFAD's cooperation due to its attention to quality, reaching deeper in poverty layers, support to innovative solutions and some tolerance for risk-taking. The North East Region Community Resource Management Project (NERCORMP) is an example. The project works with 21 tribes, each with its own language, customs and systems of land tenure and local governance. There are multiple tribes even within the domain of a single district support team. Some of the project villages are situated in pockets prone to conflicts arising from rivalries between tribes that sometimes disrupt normal life.

IFAD's culture of constructive support and attention to quality: State governments value IFAD's culture of constructive support and attention to quality. They appreciate IFAD's flexibility in responding to changing needs and adapting to emerging circumstances during the project cycle. They recognize IFAD's modus operandi: bestowing full responsibility and authority of implementation to the designated government agencies and being available to provide guidance and problem-solving support when needed. They also appreciate IFAD's emphasis on quality of implementation and not just on expanding coverage, as well as allowing flexibility for risk taking and experimentation for innovation. Positive feedback from different stakeholder groups on the process and quality of the supervision and the follow-up missions are noted. Under the Post-Tsunami project, IFAD's supervision helped partners re-designing the project. In Convergence of Agricultural Interventions in Maharashtra's Distressed District Programme (CAIM) and Mitigating Poverty in Western Rajasthan Project-MPOWER, IFAD's supervision helped shift from output-based payment system to input based system to NGO, improving their performance.

The valued IFAD culture is seen in successful projects like OTELP and NERCORMP where there is an involvement from the authorities at all levels, convinced of the validity of the projects' approaches. The two projects gathered strong functional and cooperative relationship at all levels to mobilize political and technical support for implementation. In OTELP and NERCORMP, close interaction and partnership with the District Magistrate leveraged implementation of forest and land rights for tribal poor as well as resources from Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme-MGNREGS and National Rural Livelihood Mission -NRLM for the implementation of watershed management projects.

Government promoting scaling up: The commitment and support to IFAD's mandate is also translated into high co-funding levels and scaling up efforts. IFAD-supported programmes and projects have been a starting point for larger development initiatives. Many successful models, piloted by IFAD projects, have now been scaled up by state governments and other development partners. In the case of NERCORMP, A third phase, NERCORMP III, for US$90 million covering new districts targeting 58,850 beneficiary households in

1,177 villages was launched in 2014 as a six-year project. It is funded exclusively by the Government of India (central level) to expand NERCORMP II activities to new districts. NERCORMP I model has been expanded by the Word Bank Project (North East Rural Livelihoods Project) in four new states of North Eastern India, following the Government's request. For OTELP, the Government of the state of Odisha has decided to rapidly upscale the project's activities through a new phase called OTELP+, to consolidate the achievements in OTELP target districts and extend activities to new districts and blocks. This experience underlines the importance of the government's ownership of the projects.

Convergence with government programmes: One of the Government's expectations for IFAD assistance is enhancing the effectiveness of public expenditure associated with the implementation of national- and state-level schemes through convergence. In recent years, across its portfolio, IFAD has honoured the request to facilitate convergence with national anti-poverty programmes. All projects have made concerted efforts towards convergence with national and state level government schemes to maximise the benefits to the communities. This is done by advocating with the concerned departments and educating/empowering communities to access their entitlements. Both projects, Integrated Livelihood Support Project-ILSP and Jharkhand-Chhattisgarh Tribal Development Programme-JTELP, have taken into account the substantial government funds available under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme-MGNREGS which guarantees 100 days of wage-employment annually to the rural poor and the National Rural Livelihood Mission-NRLM which focuses on savings, credit and income generation. Additionally the design of JTELP includes a significant contribution from the Special Central Assistance to the Tribal Sub-Plan-SCA to TSP. Convergence of Agricultural Interventions in Maharashtra's Distressed Districts Programme-CAIM project is also designed to use IFAD funds essentially for catalysing convergence with government programmes. The APDMP has significant convergence resources with convergence of US$42.3 million from Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme- MGNREGS and US$2.9 million from Rashtriya Krishi Vikas Yojana-RKVY and other schemes of the central and state governments to cover water conservation infrastructures and protective irrigation.

It is important to note that partnership-building with IFI and Bilateral donors has been limited and the present level of interaction is only one of information exchange and consultation during project formulations. The central government was in favour of specialized and separate financing by multilateral donors, rather than cofinancing. A point in case was the second phase of NERCORMP, initially envisaged as a cofinanced by IFAD and the World Bank but later separated in two projects, each funded by one of the two organizations. Also, in some tribal areas, IFAD has been the only international agency allowed to intervene. In the case of bilateral donors, most have dramatically reduced the size of their cooperation in India resulting in fewer cofounding opportunities. The collaboration with private actors is emerging[7]. In the case of UN agencies: there has been little substantive cooperation with UN agencies in the portfolio or non-lending spheres, (as noted in the CSPE 2016). The IFAD business model is different from other UN agencies making a unified programme more difficult to conceive and implement; No particular instrument to cement such collaboration. According to the CPM, the situation is changing as follows : (i) RBA collaboration is a high priority for all 3 agencies and human and financial resources are being allocated for this; (ii) Country grants are increasingly being used in IFAD for Technical Assistance TA and combining this with loan financing. Such TA grant is paving the way for expanding FAO Technical Assistance to the portfolio; (iii) the UN Resident Coordinator in India recognizes the diversity of business models in UN country team but is determined to develop priority programmes to achieve SDG 2030 that are articulated around the comparative advantage of each UN agency. IFAD ICO is participating in the priority programme for ending stunting which is directly contributing to SDG 2; (iv) the government now expects the RBA to work together and provide expertise/share innovations with regards SDG 2, as well as act as a vehicle to disseminate Indian expertise, innovations and achievements to the rest of the world.

[7] Convergence of Agricultural Interventions in Maharashtra's Distressed District Programme-CAIM cooperates with private sector companies.

Country: Mali

Case: Partnership at the core of Mali country programme
Main sources: CSPE 2013 – Country Strategy Note 2016 – Country Programme Manager Mali, Philippe Remy

Context: Partnerships are at the core of Mali country programme. Since the beginning of its operations in Mali in 1982, IFAD has financed 13 projects (of which five are active) at a total cost of US$488 million. The contribution of the Malian State corresponds to 16 per cent and of the cofinancing of 10 projects to 45 per cent, from development partners - including the World Bank (20 per cent), the West African Development Bank (3 per cent) and the European Commission (5 per cent). Enabling factors that are at the base of the successful partnerships include strategic framework, country presence, country programme management teams and grants financed activities.

Strategic framework identifying key and relevant partnerships: Strategic and relevant partnerships are part of the country strategic framework. For instance, the 2007 COSOP had identified partners and sub-sectors where partnerships would be particularly relevant, West African Development Bank (infrastructures), Belgium Fund for Food Security (health, primary education), World Bank (agricultural activities), United Nations Capital Development Fund and United Nations Development Programme (micro finance).

The 2016 Country Strategic Note[i] indicated that collaboration with technical and financial partners will continue to be a priority, particularly with FAO and WFP in improving the food and nutritional security of the rural poor and capitalizing on good practices. The note highlighted as well the importance of partnership with pertinent private-sector actors involved in building production infrastructure, disseminating technical packages and building stakeholder capacity such as partnering through grants with ABC Microfinance. The selection of this latter, relevant to the programme, was reinforced by its status as a private company with a social purpose, seeking to develop a structure that is both economically viable and socially oriented, and reinvesting profits in its activities.

Another guideline in Mali country programme strategy is the partnership with the Farmers 'organizations and their involvement in the projects. The country programme maintains regular relations with these organizations, enabling them to express their views on their involvement in projects/programmes supported by IFAD. Beyond this collaboration, support to their different functions (economic, advisory and advocacy) facilitates the participation of the rural poor in the definition and implementation of activities supported by IFAD on the one hand, and on the other hand, in the political dialogue and within the agricultural sectors. The involvement of Farmers 'organizations started in 1999 with FODESA[ii]. This project was conceived as a project based on the requests of the producers and co-managed by their representatives at the regional level in charge of identifying and then selecting the projects to be financed. Another two projects PAPAM[iii] and FIER[iv] operate on the same principle of closely involving producers representatives in their activities. In FIER, partnership with FOs plays a role in strengthening the capacity of youth focal point at the village level and in the sustainability of the project.

Country presence, through country programme officer and a country programme management team: Recently IFAD made a lot of progress on partnerships because of the country presence considered as key. In Mali, the programme management team includes government representatives at the central level, project teams, federations of FOs and other partners. In Rome, the programme management team includes members from the West and Central Africa and other IFAD divisions such as the Policy and Technical Advisory Division, the Financial Services Division and the Office of Partnerships and Resource Mobilization, Colleagues at FAO headquarters. The Rome subgroup is very active in the set-up of the programme and particularly during the crisis situation in March 2012, it was critical to take the option to stay in the country, implementing activities in the Northern Mali through partnerships with UN agencies and NGOs .

Partnership-building through grants financed activities: Grants contribute to engage with a wide range of partners (institutions, Union, Universities, NGOs as implementing partners). For instance, the RuralStruc grant on "Structural changes in rural economies linked to globalization" was financed by IFAD with the World Bank, CIRAD[v], and French cooperation, to better understand the changes affecting agriculture and rural areas in developing countries and to improve public policies accordingly. The results were widely disseminated and served as a basis for the design of the project FIER. The Babyloan grant with its innovative approach of creating a crowdfunding platform to collect funds for the young supported by

FIER, allowed partnerships with the private sector ABC Microfinance and a French NGO (the Rural Development Research Group-GRDR), which will be the catalyst in the partnership between the Malian community in France and the Malian rural youth. The selection of ABC as the grant recipient was reinforced by its status as a private company with a social purpose, seeking to develop a structure that is both economically viable and socially oriented, and reinvesting profits in its activities. The Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme-GAFSP through its Missing Middle Initiative-MMI initiative allocated a grant of US$2.6 million to National Coordination Agency for Farmers’ Organizations in Mali-CNOP with IFAD as the implementing institution to promote the economic integration of rural youth into poultry and fish farming and their linkage with stakeholders from the private sector.

Partnership outcomes: Partnership with the Belgian Fund for Food Security through the PIDRN resulted in a remarkable improvement in terms of health and nutrition in Mali: the programme has contributed to the improvement of the population geographical access to health structures following the construction of eight equipped Community Health Centres-CSCOMs. Moreover, there was a significant decrease in the malnutrition rate between 2008 and 2014, despite the onset of the northern crisis and its persistence. The current rate of malnutrition, 23 per cent, is below the WHO critical threshold compared to 38 per cent in 2008.

Partnership with the Global Environment Facility-GEF led to the scaling up of the Communal Climate Change Adaptation Plans-PCA[vi] within the PAPAM/ASAP[vii] components, expanding them to thirty municipalities. The development of Communal Climate Change Adaptation Plans is a new participatory approach (based on the lessons learned in the FODESA and PIDRN projects in Mali), which makes it possible to analyse the environmental vulnerabilities of municipalities and basins in order to determine adaptation measures.

Partnership with Farmers' organizations led to the establishment of a new partnership between IFAD and GAFSP: The National Coordination Agency for Farmers’ Organizations in Mali-CNOP requested specifically IFAD as the implementing institution of the GAFSP grant to promote the economic integration of rural youth into poultry and fish farming and their linkage with stakeholders from the private sector, allowing IFAD to engage with GAFSP.

Country: Philippines

Case: Knowledge partnership through IFAD Knowledge and Learning Market KLM
Main sources: CSPE 2017 - A decade of sharing and learning, IFAD Knowledge and Learning Market in the Philippines – Programme Officer Philippines, Tawfiq El-Zabri

Context: The Knowledge and Learning Market was created by IFAD as an annual, two-day, public event where IFAD project implementers, the government, CSOs, FOs, indigenous peoples, and the private sector come together to share best practices, showcase their advocacies, products and accomplishments, and engage the government in a mutually-beneficial manner to come up with policies that will benefit the country's rural poor. The platform consists of exhibits, product displays, interactive workshops, testimonies and cultural performances, financed by IFAD. ENRAP (Knowledge Networking for Rural Development in Asia-Pacific region) has also provided funding in the first three years of KLM.

IFAD's knowledge strategy: Knowledge partnership in the Philippines was anchored in the specific objectives of the KM strategy in the Philippines, guided by the Environmental and Natural Resources Accounting Project (ENRAP) grant. Funded by IFAD and implemented by IDRC (International Development Research Centre), ENRAP provided technical and financial resources that built capabilities of participating projects in knowledge sharing and facilitation. The emanating Philippines KM strategy included a component to foster partnerships for broader knowledge-sharing and learning through expanding networks. Under this component and as part of the early implementation of the IFAD Strategy for Knowledge Management, several KLM events with different focus were conducted. Those events provided the venue for policy makers, implementing government agencies and partners (NGOs, Cooperatives, Government agencies, Indigenous groups, Research institutions etc.) to exchange ideas and project learnings, as well as interact and share information with the general public and forge stronger partnership.

Expertise at the country office: The role of country office has been instrumental and crucial in facilitating knowledge management initiatives. It used its network towards convening events, promoting communication and knowledge exchange, facilitating the organization of fora and platforms where exchange can take place, and working with various partners to secure their leadership. The specific expertise in the country office was another added value. The appointment in the country office of a knowledge management officer/CPO with a clear role in knowledge and information sharing helped establish a comprehensive approach for knowledge management and provided key inputs to partnerships.

Ownership and shared responsibilities: There is shared management, as each step in the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the KLM is undertaken by a Technical Working Group (TWG) composed of representatives of IFAD, the government and NGOs. While IFAD allocates a budget for the KLM, the other stakeholders do their share. Transportation expenses of participants are borne by their respective organizations. Costs for portions of the event – lunches, dinners, fellowship nights – are "sponsored" by a specific organization. Facilitators for some of the workshops come from the participating organizations or the TWG, as well as the legwork for inviting participants, dressing up the venue, manning the registration area, and ushering the guests. With this "sharing" set-up comes ownership of the activity. "And when there is ownership, there is complete commitment without counting the cost or asking what's in it for me" (the KLM story book: *A decade of sharing and learning*). This ownership created multiple champions and helped foster replication of good practices across projects.

Impact: The KLM was crucial in creating wider public visibility for IFAD operations in the Philippines. There has been positive feedback on from all sectors, but more so among participants from local governments units (LGUs) and local communities coming from outside Manila. As expressed, the "KLM helps give recognition to communities, increases their capacity to advertise themselves, gives community leaders confidence in that they themselves can give direct testimonies of their own situations and achievements." This process, as noted by community participants, gives local communities a greater sense of ownership over their projects.

A major outcome was social networking which opened up opportunities for continuing intercommunications through email and internet.

Some participants credited the KLM as an effective tool for generating policies, aside from sharing of knowledge, noting that the presence of agencies like National Economic and Development Authority, Department of Agrarian Reform, Department of Agriculture and other relevant government agencies, alongside representatives of farmers groups and NGOs were crucial in helping to move along policy dialogs. In fact, three KLMs went beyond showcasing IFAD-supported projects and sharing of stories and best practices, as these became policy review and generation sessions. The last two KLMs (KLM-8 and 9), were in fact renamed Knowledge and Learning Market – Policy Engagement (KLM-PE), leading to some successes, like the revision in the LGU-NGO cost-sharing mechanism for rural infrastructure projects - *Declaration for IYFF*[viii] *(KLM-PE 9)*. The KLM-10 served as the Philippine IYFF platform, and as national mechanism of the Committee on World Food Security, Farmers Forum (FAFO), and Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), among others. Being an "open to the public" event, the KLM also became a way for the projects to engage the general public, not just the "public" of the project. The KLM was also seen as complementing IFAD's annual portfolio review as it became a means for the projects to discuss their accomplishments and voice out their challenges.

Country: Turkey

Case: Partnership with the Government
Main sources: CSPE 2016, PCRs SEDP & DBSDP[8] - COSOP 2006, COSOP 2016
Dina Saleh, Country Programme Manager – Sylvia Schollbrock, NEN portfolio adviser

Country context: Turkey has experienced rapid growth and development over the last decade, and is currently classified as an upper middle-income country. It has the eighteenth largest economy in the world; it is a European Union-EU accession candidate; and it is a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-OECD and the G20.

IFAD started operations in Turkey in 1982, and since then it has financed ten projects for a total of US$661.1 million; Turkey's contribution corresponds to 49 per cent of the costs, and cofinancing accounts for 22 per cent. The Government of Turkey in particular the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock and IFAD have developed a solid and strategic partnership, leading to effectiveness in improving the incomes and quality of life of the rural poor. The Fund also maintains a good working relationship with the Ministry of Development and the Under-Secretariat of Treasury, the Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs and the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency-TIKA.

Comparative advantage of IFAD and expertise: In a large upper middle-income country like Turkey, beyond IFAD's financing role, there has been demand for IFAD to be an active player in sharing its knowledge and experience as a way to provide additional value to the partnership. From Turkey's perspective, IFAD is recognized and appreciated for its rural poverty focus, technical expertise, country experience, and its potential to bring international knowledge and experience to Turkey. IFAD's added value in Turkey lies in partnering with the Government in finding new solutions to reduce regional and socio-economic disparities, as well as provide capacity-building in project design and management of rural development interventions, M&E, participatory approaches, targeting and technical solutions. IFAD is in a strong position because of its good relation with the government and focuses on rural poverty in remote rural areas where other IFIs and development partners do not work. Where needed it works in complementarities rather than in cofinancing. This is the comparative advantage the Turkish government is looking for when partnering with IFAD.

South-South and Triangular Cooperation: SSTC has increasingly been recognized as a key priority for IFAD to achieve its mandate of rural poverty reduction. The Government expressed an interest in working with IFAD to cofinance projects and provide technical assistance through SSTC, mainly through TIKA, the government agency responsible for SSTC and the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock-MFAL. A pilot initiative was undertaken in 2014 which facilitated training in Turkey for 14 participants from Sudan, Morocco, Yemen and Tunisia. The 14 participants learned from Turkish experience on issues related to water development and farmer's organizations.
MFAL views IFAD as more than a lending institution and looks to it for extending cooperation in agriculture and rural development between Turkey and other countries of interest to the Government of Turkey, particularly in Central Asia, the Balkans, North Africa and the Middle East. Turkish officials indicated that they needed internationally-accepted training to be able to work in other countries and could contribute through Turkish expertise in value chains, food safety, food processing, agricultural machinery and minimizing food losses and waste in production and consumption.

Government capacities and ownership: The Government of Turkey demonstrates a good level of ownership and commitment to the IFAD-supported portfolio at both the central and the provincial levels. It has participated actively in the design of programmes, preparation of the two country strategies (and the 2010 addendum), and has participated actively in supervision missions. It has complied with loan covenants and has provided timely counterpart funds. The Government contributes to planning exit strategies for all projects, and its continued support has been a key dimension in ensuring sustainability. In Sivas Erzincan Development Project-SEDP and Diyarbakir Batman Siirt Development Project -DBSDP, for example, the Government is providing budgetary support for post-project activities. This facilitates re-training needs, financing of local consultancies as well as the purchasing of

[8] Project Completion Report, Sivas-Erzincan Development Project, 2013.
Project Completion Report Diyarbakir, Batman & Siirt Development Project, 2015.

necessary equipment as needed. The overall policy environment has been supportive, and the Government is generally open to new ideas from IFAD.

COSOP guidance: The COSOPs identified key international partners for IFAD (such as EU, World Bank and UNDP) and note that private or public/private partnerships were required. The COSOP also pointed to promising opportunities with farmer and other representative organizations including chambers of commerce and industry and chambers of agriculture as well as Agricultural Credit Cooperatives. "Through its existing and future programmes in Turkey, and in partnership with the EU, UNDP and the World Bank, IFAD will contribute in providing its knowledge and experience in these various issues, and in engaging in policy dialogue with the Government and its partners when appropriate. IFAD can contribute to the debate on the financial sector reform to avoid distortions and promote healthy competition among providers of commercial financial service to rural areas. IFAD can also be involved in pushing for the development of the microfinance sector".[9]

Alignment in policies and objectives: The COSOPs document show alignment with national strategies and plans: all COSOP documents had clearly defined strategic directions, supported by the national strategies and plans, specifying the sectors and sub-sectors in which IFAD intended to cooperate with the Government of Turkey, and provided references to national strategies and plans in support of some or many of these choices. The country is a signatory to the Principles of Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which has been integral to its South-South Cooperation Programme. Since 2012, Turkey has been making US$200 million available annually to Least Developed Countries for technical cooperation projects and scholarships.

Knowledge: Some valuable innovations in techniques and approaches were introduced such as the introduction of natural treatment of waste water plant using constructed wetland system[10] and the use of solar energy to pump water for irrigation purpose is another innovative technology for the region that saves money.[11] These technologies have a potential of being replicated.

As noted in the CSPE 2016, there are opportunities to strengthening and diversifying IFAD partners in Turkey. However, it is important to note that IFAD has been focusing on its partnership with the government and would seek partnership with other stakeholder where needed. Moreover, Turkey does not have a significant bilateral donor presence; IFAD's partnerships with cooperating partners in Turkey are limited and the level of cofinancing mobilized from other donors has been overall weak. The COSOP 2006 highlighted that the public sector dominated the management of regional and rural development programmes and that this had been a disincentive to the emergence of national or local initiatives outside the public domain. As a result there were no foreign NGOs and few national NGOs with the required capacity to provide broad based services and collaboration with private sector only incipient.

[9] Country Strategic Opportunities Paper 2016.
[10] Project Completion Report, Sivas-Erzincan Development Project.
[11] Project Completion Report Diyarbakir, Batman & Siirt Development Project, Project Completion Report, Sivas-Erzincan Development Project.

Country: Uganda

Case: Public-private partnership
Project: Vegetable oil development Project
Implementation period: 1997-2010
Main documents: PPE VODP[12] – Brokering development (Uganda case study)[13]

Country context: Agriculture is one of the mainstays of Uganda's economy, accounting for 22 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) and engaging two-thirds of the economically active population (UBOS 2010, 2013). The idea of producing oil palm in Uganda dates back to the 1960s, with seedlings imported from West Africa in the 1970s for use in trials in three areas (including Kalangala, which produced the best results, influencing the choice of area for the Vegetable Oil Development Project (VODP) when discussions were taking place in the 1990s).

Project objectives and rational:[14] The overall goal of the Vegetable Oil Development Project (VODP) is to increase household cash income of smallholders by revitalizing and increasing domestic vegetable oil production, in partnership with the private sector. An innovative, high-profile project, VODP represents one of the first large public-private partnerships (PPP) in agribusiness for Uganda.

Alignment in policies and objectives: *Government*: The VODP is highly relevant to government policy, precisely to the Plan for Modernization of Agriculture as a source of growth and poverty reduction, and on fostering partnerships with the private sector in that process. It is also relevant to its objectives of promoting import substitution and export diversification.

IFAD: In 2005, the Fund developed a strategy for partnership with the private sector through which it would seek to forge partnerships with a range of private sector operators. VODP is the first PPP of the kind envisaged under this strategy.

Donor policies and programmes: The Government has promoted donor coordination and alignment since the early 1990s. It has encouraged the development of joint sector working groups and pooled funding mechanisms, and Uganda was the first country to see the adoption of a joint assistance strategy by several major donors (2005). IFAD contributes actively to policy dialogue within the donor working group on agriculture including that on the vegetable oil subsector.

Private sector: In the face of high income-elasticity of demand for vegetable oil and the growing prosperity of Uganda and its neighbours, investment in the subsector was bound to offer attractive returns to the private sector. Partnership with the Government that would resolve the land problem was therefore attractive. Some form of smallholder involvement was also necessary because of the large numbers of *Kibanja* tenants occupying the available private land. Support from a donor like IFAD would provide financial, institutional and technical support to such farmers, at least in the early years.

Clear responsibilities and roles – ownership - expertise and comparative advantage: The PPP in the Oil Palm Subproject is a fully integrated oil palm value chain, with forward and backward linkages addressing all chain requirements from inputs and production to marketing and processing. The parties involved are: Government of Uganda (represented by the VODP) - Bidco, the private investor and majority shareholder in Oil Palm Uganda Limited (OPUL)-Smallholder farmers, represented by the Kalangala Oil Palm Growers Trust (KOPGT)-IFAD as a broker. The arrangements between the parties are well structured, with their roles and responsibilities clearly articulated in two agreements, one between Bidco and the government and a tripartite agreement signed between the government, the KOPGT and OPUL. There is also an agreement between IFAD and the government, on financing of the loan[15].

Government: strong ownership and commitment to the project at all levels of government. Through the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF), it provided strong leadership and a conducive environment for the private sector. Despite the opposition of vested interests and adverse publicity, senior officials have played a major role in pushing the project forward, thanks to their participation in the Land Acquisition Taskforce, VODC (vegetable

[12] Project performance evaluation-Vegetable Oil Development Project.
[13] Brokering development – Enabling factor for Public-Producer Partnerships in Agricultural Value Chains (Uganda case study), IFAD & IDS, 2015.
[14] Due to the controversy surrounding the potential environmental impact of the oil palm subproject, a detailed environmental management plan was put in place and has been monitored closely. (The implementation of environmental protection measures for oil palm has been satisfactory as noted in the project evaluation).
[15] Brokering development, Uganda case study.

oil development council) and Impact Monitoring System. Government commitment to the project is also demonstrated by the fourfold increase in its financial support, from US$3.8 million to US$12 million.

The private-sector: has demonstrated strong commitment to realisation of the oil palm subproject and an extraordinary degree of patience with the Government over its negotiation of the agreement and slow pace of land acquisition. Its commitment is reflected in the size of the investment and the speed of its implementation.

IFAD: partner to the Ugandan government, has played a key brokering role from the outset, conducting a feasibility study with the World Bank and engaging in environmental impact assessments, as well as ensuring a pro-poor focus for the PPP. It also supported the government 'behind-the-scenes' when securing a private investor and during subsequent negotiations with Bidco over redesigning the project.

KOPGT: a trust, representing the interests of farmers, national and local government, local NGOs and VODP. It has developed into an effective organization that provides a range of services including FO, extension and loan administration.

The Kalangala Oil Palm Growers Association (KOPGA): formed by some farmers, it gives farmers a platform in which to discuss and formulate proposals or requests that can then be negotiated within KOPGT.

Outcomes: The PPP has been linked to positive changes in food security as a result of intercropping, improved land tenure security for participating farmers, improved transport infrastructure, good production levels of oil palm, capacity-building and new opportunities for empowerment.

List of key people met

(in alphabetical order)

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